The Semiotic Nature of Power in Social-Ecological Systems by Bozicevic, Miran (Author) et al.




A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved July 2017 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:






Anderies (2015); Anderies et al. (2016), informed by Ostrom (2005), aim to employ robust
feedback control models of social-ecological systems (SESs), to inform policy and the
design of institutions guiding resilient resource use. Cote and Nightingale (2012) note that
the main assumptions of resilience research downplay culture and social power. Addressing
the epistemic gap between positivism and interpretation (Rosenberg 2016), this dissertation
argues that power and culture indeed are of primary interest in SES research.
Human use of symbols is seen as an evolved semiotic capacity. First, representation is
argued to arise as matter achieves semiotic closure (Pattee 1969; Rocha 2001) at the onset
of natural selection. Guided by models by Kauffman (1993), the evolution of a symbolic
code in genes is examined, and thereon the origin of representations other than genetic
in evolutionary transitions (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Beach 2003). Human
symbolic interaction is proposed as one that can support its own evolutionary dynamics.
The model offered for wider dynamics in society are “flywheels,” mutually reinforcing
networks of relations. They arise as interactions in a domain of social activity intensify, e.g.
due to interplay of infrastructures, mediating built, social, and ecological affordances (An-
deries et al. 2016). Flywheels manifest as entities facilitated by the simplified interactions
(e.g. organizations) and as cycles maintaining the infrastructures (e.g. supply chains). They
manifest internal specialization as well as distributed intention, and so can favor certain
groups’ interests, and reinforce cultural blind spots to social exclusion (Mills 2007).
The perspective is applied to research of resilience in SESs, considering flywheels a
semiotic extension of feedback control. Closer attention to representations of potentially
excluded groups is justified on epistemic in addition to ethical grounds, as patterns in cul-
tural text and social relations reflect the functioning of wider social processes. Participatory
methods are suggested to aid in building capacity for institutional learning.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The main motivation for this study is the existing conceptual and practical gap in inter-
disciplinary research usually characterized as running between quantitative and qualita-
tive methods, specifically in the understanding of resilience in social-ecological systems
(SESs). While there is considerable interplay between perspectives on this topic, a division
still runs between institutional approaches that rely on modeling and economic experiments
(Ostrom 2005; Anderies et al. 2016; Anderies 2015), and case studies that examine social
differences and justice (too many to list) or analyze complex relational and textual data
from the field (e.g. reviewed in Bodin and Crona 2009).
Of possible pitfalls, Cote and Nightingale (2012) note that institutional and quantita-
tive approaches risk a lack of attention to how social power imbalances shape SESs, and
concerns of underrepresented groups in them. The potential blind spot is especially prob-
lematic as the results of this research can have direct practical effect through the guidance
they offer to international and national agencies. Indeed, providing policy advice is one of
the main stated aims of Anderies (2015); Anderies et al. (2016). While these studies men-
tion the necessity to address power inequalities as well as employ participative methods,
little is offered by the way of specifics.
The present essay offers one avenue to address this gap by taking up the issue of em-
pirical legitimation of critical and interpretive research. While there is no lack of practical
advice and experience in meaningfully treating quantitative and qualitative data side by side
(Small 2011), there is a gap in what kinds of data and methods are accepted as trustworthy
that is quite real. As Rosenberg (2016, ch. 1) presents it, one extreme seeks replicable and
quantifiable relationships that can neutrally inform policy and consider qualitative study
too subjective to be useful; the other is happy to relay and interpret study participants’ own
points of view, often eschewing systematic comparison altogether. The tack taken here is
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to argue that textual and perspectival data, while subjective, closely bear on a materially
efficacious phenomenon, social power; and to offer a framework consilient with natural
sciences to investigate it.
It makes sense to consider social power, seen generally as the ability to shape and con-
trol how other people act through one’s own social actions, as a natural phenomenon. In
addition to the fact that we are material beings and everything we do is consistent with find-
ings of natural sciences, social influences decisively shape biological features and prospects
of human populations. War deaths, for example, can be attributed to battle, hunger, and
disease, each of which can be traced to a different assortment of specific biophysical and
social causes, from bacteria to bayonets. Whatever caused the war indirectly shapes basic
material characteristics of populations, in this case by influencing death rates. While con-
nections have been indeed been made, for example, between demography and population
ecology, primary social dynamics the data reflect, such as war, while intelligible, remain
hard to analyze rigorously. There are many noticeable patterns in human action and they
interact in complex ways, and there is so far no agreement in social research on how to
systematize them or compare different perspectives. This poses the question, how, if at
all, can one characterize social power in general as a material phenomenon consilient with
natural sciences?
Addressing this question leads far afield. Since most human activity involves sym-
bolic representations, accounting for power requires addressing what kind of a natural phe-
nomenon symbols are, what is their material nature and efficacy, the topic investigated in
biosemiotics (e.g. Pattee 2007; Rocha 2001). Building on this work, it can be argued that
social power arises from self-reinforcing networks of interactions that can span many kinds
of social activity (“flywheels”), to which we can attribute emergent collective intention, if
rudimentary. These networks comprise human symbolic interactions, which, it is argued,
mediate a process of sociocultural change with evolutionary characteristics.
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Information involved in social reproduction is multilayered and still incompletely char-
acterized. We can tell it resides in persons, enculturated humans, and activities, kinds of
interactions we initiate in our surroundings. This means especially that any large scale
social processes materially shaping persons and activities (our surroundings and how we
interpret them), and group interests in position to influence these processes (explicitly or
diffusely), are implicated in power, shaping social relations and cultural representations.
A number of perspectives in social sciences are compatible with this view, for example
dialectical materialism as articulated in Harvey (1996); Cox and Nilsen (2014).
If the flywheel picture of social power is correct, patterns in individual and group rela-
tions and narratives are likely to reflect the regularities in self-reinforcing interactions that
shape it. In particular, differential access to infrastructure is likely to be a primary means of
shaping social activities. Anderies et al. (2016) address the importance of coupling between
different infrastructures; it is the coupling of differences in access, if it can be detected, that
might reflect features of robust control-like self-maintenance in SESs (Anderies 2015). For
the framework in Anderies et al. (2016) this points to two empirical directions, as well as
two general suggestions for interdisciplinary research.
First, differences in access to infrastructure are likely to drive social-ecological dynam-
ics and can in some cases be investigated directly. Second, information on social relation-
ships and a diversity of narrative accounts needs to be gathered, as they together indicate
wider dynamics (Mohr and White 2008; White 2008). Moreover, modern environments
change quickly, so attempts at practical advice in institutional design to communities as
suggested by Anderies (2015, pp. 277–278) need to attend to local capacity for redesign
and change. This points in favor of methods that are accessible to and potentially replicable
by the study participants as citizen science, such as, indeed, mapping the networks of social
relations and beliefs.
Finally, for research traditions whose coexistence is mutually epistemically uneasy the
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broad advice is simple. Find observables both claim to voice on, and focus on differences
in respective answers to Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions: how does it manifest in social
activities, how is it learned, what is its history, what else it shapes and what shapes it.
Chapter Overview The treatment proceeds in three strides covering the span from nat-
ural to social sciences from a semiotic perspective. Given the breadth, the steps are spec-
ulative and differ in depth. In some preliminary analysis is offered, others summarize the
argument and discuss related literature. First, it is argued that representational phenom-
ena arise with natural selection, with genetic code one that can be considered symbolic.
Second, material manifestations of signs are traced through evolutionary history to human
symbolic interaction, which, it is claimed, is versatile enough to underlie sociocultural
dynamics with evolutionary characteristics. Finally, possible nature of patterns in human
activity that thereon arise is discussed, along with implications for decreasing the epistemic
gap in interdisciplinary studies of SESs. Each of the steps takes up a cluster of chapters in
the document, with introductory two setting the stage, as follows.
Chapters 2 and 3 address underlying conceptual concerns and preliminary assump-
tions. A natural science of human society is best, it is argued, that assumes the least about
the society and itself as a social activity. In general, occurrences in the world are taken to be
events that interact, and with which we can interact and describe them. The way to sort out
our accounts, it is argued, is to recognize that each is contingent on context, and to initiate
conversations interlinking them with natural sciences, possibly difficult to reconcile.
Chapter 2 asks how a natural science of society can proceed by making the fewest as-
sumptions on the nature of society, and about itself as a social activity. Qualitative and
perspectival statements, it is argued, cannot be excluded without assumptions on existing
social relationships. The result is a multitude of accounts, expressed in vocabularies tied to
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specific contexts. They can engage by constructing more encompassing contexts of inter-
linked conversations, committed to eventual, if often indirect and incomplete, engagement
with physical sciences. The suggestion is guided by Longino’s (2002) sociopragmatism
and by Feynman’s (1965) analysis of research in theoretical physics.
Chapter 3 outlines the basic assumptions: phenomena in the world can be seen flexibly
as occurrences or actions that interact, their interaction another action (a given); we can
interact with and describe them (to be explained). A formal representation of a statement
about such occurrences is introduced, later used as pseudo syntax to clarify arguments
about the link between semiotics and material processes. Then, the choice of natural sci-
ences as the starting set of statements is substantiated with reference to our social actions.
Both a justification and a responsibility for sciences is claimed to ground results in terms
that ultimately lead to widely shared, if not quite culturally independent concepts and ac-
tivities, such as counting, measuring, and so on.
Chapters 4 to 6 argue that representation of information arose as a natural phe-
nomenon at the origin of life, with genes the earliest attested code that can be deemed sym-
bolic. This is done by casting the explanation of physical origins of intentional, “about,”
relationships by Deacon (2012) in partly formalized, semiotic terms, representing potential
interactions among non-living natural processes. Representation originates, it is argued,
as autocatalytic sets such as those modeled by Kauffman (1993) achieve semiotic closure
(Rocha 2001) (section 6.1 to 6.3). The account follows Deacon’s from basic physics to the
first living beings, representing material processes as proto-semiotic information transmis-
sion channels.
Chapter 4 introduces a way to represent physical relationships as information channels,
and demonstrates how doing so naturally connects with semiotics. There is no intrinsic
content in physical relationships other than change over time, but opportunities of interac-
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tion a process affords to another can be shown to exhibit some properties of signs. On two
examples, physical processes are associated with Shannon transmission channels: a can-
non shot with a continuous one, and combustion with a discrete channel. Proto-semiotic
relationships are identified formally on the discrete example.
Chapter 5 applies the proto-semiotic representation of physical relationships to aggre-
gate and emergent material processes, such as those in Deacon (2012, ch. 6–8). Implica-
tions of viewing material processes as information channels are discussed, such as assump-
tions on time scopes and the social nature of symbols used in our descriptions. This lays
grounds for the argument in the next chapter on the origin of semiosis (sign making) and
intentionality, by extending the framework to processes just preceding living beings.
Chapter 6 traces how interacting matter first organized itself into what we can recog-
nize as a symbolic representation or a message. Research in biosemiotics (Pattee 1969,
1982; Rocha 2001) posits that representations are parts of semiotically closed processes.
Symbols are recognized and used to initiate other interactions, including but not limited to
reproducing the message and molecules that interpret it; the example is the genome.
An account for the material origin of representation is given, guided by Tinbergen’s
(1963) four questions and Kauffman’s (1993, ch. 7) models of the origin of life. Kauff-
man argues natural selection sets in as autocatalytic (self-reinforcing) reaction sets become
supracritical, able to interact with almost arbitrary chemicals, due to increase in possibili-
ties for interaction. Such sets satisfy criteria for semiotic closure, thus they are (somehow)
representational. The origin of representation is traced on an example autocatalytic set
from Kauffman, cast in semiotic terms from the previous two chapters.
The representation within the living process evolves along with it. Organs and metabolic
pathways can be seen as distinct information contexts, operating on scopes appropriate to
the affordances they address, integrated into the bounded organism. Metabolic relation-
ships can approximate robust control (Csete and Doyle 2002). Further, information needs
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to pass through the bottleneck of reproduction, which favors evolution of symbols, in this
case genetic code (Pattee 1969). The three aspects of evolution of symbols in semiotic
closure: self-reinforcement, specialization, symbolic encoding, are proposed as the general
framework for appearance of representation.
Chapters 7 and 8 follow material manifestations of semiotics from genes to human
symbols. In the previous chapter, semiotically closed representations were argued to evolve
symbols in three aspects: while in an autocatalytic set one can not locate representation pre-
cisely other than tied to the living process, semiotics specialize as the population evolves,
and are eventually encoded symbolically. The three provide a framework to consider evo-
lution of semiotics other than genetic, such as evo-devo regulatory switches, cognitive con-
cepts, and human symbols. Human social interaction is argued to support evolutionary
dynamics.
Chapter 7 discusses how further representational and evolving processes may originate,
now involving living beings and their actions. This helps understand what kinds of affor-
dances an organism addresses and how, specifically what kinds of semiotic processes other
than genetic it can recognize and initiate. When and if new representations appear, it is
argued, they follow to differing degrees the three aspects of the evolution of symbols. This
assumes the least about the information carrying substrate, and suggests specific indicators
of the three aspects. The chapter ends with a heuristic argument why it is reasonable to
expect a sociocultural evolutionary process, and about the likely nature of social reproduc-
tion.
Chapter 8 analyzes evolutionary transitions (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995) for
semiotic closure, looking at proposed indicators: self-reinforcement giving rise to selective
dynamics; differentiation reflected in individuation and teleonomy; symbols appearing at
information bottlenecks. Human culture is argued to be the first appearance of an evo-
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lutionary process on a new channel, persons in social activities, or symbolic interaction.
Semiotic closure in human symbolizing has evolved as primate social learning intensified
within a diversity of ever faster interactions. The channel of reproduction is outward, with
symbols both spoken and present in the interaction, in people in their surroundings (ac-
tivity). Enculturated humans (persons) carry the representation between activities, with its
material realization not fully known. Current sociocultural evolutionary approaches (Boyd
and Richerson 2005; Henrich and Henrich 2007) model only a small part of the channel;
Garfinkel (2008) presents an attempt to characterize it more fully.
Chapters 9 to 11 finally bring the account to human society. A simple model for
wider dynamic entities on top of social interactions is offered, “flywheel,” a semiotically
closed self-reinforcing networks of activities, exhibiting a degree of distributed intention-
ality. Flywheels are hypothesized as the material and dynamic basis for social power. Ob-
servable proxies of their patterned effects are identified in relational and cultural sociology
(White 2008; Patterson 2014). Finally, implications for research of resilience of SESs are
discussed.
Chapter 9 begins with considering the semiotics of human symbolic interactions and re-
lations. It then argues that wider dynamics that take shape in cultures and societies have the
nature of semiotically closed self-reinforcing sets of social interactions, “flywheels,” and
that these are the likely immediate material manifestation of social power. Their persis-
tence over longer periods can with care be ascribed to collective intention of social groups,
ranging from emergent and diffuse to explicitly stated. Infrastructure systems, regularities
shaping action situations (Anderies et al. 2016) do indeed convey social power, from (any)
persons and groups with preferential access to the infrastructure. The dynamics structure
social relations and cultural representations over wider scopes, and so viable methods to
study them include structural similarity in social networks (Kadushin 2012), and cultural
8
content analysis (e.g. Mohr and Neely 2009; Mohr and Guerra-Pearson 2010). Specific so-
ciological and critical formulations of social power are examined (Wolf 1999; Mann 1986;
Ortner 2006; Kondo 1990; Freire 1970; Mills 2007), establishing common points with the
semiotic perspective. Finally, the criticisms of sociocultural evolution by Fracchia and
Lewontin (1999); Ingold (2007) are addressed, with the current perspective offered as a
response to their main objections.
Chapter 10 turns to consider ways to pay greater attention to power imbalances and
participation in research of SESs. Investigation of such differential access, it is suggested,
needs to be primary, treated on part with institutional design principles. The differentiation
into social groups is likely to shape sustained relations and narratives in any SES; also,
specific attention to gathering accounts of underrepresented concerns helps reduce possible
ignorance effects (e.g. Mills 2007). Potential directions for research are considered, starting
with the logistic barriers to coordinating disparate efforts in general. Then, a study of
knowledge creation by alternative food initiatives in an area is proposed and evaluated.
Finally, the need to support local institutional learning through participatory methods is
briefly noted: enabling communities to experiment with semiotic closure.
Chapter 11, finally, charts the next needed steps to advance the argument, and offers the
final suggestions for transdisciplinary research: broaden infrastructural affordances, and
ask the four questions (Tinbergen 1963).
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CHAPTER 2 BABYLON
This essay outlines a case for accounts of human society and culture that focus on sym-
bolic interaction, social relations, and power, as consistent and consilient with empirical
positivist natural sciences. Although a detailed philosophical treatment is beyond my com-
petence, articulating the foundations briefly is necessary, as the theoretical link between
natural and social sciences is established via evolution.
Currently, while they offer many valuable ideas, evolutionary approaches to social sci-
ences retain barriers to engagement with much of the rest. Arguing that some of the gaps
are bridgeable will necessitate a fresh look at the informational characteristics of evolu-
tionary processes as semiosis or sign making. Semiotics is usually seen on the opposite
side of the division between sciences and humanities; however, it would be hard to give
an empirical account of science itself if we do not somehow explain sign making, in form
of symbol use. I now briefly turn to the vexed philosophical issues, most importantly how
we can characterize human society as a natural phenomenon while acknowledging that the
study of natural phenomena, as a social activity, is a part of what we are trying to account
for, so that we need to make its social assumptions transparent at start. To navigate this,
I rely closely on the pragmatic characterization of physical sciences by Feynman (1965),
and on insights about the relation between the social and the rational by Longino (2002);
Anderson (2017).
2.1 The Material with Which We Work
What statements we make about the world make sense in light of natural science? To
address this, we need to get some sense of what we mean by natural science. This is far
from decided, a matter of heated debates among philosophers of science as well as between
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them and sociologists. I will bring up some insights from these arguments when relevant,
but will not delve into them very deeply now. Instead, I start with advice arising out of one
scientist’s understanding of his own work:
What is necessary ‘for the very existence of science’, and what the characteris-
tics of nature are, are not to be determined by pompous preconditions, they are
determined always by the material with which we work, by nature herself. We
look, and we see what we find, and we cannot say ahead of time successfully
what it is going to look like. The most reasonable possibilities often turn out
not to be the situation. (Feynman 1965, pp. 147–148)
Following this advice, to get a sense of what we mean by natural science, we need to
look at “the material with which we work” when we talk about it. This can be one of many
things. By natural science we may mean, for example, what a person or a team of people
is doing at a given moment, a course one takes in school or university, written matter that
is considered part of this subject, or the works of many people through history that manage
these written texts and formal representations.
The last meaning is the most comprehensive one. As an observable empirical phe-
nomenon, natural science is an ongoing human social activity that produces, changes, and
maintains symbolic representations tied to observation (“we look, we see what we find”).
This sense can be taken to comprise the others: the doing and learning of natural science
are its parts, particular written expressions its products.
Here we run into a few snags.
Epistemic Circle First, because natural science is a social activity, understanding what
we mean by it in its own terms already requires a social science consilient with natural
science, which is what we are trying to work toward. (For simplicity, we can call natural
science together with such consilient social study simply “science.”)
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The way out is to aim for epistemic closure. Grant that the account is necessarily
circular, so that our understanding of science needs to be responsive to the scientific study
of science as a social activity (Longino 2002), then provide a starting point for such a
natural scientific understanding of culture and society. In the remainder of this chapter,
I outline a few characteristics of science as a social activity that aim to assume as little
as possible. Heeding the warning against imposing preconditions, I err on the side of
inclusion, of assuming broad, observably evident features of a wider range social activities,
that can plausibly be argued to include both natural sciences and studies of society that
could participate in work on a consilient account. The rest of this essay approaches the
issue from the other side, aiming to demonstrate how it is possible, beginning with known
findings of natural sciences, to account for human sociality in general, and as a part of it for
those social activities that satisfy the starting assumptions. Fine tuning of what precisely
counts as science is left aside.
In doing this, I am placing the bet that the disputes between sociologists and philoso-
phers of science are eventually to be carried by sociologists. Claims anyone makes about
science are either factual, thus empirically observable and can be checked against the ac-
tual practices that produce knowledge we deem as science, or normative, thus an attempt
to legislate what science is, which also observably holds or not, as any scientist in practice
follows or disregards any specific norm. So, Feynman (1965) above caricatures the norma-
tive requirement that “the same conditions always produce the same results,” parrying that
in quantum mechanics they do not (p. 147). Admittedly, social studies of science still have
a way to go before they can take on the task of evaluating arbitrary empirical claims about
scientific practice; before then, their debates both with philosophers and with practitioners
such as Sokal and Bricmont (2003) have ways to go to clear the thickets.
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What is Informative? Second, in social study of science along with the rest of social sci-
ence, but unlike in much natural science, experiments are in general not available. Feynman
(1965) continues from the above:
If science is to progress, what we need is the ability to experiment, honesty in
reporting results – the results must be reported without somebody saying what
they would like the results to have been – ... (p. 148, emphasis added)
The way out is, in parallel to giving up strict prediction, to relax too the condition on
experiment in favor of a more general empiricism. While experimental social sciences are
thriving, there is also no shortage of other kinds of data or ways to interpret them. While
few seek predictive laws, they offer a trove of empirical observations and analyses informed
by them, claims that any natural science of society would seek to evaluate. In Feynman’s
(1965) words, we need to “make statements about the regions [of experience] that we have
not seen, or the whole business is no use” (p. 76).
We thus admit any kind of reporting on interaction with “the material with which we
work” as long it is informative, able or at least aiming to shed light onto other contexts.
The scope of this ambition can be modest: for example, an ethnographic thick description
may only aim to impart to the reader some of what they may experience should they par-
ticipate in situations very similar to those described, to provide context for evaluating other
accounts from and about the same cultural group, or the like; some such potential needs to
be present.
Voices and Values Third, in science as in any other social activity, almost everything
we say says something about society: practically every word we speak and every gesture
we make we have encountered before, learned it from someone else and adapted it for our
purposes, and many of them carry quite a history. Also, almost everything we say does
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something in society: it is told to someone with the expectation of having an effect on what
they will do later, even if we are just speaking to ourselves. This simple observation in
its extreme implications spelled out by poststructuralists such as Foucault and Derrida has
sowed a rift between interpretive and experimental approaches to social sciences, which
many (e.g. Rosenberg 2016, pp. 28–32) consider unbridgeable.
When studying abstract concepts or non-living subjects, one can set oneself apart from
the matter of study and bestow on one’s terms meanings that are clear and distinct. In
social sciences, such a tactic has proved elusive. There are many reasons for this but one is
immediately easy to see: at least some areas of social science the subject matter of study
needs to include one’s own social activities, including that of study, lest one deems oneself
exempt from study or study exempt from itself. As Anderson (2017, sec. 7) points out,
When the objects of inquiry are knowers themselves, these assumptions [of
subject/object dichotomy] rule out the possibility that knowers’ self-understandings
help constitute the ways knowers are. It therefore rules out the possibility that
some of our characteristics, such as our gender, are socially constructed. Ironi-
cally, these assumptions may lead people to make the very projective errors the
objectivity package is supposed to avoid: attributing to the essential natures of
the objects of study what are actually products of people’s contingent beliefs
and attitudes about those objects (citing Haslanger 1995).
This is a general point and it works in several ways. The first is the one primarily
meant by Anderson (2017): that one’s “findings” may be an artifact of the wider social
dynamics that make certain kinds of observation possible in the first place. In this case, the
power male observers had to dictate what women do lead them to conclude that women
were intrinsically passive (2017, sec. 7). Another is that familiarity with a theory about hu-
mans can change the understandings and actions both of the researchers and of the public
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at large. Learning rational actor theory can make students more selfish (Frank et al. 1993;
Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis 2004, box 5.2, p. 182), and small talk about one’s re-
pressed urges was likely rare before Freud became well known. The final possibility, more
abstractly, if what we study are the terms that help articulate the study, what we find out
can change these terms and thus change the study. In short, society is dense with chang-
ing information on many levels and time scopes, and the act of research or the one who
performs it are not innocent of or easily isolated from this.
For all his celebration of science as a way to not fool himself, Feynman (1998) fell
into the first trap head on, expounding on the supposed virtues of rational skepticism on
the example of arguing against a fictional woman’s suspicions that “her husband is trying
to make trouble for her” (p. 103–105). This a few years after he confessed to “Extreme
Cruelty,” “physical and mental,” in the dissolution of his messy second marriage (Gleick
1992, p. 294). Feynman was not alone in this: at the time, published papers in psychia-
try argued domestic violence gave wives “apparent masochistic gratification” (Snell et al.
1964, quoted by Time 1964).
History of science is replete with examples of the use of the mantle of scientific reason-
ing to wholly or partially deny the legitimacy or existence of someone’s viewpoint, usually
of those belonging to a social group underrepresented among the reasoners, too often to
the point of advocating actions that jeopardize another’s livelihood or life. In some cases,
e.g. in relations between the colonizers and the colonized, this was so pervasive that major
aspects and aims of positivist science are seen as intrinsically Eurocentric (de Sousa Santos
et al. 2007; Tuhiwai Smith 2012).
It does not suffice simply to call these historical cases bad science. Such judgment is
passed in retrospect; at the time it mattered, abuse had the imprint of science and com-
manded the prestige and authority accorded to it, and was typically not limited to isolated
incidents but systematic and predictable. The fact that it is now recognized as bad science
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may curtail similar excesses, but does not foreclose the question which scientific practices
today will be seen as abusive a generation down the line.
The way out is to extend Feynman’s warning against preconditions to idealized notions
of objectivity. These are always set and maintained by specific communities of practition-
ers, too easily replicate their blind spots, and can be used to forward their interests. As Mills
(2007) points out, an idealized picture of social practices in the face of blatantly observ-
able inequality is too often a mask for self-serving willful ignorance. In the interest, then,
of not fooling ourselves, we need to include self-consciously perspectival and value-laden
accounts in our conception (a) of natural science as a social phenomenon in particular, as
these views contribute to understanding the social role played by activities recognized as
natural science in the past and today, and (b) of a science of society in general, as they are
an informative way at getting at explanations not just of what we do or why, but what what
we do does (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 187, citing Foucault).
Symbolic representations, scientific or not, can be implicated in social power dynamics,
and if we are to grasp how this takes place we need to consider front line reports from
many sides; it is only to be expected they will be personal and passionate. This does
not mean, however, that all value-laden and perspectival accounts are scientific or indeed
insightful. Many are informative, and many are not; biases can be both generative and
limiting (Anderson 2017, sec. 5). One salient and largely accepted point is that value-laden
inquiry can only be epistemically fruitful if it avoids narrow circularity:
It is now generally agreed that the theory-laden character of observations does
not threaten their status as evidence for a theory, provided that the theories
presupposed in those observations do not immediately include the very the-
ory being tested by those observations. Circularity, at least of a narrow sort,
should be avoided. Similarly, the chief danger of value-laden inquiry is a kind
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of circularity of wishful thinking or dogmatism (Anderson 2004). The value-
laden character of the background assumptions linking evidence to theories
should not foreclose the possibility of discovering that one’s values are mis-
taken, because (for example) they are based on erroneous beliefs about human
potentialities and the consequences of putting certain values into practice. ...
As long as the different research programs are producing empirical successes
not produced by the others, and avoiding clear error and viciously circular or
dogmatic reasoning, there is good reason to treat the value-biases animating
them as epistemic resources, helping us discover and understand new aspects
of the world and see them in new perspectives, rather than as obstacles to the
search for truth. (Anderson 2017, sec. 6)
Remarkably, Feynman (1965) anticipates and fully endorses this view in physics:
... and finally – an important thing – the intelligence to interpret the results.
An important point about this intelligence [to interpret results] is that it should
not be sure ahead of time what must be. It can be prejudiced, and say ‘That is
very unlikely; I don’t like that’. Prejudice is different from absolute certainty.
I do not mean absolute prejudice – just bias. As long as you are only biased
it does not make any difference, because if your bias is wrong a perpetual
accumulation of experiments will perpetually annoy you until they cannot be
disregarded any longer. They can only be disregarded if you are absolutely
sure ahead of time of some precondition that science has to have. (p. 148)
So, prejudice is in, dogma is out.
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2.2 All Talk
Babylon in Babel Now, while these relaxations address one set of problems, they intro-
duce others. Simply, everyone possessed of senses and language can observe and commu-
nicate one’s perspective, one’s experience of own situation and of other social activities,
in ways that can in principle be informative. We are open to the entirety of phenomenal
world disclosure, subject to the condition that it is not circularly dogmatic. And given the
proliferation of perspectives, it is clear that even this condition cannot hold up in the form
outlined above.
One, it is badly defined, as what is a circular dogma for one person may be a fundamen-
tal starting assumption for another, and there is no fixed point of view from which we can
judge this. Two, lines of reasoning based on assumptions we would consider impervious
to being proven wrong can still yield informative insights. The case in point is Cartesian
dualism. The present essay agrees with Deacon (2012, pp. 39, 544) and Dennett (2017,
pp. 13–22) that considering mind and body as made of separate stuff is nowadays both
untenable and unproductive. Yet little would remain of science if we ignored insights that
assumed the Cartesian division or excluded speakers whose reasoning was rooted in it.
The way out is to specify more explicitly what the proliferating accounts can be taken
to refer to, and how they can engage with one another. Thus: all we say refers to some prac-
tical context, limited in scope (when, where, for whom) and manner (how) it comes about.
What we can say is unlimited, but contexts we can talk about are limited, as they arise when
we interact with the world and so are limited by our physical capacities. Through conversa-
tion, a context in its own right, we can link up different statements about a(n other) context,
and statements about different contexts intersecting in scope.
Such an approach follows Longino (2002, pp. 93–95) in recognizing that statements
are attached to contexts, and that there are subtle and not-so-subtle ways whereby different
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accounts of what is naively seen as the same phenomenon end up not easily reconcilable.
In such cases, though, the approach recommends “constructing a further or more encom-
passing context” in which different ways of making statements may establish dialogue, if
not be entirely reconciled. The resulting structure of conversations can be seen as a loos-
ening of the positivist framework by Nagel (1979): instead of boundary conditions on the
validity of physical law, specify situated contexts with the added condition “for whom”;
instead of lawlike statements, just informative ones; instead of bridge principles, conversa-
tions between contexts. This adopts what Feynman (1965, pp. 46–50) dubs the Babylonian
attitude, writ large: rather than fixing first principles from which to deduce the rest, we start
from the many things we know or think we know and look to expand connections between
them.
This is not much; it grants much ground to poststructuralists, and resembles the Tower
of Babel characterized by Rorty (1989), for whom knowledge is conversational, tied to
practical contexts, and expressed in vocabularies that may do nothing with each other.
However, it assumes that it is possible to link conversations up by reference to some stub-
bornly observable features, albeit with criteria up for discussion. The bet is, there can be
conversations that purposely aim to make visible in present practice whatever background
assumptions and historical sediments lie in the terms being used, and clear up or at least
anticipate possible misunderstandings. So, a degree of dogmatism is tolerable when prac-
ticed by some, as long as there are others engaging with the same context building bridges.
The mandate against dogmas is enacted through their distributed deconstruction.
Manifest Science Finally, note that, in including statements relevant to understanding
society in general and natural science in particular, we have given up strict experiment and
allowed in value-laden and perspectival accounts. With these relaxations, what remains
is to reestablish what it still means, if anything, that the conversations are consilient with
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natural sciences.
We cannot rely on the division between the manifest and scientific images of the world,
introduced by Sellars (1963) and taken further by Dennett (2017, pp. 61–63). Both of these
concepts are idealizations of ontologies that are shared by many people to differing extent,
and are deeply contingent on culture (manifest image, the “common core of ontology that is
shared by all normal human beings” as early as age six, p. 61) or institutions that create and
purvey it (scientific image, “something you have to learn about in school,” p. 62). As we
are trying to assume the least about how society shapes knowledge, just stamping the seal
of science on institutional knowledge will not do: it only passes the buck to explaining how
one set of social institutions, in comparison to whatever else we do, is good at producing
scientific accounts.
The way out is to invert the relationship between the manifest and scientific images,
and make the scientific image rely on the transparency of the manifest image, to the extent
parts of it indeed are common to different cultures. Thus we root physical sciences in the
study of those objects and relationships we can agree are manifestly material, if and when
we can do so, and in addition afford a detailed analysis and a thorough account, to some
negotiated standards. This removes the methodological requirements for something to be
considered physical science, and recasts it instead as a practical social achievement.
So, some contexts and relationships that we consider we can agree are physical, and
some of these are separable from us, in ways that we can replicate in practice, and as such
demonstrate and teach. Physical contexts are such that one can, with effort, eventually
replace the delineation “for whom” with instructions about when, where, and how, and so
reenact situations in them quite widely, with minimum or no background knowledge about
people who first produced them: “Don’t trust me; check it out for yourself” (Cartmill
2002). This turns out usually to be the case with processes that are informationally much
simpler than us, so they can be accounted for precisely and quite completely, to the point
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where for many practical purposes and wide ranges of conditions, “we do not know where
to look for trouble, we think everything is all right” (Feynman 1965, p. 158).
In this essay the trouble is seen to start with the study of life. While we can describe
in detail the many of its physical aspects, living matter is packed with information to the
smallest scales and its gross features and behavior cannot be predicted nearly as easily or to
the same precision (Schrödinger 1956, p. 16–17). Also, aspects of living creatures can be
described as intentional, apparently acting on purposes, which poses a range of conceptual
conundrums about causation (Dennett 1995, ch. 1; Deacon 2012, ch. 0), along with the
question “is there anyone in there?” These require evolutionary arguments to address in
terms of physical causes (chapters 6 and 7).
Evolution is one of the cranes (Dennett 1995, pp. 74–77) used to link up different
accounts to physical sciences. This means that, if we view the study of a context as a
social activity, at least some people who take part in it are committed to connecting their
world descriptions with physics on the basis of observation, directly or indirectly. There
are no skyhooks, no entities or processes that we can invoke to obtain arbitrarily complex
information. We cannot postulate a God or a separate realm for mind or culture, though in
the latter cases there can be disagreement on how tight or tenuous connections to simpler
accounts can be. Otherwise, the simplicity and clarity of context vocabularies are up to the
speaker; there can be as many “moos and goos” and they can be as vague as one wants as
long as one takes a rain check on eventually being able to prove them useless. Feynman
(1965) makes some fun of ambiguity in psychology to make a point that “you cannot prove
a vague theory wrong,” but immediately backtracks and allows room for guesswork, with
care, at the beginning of every science (pp. 158–160, 164).
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2.3 Sociopragmatism
Summing up what we have got so far. Observably, science is a social activity. As a social
activity, science is a part of interlinked conversations that create and manage symbolically
represented statements about various practical contexts of human activity. Its goal is to be
informative: what it finds out about one context, it claims, can be used in others. Alternative
accounts are judged by reference to what can be observed. Slanted accounts are fine as
long as they use the bias as a resource to come up with informative claims, and are open
to negotiating and carrying the burden of attempting to obviate it. In each conversation
there is at least a notional understanding that we are talking about the physical world,
and a commitment to connect to physical accounts via a possibly large number of other
conversations.
This picture ends up close to Longino’s (2002, pp. 207–208) “critical contextual em-
piricism” or “sociopragmatism,” of knowledge as partial, plural, and provisional, with plu-
rality as a recognition of empirical realities of inquiry rather than an a priori theoretical
commitment to pluralism (p. 95). This should not be controversial: in physics too there is
a plurality of lines of inquiry, and we do not yet know how to connect some of them very
well. In addition, in recognition that all phenomena we are considering are ultimately phys-
ical, the present essay replaces the monist stance frequent among proponents of naturalism
with the openness to establishing conversational links with natural sciences, possibly quite
indirect.
Feynman (1965), in fact, anticipated a similar picture, as the work of “all the efforts of
intellectual kinds, ... to see the connections of the hierarchies, to connect beauty to history,
to connect history to man’s psychology, man’s psychology to the working of the brain, the
brain to the neural impulse, the neural impulse to the chemistry, and so forth, up and down,
both ways” (p. 125). While many will disagree that this cloud of conversing inquiries is
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science, most conceptions of science should be contained as subsets of it. Better to err
on the side of inclusion, as “it is necessary for the very existence of science that minds
exist which do not allow that nature must satisfy some preconceived conditions” (Feynman
1965, p. 148).
Here, then, are what seem to be minimal conditions on “nature” necessary for science
to exist as a social activity. Any science assumes something of the sort, and any compre-
hensive social science can only achieve epistemic closure by accounting for them:
1. We (human beings) can perceive, interact with, reason, and issue symbolic statements
about the world.
2. Our statements about the world usually, self-consciously or not, make sense in par-
ticular contexts. Contexts are practical, associated with some social activities, and
also with vocabularies from which our statements draw their terms. Each context
possesses scopes in time, space, and society, which we may be able to discern and
delineate to differing degrees of accuracy.
These first two points are restated and partly formalized at the beginning of chapter
3.
3. With each other, we can enter into relationships that exhibit persistent features.
This includes assumptions on the institutional arrangements of science as a social
activity, as well as roles such activity plays in the larger society for good or ill. Any
value-orientation of inquiry makes reference to features of relationships. Conversely,
any orientation to inquiry that makes reference to specific relational arrangements
can, in absence of further analysis, be taken to be value-laden by default.
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4. We can engage in conversations, and change our minds as a result of them. We can
agree or agree to disagree on the terms of engagement, reenact or translate between
vocabularies of existing conversational contexts, or create new ones.
To this are added the normative commitments to consilience in general and with natu-
ralism in particular:
(a) In each context, we can conduct a study: an ongoing stream of conversations about
our statements about the context.
(b) We can attempt to address disagreement between statements whose context scopes
overlap by studying the overlap. If such statements drawn from different contexts,
we can attempt translation between context vocabularies by studying a more encom-
passing context, possibly created for the purpose.
(c) We can agree that some contexts are physical or material and we can study them. The
extent and degree of this agreement is a social achievement.
(d) We can in principle connect the study of other contexts to physical study through
conversations as in (b) above, though the ways to do so may be too indirect for us to
be able to accomplish in practice; call them bridging conversations.
Moving on, I use a simple syntax to express the fact that we make statements about
what goes on in the world. Then I rehearse how we can justify math and physical sci-
ences on practical grounds, as social activities traceable to the above assumptions (chapter
3). Having justified the needed tools, I use information theoretic concepts to elaborate a
rudimentary semiotics describing the insights of physical sciences (chapters 4 and 5).
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CHAPTER 3 ACTION
In keeping with a number of attempts to reconcile explanations of emergent phenomena
with natural sciences such as Juarrero (2002); Bickhard (2003); Deacon (2012), I am adopt-
ing the ontological orientation of process or action. This means, I take that the phenomena
under study have the nature of an event, whether change or abidance, and afford descrip-
tion by a verb, in its basic grammatical sense of an act, an occurrence, or a mode of being
(Merriam-Webster 2017, Croatian: radnja, zbivanje, stanje). The only thing I am assuming
about actions is that some can influence each other and so give rise to interactions, which
too are actions. By implication, some actions are interactions that come into being through
mutual influence of other actions.
3.1 Describing
As an observed fact that lets me proceed but that eventually needs to be explained, I take
that we can describe interaction at the most general level by sentences of form A ýC
B. Here A and B are symbolic representations, and C some practical context of action
they refer to. The sentences may be read as “B accompanies or follows A (in time, not
necessarily causally) in context or under conditions C,” or “A in interaction with (aspects
of) C is accompanied or followed by B,” or the like. More precisely,
(a) A and B each describe one or more interactions somehow associated with C (part of,
implied in, or necessary for it);
(b) if A and B tell about different times, A comes before B.
In essence, the least we need to be able to say anything is an action c from the context C,
and an interaction with it, a, affording different descriptions A and B; or in a typical case,
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two interactions a and b separated in time, a occurring first. We inherit the notions of
context, vocabulary, and description from the above argument (chapter 2), but take a rain
check on how any of them can be understood and accounted for in terms of action.
The sentence AýC B can be understood in information theoretic terms: A and B can be
seen as the source and received messages, and C as the information channel. I will expand
this intuition in more detail below. Also, the arrowý is used to denote an action mostly
because it is unusual, but specific ways to read it will crop up in time.
As discussed above, the sentences can be anything; in particular, they can be any phe-
nomenological account. For example, a thick ethnographic description D such as that pro-
pounded by Geertz (1973) can be seen as part of the sentence “I took part in context C and
observed D.” This can be parsed in several ways:
I participate and observe ýC I write D
I participate and observe C ýI write D
I take part in C ýI observe and write D
C ýI participate, observe, and write D
C ýsocial science D
The first rendition focuses on the context C as the information shaping channel, pre-
sumably affecting various participants differently. The rest do so with the research process
at varying levels of generality.
As another example, take the simple statement of linear uniform motion, xptq “ x0`vt.
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Again depending on focus it can be rendered as
x0, v, t ýlinear uniform motion x0 ` vt
x0, t ýlinear uniform motion at velocity v x0 ` vt
x0 ýlinear uniform motion at velocity v in time t x0 ` vt
v, t ýlinear uniform motion starting at x0 x0 ` vt
x0 ýlinear uniform motion in time t xptq, v “ pxptq ´ x0q {t
and so on.
In this case, the sentences can notionally be seen as describing action in the physical
sense. Action in physics has a specific use in expressing laws of motion via path integrals,
which is intrinsically interesting but does not play much of a role in this essay. It happens
to be the closest quantity to depicting what occurs in the physical world when one describes
a phenomenon with a verb or a clause. It combines duration or extent (time or distance)
with influence or change (energy or momentum), so it includes aspects of state (mass),
occurrence (distance or time), and activity (velocity or energy).
The naturalist stance taken in chapter 2 can be reformulated as an assumption that all
statements about the world ultimately refer to action in the physical sense, albeit possi-
bly very abbreviated statements about very intricate arrangements of action. What such
arrangements may be is the topic of much of this essay. First, though, I establish how
statements in physical sciences can be reconstructed from the above assumptions about so-
ciety, and represented in information theoretic terms with help of the pseudo-syntax just
introduced.
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3.2 Numbering and Measuring
Almost every person, presumably everyone who has made it this far, and almost every
human language recognizes the actions of repeating and counting, and has words for at
least the first few natural numbers and some simple shapes. We can extend the notion of
number in familiar ways to words and later symbols for different kinds of numbers, their
relationships, and other mathematical concepts.
Elementary mathematical concepts systematize manipulations with objects and some
common tools that produce reliable results. For example, we can establish the first few
hundred numbers just by counting tokens or repetitions of an action, then define the oper-
ations of addition and multiplication, and so extend the natural numbers as far as we wish.
Subtraction and division, associated with notions such as debt and partition, can get us to
zero, negative numbers, and fractions. If we augment counting with use of a straight edge
and a compass we get to geometry along with some irrational numbers, algebraic such as
square roots and transcendental such as pi.
We move from such manipulations to operations with symbols as we are confident the
two are equivalent, and in simple cases we can switch between them. Once comfortable
with symbols and abstract statements, we can work with them exclusively, and introduce
formalisms of real and complex numbers, calculus, non-Euclidean geometries, axiomatic
systems, and so on. What we find out in abstract we can still translate back into concrete
contexts that involve analogous operations.
One first makes the transition from mathematics to physical sciences via measurement.
We pick unit lengths, periods, weights, and so on, and using arithmetic and geometric
operations assign them to particular real world quantities. In their introductory lecture on
time and distance, in fact, Feynman et al. (1963) dispense entirely with trying to define
these properties and equate them with the corresponding acts of measurement:
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All we can say is that we find that a regularity of one kind fits together with
a regularity of another kind. We can just say that we base our definition of
time on the repetition of some apparently periodic event. (p. 5-2, emphasis in
original)
It would be difficult to measure the horizontal distance between two mountain
tops using only a meter stick. We have found by experience that distance can
be measured in another fashion: by triangulation. Although this means we are
really using a different definition of distance, when they can both be used they
agree with each other. Space is more or less what Euclid thought it to be, so
the two types of definitions of distance agree. (p. 5-6)
On this account, physics fundamentally involves translation, in its linguistic sense,
among actions we undertake to examine reliable relationships in the world. It translates
between different ways of identifying and measuring physical concepts, and between them
and the colloquial meanings and experiences of distance, time, and the like. Starting, then,
with these basic experiences of the physical world, such as movement, light, heat, and
others, we can devise ways of measuring them and new concepts that help us make sense of
them, then formulate hypotheses and design experiments to test them. We often get findings
that go deeply against everyday intuitions, but we justify and defend them as ultimately
accessible. In principle, if one is ready and able to shed the sweat to follow the train of an
argument, one can check it for oneself, or at least reliably fail to falsify it.
At the same time, scientific research is a complex social process. It takes time and
effort for any putative conclusion to get accepted and established, and most theories are
eventually superseded by new ones. At any moment, then, what we say we know is not
set in stone but holds FAPP, for all practical purposes and under the conditions tested and
those reasonably similar. This is quite a lot, though.
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Moving forward, I assume that the findings of mathematics and empirical sciences of
the non-living world, such as physics, chemistry, planetary sciences, and the like, can if
necessary be bootstrapped in the above ways. The specific examples I will work with are
not controversial, and in any event, a skeptic should always be able to ask for demonstra-
tion. It is to be expected if such demonstrations are to be at all accessible that they would
freely cross between the manifest and scientific images to the point where it would make
little sense to pry the two apart.
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CHAPTER 4 CHANNELS
The previous chapter has sketched out how one can view mathematics and physical sci-
ences as connected conversations about contexts of action, according to the assumptions
outlined at the end of chapter 2. In this chapter, in preparation for discussing the origin
of intentionality, I bring together a mathematical conversation, information theory, with a
phenomenological one, semiotics.
Semiotics and information theory complement each other both in their methods and in
their subject matters. Semiotics is a qualitative study of signs, phenomena that are under-
stood or experienced as representing others, and has found application in fields such as
cultural criticism and art theory. Its main focus is the nature and the meaning of signs.
The ways signs are produced and the channels they follow are considered, but take a back
seat. Information theory, on the other hand, is quantitative, used in engineering. It analyzes
statistical relationships between codes or variables at either end of communication chan-
nels. This is the sense of information we use when we talk about it in terms of bits, bytes,
and terabytes; we also call it “Shannon information” after the author who first articulated
it (Shannon and Weaver 1949, pp. 31–125). The meaning of the signs is irrelevant to the
theory, so they are represented as numbers or abstract tokens.
Making sense of the Babel of possible statements requires both semiotics and infor-
mation theory. Recall that the sentence form A ýC B can be understood with A and B
as symbolically encoded source and target messages, and C the channel. (Departing from
information theory, I use “target” instead of “receiver” as the channels I am considering are
not engineered nor necessarily involve living beings.) Semiotics helps account for what the
messages A and B are, and what vocabularies of signs are used to express them. What the
signs mean and how they came to be requires understanding how they are interpreted in the
context of action C, which is a task for information theory and natural sciences.
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In the ensuing chapters I will argue that meaningful signs as a physical phenomenon
originate along with life, with the ability of organisms to discern and react to aspects of
their environments (Dennett 2017, p. 40). Semantic information, information expressed by
the signs (p. 107) can be seen as embodied, an evolved property of non-living interactions
that comprise living beings. Signs require a point of view to interpret them, which life
provides.
In this chapter, I aim to establish how the prerequisites for semiosis can be found in the
context of fundamental physics. Reliable change effected by a physical or chemical process
can be represented as a Shannon information channel between the underlying quantities.
Particular values and ranges of these properties that can be influenced by or can affect
another process in interaction can be seen as precursors to signs. In other words, the notion
of the sign can be founded in opportunities for interaction one physical process provides
another, and formally expressed in information theoretic terms.
4.1 Interfaces
Information theory defines various measures of information with respect to two random
variables, source X and target Y . It recognizes two basic cases, the discrete and the con-
tinuous. In the discrete case X and Y are sets of symbols and we are given their individual
and joint probabilities, while in the continuous case they are real-valued variables and we
work with their probability distributions (Reza 1961, ch. 3, 8). In principle, any situation
where we can express relationships among variables and measurements as probabilities can
be treated as an information channel. In particular, we can state quantitative regularities in
physical sciences in this way directly.
For illustration, here are two examples, one continuous, the other discrete. In both
cases I give the conditional probabilities of target values given the sources. I start with the
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continuous case as it does not assume any preexisting vocabularies other than real numbers.
Continuous: Horizontal Shot For the continuous case, take a cannon firing a horizon-
tal shot at a given initial speed u “ u0 in Earth’s gravitational field with acceleration
g “ 9.8 m{s2 [figure]. After time t, the shot will move at the velocity that combines
the horizontal component u0 with the vertical speed gt it gained by falling in this period of
time. The total speed of the shot vptq, i.e. the absolute value of its velocity, is given by
vptq “
b
u20 ` pgtq2 (4.1)
Let us say we measure the speed after t “ 1 s, and we do so with accuracy σv. The









for u ě 0, v ą 0.
Qualitatively, this expression gives the speed after one second vp1 sq “ au2 ` pg ¨ 1 sq2
for varying initial speeds u with measurement error added on top [graph]. More formally,
for a given starting speed u, this is a normal distribution in v with the mean v¯ “ vp1 sq and
standard deviation σv. In information theoretic terms, the gravitational field is reformulated
as though it communicates the speed of the horizontal shot at time t “ 0 by converting it to
the speed at time t “ 1 s, with measurement error treated as noise.
Discrete: Combustion In the discrete case there are known vocabularies for both source
and target. As an example take combustion: the sources are several possible compounds
that could be burning, the targets are the products. Let the starting substances be, say,
molecular hydrogen (H2), methane (CH4), methanol (CH3OH), glucose (C6H12O6), methy-
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lamine (CH3NH2), and hydrogen sulfide (H2S). If they burn completely, they can produce
water (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), a nitrogen oxide (NOx, either NO or NO2), and sulfur
dioxide (SO2). In short,
X “ tH2,CH4,CH3OH,C6H12O6,CH3NH2,H2Su (4.3)
Y “ tH2O,CO2,NOx,SO2u (4.4)
As a somewhat contrived outcome, let the target symbol be a random molecule of the
combustion product we detect afterwards. For simplicity, assume that the starting mixture
of gasses that sustains the burn, such as air, has enough oxygen to complete combustion,
and optimistically that there is no prior amount of CO2. We could make the example more
realistic by specifying detected quantities, such as concentrations, rather than probabilities
of discrete events. This would represent the interaction as a multidimensional continuous
channel instead.
The conditional probabilities of the targets are:
PtY|Xu “
»——————————————–
1 0 0 0
2{3 1{3 0 0
2{3 1{3 0 0
1{2 1{2 0 0
5{9 2{9 2{9 0
1{2 0 0 1{2
fiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifl
(4.5)
Similarly we can express situations that enact physical relationships in general as infor-
mation channels. If needed, we can proceed to determine information theoretic quantities
such as the maximum channel capacity etc.
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Interfaces over Directives This exercise hopefully upsets to the popular mindset toward
physical relationships as laws encoded in disembodied equations. There is no question
that equations predict outcomes with very high accuracy, and are certainly less clunky than
probabilities to represent these relationships. Everything physics ever learns from or hopes
to apply to, however, are informative relationships between and within interactions such as
those sketched out above. Except when we write them down, natural “laws” are not ever
realized as equations: science describes interfaces rather than directives.
While this makes no difference in how the world behaves, it does in how we conceptual-
ize it: as orchestrated by an implacable, all knowing, quasi-legal clockwork; or proceeding,
possibly implacably, on limited information present. Physics is no stranger to the latter per-
spective: for instance, fields and field potentials are seen as local properties of space that
interact with object attributes, such as position, momentum etc., to specify how they change
from one moment to the next.
The terms “interfaces” and “directives” come from an analogous distinction in com-
puting, between object-oriented and procedural programming languages. Procedural lan-
guages represent their flow as execution of successive directives (“have A done to X”) on
data of simple types (numbers, strings) that afford relatively few basic operations; at best
data can be combined into buckets (structures). Object-oriented flow comprises interaction
among objects of complex types (classes) which encapsulate the nitty-gritty of the data
along with ways (methods) they can behave, bundling them into interfaces (“Y can do B
with Z”). The programs written in the two paradigms can behave exactly the same, allowing
for a few clock cycles either way, but their formal representations and the ways of thinking
that go into implementing them can be quite different.
Note that this and a few other analogies with computing in this chapter are not meant
to argue, as e.g. Wolfram (2002) does, that the universe is a big computer program or a
computer. Computers are systems of many interacting layers of informational relationships
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that we have engineered and largely understand, so they can serve as a toy case to help
clarify informational aspects of complex processes that arise on their own.
4.2 Semiosis
While the predictions of physical relationships are extremely accurate, they often do not
hold all that much information. The above examples take nary a few lines to describe,
are not hard to approximately enact in practice, and if we are careful doing so will not
present many surprises. If a process, while following the same physics at the micro level,
can represent and act on information about these relationships ahead of time, it can have
more information about how the action will proceed than there is in the action itself up to
the moment it is initiated. We, in fact, do this all the time. If we can account for how this
happens, how a physical process can represent and express information, we can demystify
our own intentional acts and get a sense of who or what else can perform them too.
To start putting some substance on this intuition, revisit for the moment the case of
combustion. We can represent the entire process as a matrix multiplication:










1 0 0 0
2{3 1{3 0 0
2{3 1{3 0 0
1{2 1{2 0 0
5{9 2{9 2{9 0








This simply says that a process that isolates one of the source compounds rXs and
brings them to burn or otherwise oxidize results in the ratio of products rYs as given by
36
the corresponding row of PtY|Xu. For each chemical the result is reliable: if we know
what the substance is and what is done to it, we know what we will get. Once the reaction
happens, we can sometimes say what the original compound was, but only by comparing
the differences between results. For example, we cannot tell methane from methanol at
all from these ratios. If we are limited to detecting the products one random molecule
at a time, we will have difficulty telling glucose from either methane or methanol before
we sample the vapors several times, and methylamine will look very similar too until we
perform many trials or come across a nitrogen oxide.
These relationships exhibit an elementary semiotic quality. While we are far away
indeed from arbitrary signs, the initial substance xi P X can be seen as a signifier and its
result row of ratios PtY|xiu as its referent. Physical relationships that produce the referents
thus constitute the “meaning system” instead of the abstract signifieds. Formally, for each
source character xi P X, call the single-member subset Xi “ txiu the channel-signifier or
c-signifier corresponding to xi, and the corresponding row PtY|Xiu “ PtY|xiu the channel-
referent or c-referent of Xi. Take this to mean that PtY|Xiu is the precursor to a referent
that can be ascribed to Xi as a signifier with respect to the given action context serving as
the information channel.
Anticipating e.g. de Saussure (1959, pp. 117–122), we can distinguish signifiers only
by relating and comparing their referents, i.e. we can tell the original substances apart only
if they burn into different ratios of products. This, incidentally, is one heuristic way to
read the symbol ý: whatever is on the left side gives rise to what is on the right, but
whatever shade of meaning the source can communicate can only be reconstructed from
the target. Formally, if we have a channel with discrete source and target vocabularies
X and Y , let X1 be a subset of X be such that all the rows of PtY|X1u are the same, so
PtY|xiu “ PtYu for all xi P X1. This means that X1 and Y are independent, with mutual
information IpX1; Yq “ HpYq ´ HpY|X1q “ 0. For all we know, the information we detect
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is introduced at the receiving end. If no xi P X1 at the source makes any difference to which
y j P Y we receive, given y j we cannot tell what xi we started with. Given vocabularies and
a channel, Shannon information too is a distinction that makes a difference.
The reference relationship can be established in the opposite direction as well. If we
were to enact the experiment and probe the smoke, we could use PtY|Xu to help us guess
what burned. In this direction, the combustion products can be called c-symptoms and the
possible original compounds they denote c-states (Sebeok 2001, p. 4). The exact rela-
tionships depend on the details of what we are detecting and how, and on what we know
beforehand about what might be burning, so I leave the formalization aside.
The letter “c” in front of “c-referent” etc. stands for Channel/context/conditions, or if
one wishes “cituation.” As a mnemonic, the letter will move forward through the alphabet
to indicate increasingly explicit ways the reference relationship is represented. (The first
two letters are taken by Action and Babel/Babylon/babble.)
Channel-reference is a descriptive category, portraying a reliable relationship in physi-
cal sciences. It is not represented or used in any part of the information channel, not even
potentially, as the processes that comprise the reference relationship have no capacity to do
so. In general, it can be represented externally, exposed as potentially available to other
processes, and used by them. In these examples we have represented the source and target
vocabularies ourselves.
The link between interaction opportunities and semiosis can be more easily illustrated
on the continuous example. We can represent the horizontal shot as








a distribution of values v ą 0 for each u ě 0.
The reference relationships can be established analogously in both directions, intu-
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itively for focal intervals of initial and final speeds. For initial speeds in range U “ pu1, u2q
as c-signifiers, the c-referent are the final speeds they can give rise to; conversely, the final
speeds in range V “ pv1, v2q are a c-symptom for the initial speeds as c-states that can lead
to them. Because of the probabilistic nature of the relationship, in both cases the counter-
part of the focal interval (the c-referent of U and the c-state for V) can be represented by a
fuzzy set: some values are almost definitely its members, most are quite certainly outside
it, with blurry boundary regions in between. In general, the reference relationships obtain
between fuzzy subsets on both ends.
Channel-reference provides a way to talk about the opportunities afforded and condi-
tions required for interaction with other physical processes, one abstraction step removed
from specifying focal fuzzy intervals. Suppose the cannon is a part of a Rube Goldberg
contraption we are designing. On one end, we can vary the cannonball c supplied by the
previous task, and the mass of the explosive charge m residing in the cannon, resulting in
different possible ranges of initial speeds Ucpmq. On the other end, the shot is supposed to
hit a dolly on the floor 4.9 m below (so it reaches it in 1 s) at the speed within a given range
Vd to impart just the right push to send it off to perform the next task [figure].
By itself the horizontal shot is just that, but as part of the device, a cannon charged with
the explosive of mass m provides the opportunity to the task supplying the cannonball c to
have it fired at a given speed, and to the dolly to receive the impetus to accomplish what it
needs to. The contraption works if c and m are chosen so that, from the point of view of the
cannon, the c-referents of speeds in Ucpmq are included within Vd, or from the perspective
of the dolly, the speeds in Vd are c-symptoms of initial speeds that include Ucpmq.
I am rehearsing the steps to suggest there is an explicit information theoretic basis for
moving from the exact quantitative ways we express physical processes to the qualitative
language of the intentional stance we use to talk about and understand living creatures.
The point is not to argue we can easily measure semantic information; this is of limited
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use and difficult or impossible to do, and probably will be for quite some time (Dennett
2017, pp. 122–128). Rather, I aim to make explicit the physical rather than metaphysical
nature of the epistemic cut between natural scientific descriptions by us and the semantic
information embodied in organisms. In basic physics there is no text, but an interaction of
two processes provides two different points of view from which to articulate their interface
in semiotic terms. This is still done by us; for a sign to exist, a process that can interpret it
needs to as well.
Over the next several chapters I will consider increasingly complex dynamics of in-
teraction, and outline how we can represent semantic information associated with living
processes as physically transmitted Shannon information if we keep track of what kind of a
process the communication channel is, what the source and target vocabularies or measures
are, and what or who can determine and represent them.
4.3 Process and Emergence
A few conceptual notes.
First, this information theoretic restatement of physical relationships does not claim that
all that exists is information. (I am aware that there are conceptions of physics claiming
so, and will consult them for more detail in near future.) Instead, it may simply be a
way of saying that there is such a thing as (change in) time, and information a way we
have of talking about and making sense of it. In other words, if a piece of information is
characterized as a difference (in something) that makes a difference (in something else),
then, on the one hand, the concept of information depends on and requires the existence
of change; and on the other, any change can be said to be informative because it makes a
detectable difference. Even no change over a period is informative as what changes is the
time. Physics is not information, but information requires physical change.
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Second, the fact that we can think of physical relationships as information-bearing and
need physical interactions to gain information about the universe signals a flaw in naive
arguments for determinism based on the mathematical determinism of physical equations.
Here I offer a few heuristic observations that should be helpful to keep in mind in what
follows; I am sure have already been brought up and evaluated, likely turned out either as
obvious or obviously wrong. Feynman (1965, pp. 57–58, 166–167) anticipates some of it,
and Wolpert (2008) makes a related case formally.
If we really are pawns in a majestic Laplacian clockwork with physical laws unfolding
as real-numbered functions with values at every point in continuous space, as they are often
imagined to do, it is not at all certain where such values might reside. Any detectable infor-
mation in the universe comes from interactions in spacetime. With quantum uncertainty, we
cannot approach every point in space indefinitely closely or precisely. Even if we could, we
cannot even logically obtain an uncountably infinite continuum of values, at least not using
particulate matter for interactions. Therefore, if real-valued physical laws acting on con-
tinuous spacetime corresponded to reality in detail, the information they work with would
need to be represented and the calculations carried out independently of the known uni-
verse. A Laplace’s demon is a physically impossible analog computer pulling the strings
from nowhere: a candidate for Occam’s razor if there ever was one.
It makes as much sense to conceptualize spacetime as simply very dense with an un-
known topology at very small scales, and “real” numbers a formalism with, as far as we
can tell, no realizable physical equivalent, invented to represent our intuitions of continuity
and to do away with Zeno’s paradoxes. Ongoing experiments (Chou et al. 2016) should
be able to tell if spacetime is granular, but whatever it is, our successful use of real and
complex numbers in calculation should not fool us into forgetting that actual spacetime can
most likely hold no more than finite amounts of information in finite volumes, depending
on interactions a volume can realize.
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In effect, the overall picture here adopted amounts to a version of the process ontology
by Whitehead (1929), but more reductionist. The assumption of panpsychism, intrinsic
anticipated mentality, is given up in favor of what is already unmysteriously known from
physics. Instead, mechanical determinism is avoided by viewing physical change as infor-
mational rather than law-like. Physical relationships may be seen neither as set by an absent
watchmaker, or more modernly as infinitely precise impersonal algorithms, but as imma-
nent to tiny but finite pieces of energy and spacetime, always in motion, acting on limited
information available. This is just another way of saying that their actions are reliable, sim-
ple, and reliably uncertain (Deacon 2012, pp. 167–168). Contrary to Whitehead and recent
panpsychists (e.g. Mørch 2017), there is no room for mind in basic physics, and neither
there is for representation. Quantitative regularities are intrinsic to action at these scopes
and not expressed in any terms; Rorty (1998, ch. 4) would say they exist only causally, not
representationally. Each opportunity for interaction, however, provides a perspective with
respect to which we can say a physical process makes rudimentary signs. Interacting pro-
cesses give rise to new dynamics on wider scopes which we can express using such signs;
eventually, the novel behaviors themselves represent opportunities of interaction, giving
rise to symbols and minds using the symbols. All is action all the way up and down, and
every new level of phenomena, including representation, arises from a different process
organization (Deacon 2012, p. 168).
Viewing all the interactions as interfaces flattens emergence events into transitions be-
tween physically realized dynamics in information and time. If, instead of an infinitely
precise continuous clockwork packed with data to the last uncountable point, we see the
physics of our world as consisting of fuzzy blips moving on limited information over small
but definite extents in space and time, it is much easier to allow elbow room to conceptual-
ize different levels of phenomena, such as that of chemistry and particle physics, as existing
and unfolding side by side rather than one governed by the other. Rules of chemistry can
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be reduced to particle physics, expressed in its terms, but they cannot fit into spacetime
extents relevant to the elementary particles, as they represent genuinely different semiotic
dynamics realized only in relationships among conglomerations of particles we call atoms.
Indeed, while a potential for it certainly existed, chemistry only came into being when
heavier atoms formed and matter cooled down to allow nuclei to keep electrons: at one
point atoms, molecules, and the ways they behave together were quite new. The “extra
something” to chemistry over and above particle physics, then, is the way many interact-
ing atoms handle information; chemistry is not so much determined by physics as it arises
from, or, if we wish to sound computational, is implemented in it.
In the next chapter, I apply the informational lens to discuss how various non-living
phenomena interact and constitute each other, connecting up and down spatial and temporal
scopes. Later on (chapter 6) I work through Kauffman’s (1993) analysis of the origin of
life, and demonstrate that ways living processes handle information, including the time
reversal associated with intentionality, should be as unmysterious as relationships among
non-living processes comprising each other. This then forms a basis for tracing semiotic
changes through evolutionary transitions (chapter 8, tables 8.1, 8.2).
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CHAPTER 5 AFFORDANCES, TIMES, GRADIENTS, CYCLES
Symbols as a natural phenomenon have not been around forever. We take our history to be-
gin when we started writing things down, and we know that before then we were producing
symbols all the time, speaking, although we inscribed them only indirectly. Further back,
we were capable of actively producing signs only only to a limited extent (Maynard Smith
and Harper 2003). The cells in our bodies depend on the representation in genes that has
a number of properties of a formal symbolic language (Pattee 1982, p. 171). Genetic code
has been around for much longer than human languages, but there was a time when it did
not exist either. At some point the first natural phenomena we can identify as signs needed
to appear.
Signs do not exist independently but are made and read, produced and interpreted by
natural processes capable of doing so; call them semiotic processes. To show that a phe-
nomenon is semiotic, we need to be able to demonstrate that some of its features are salient
to and informative about its occurrence in ways we can claim amount to signs. Pattee
(1969, 2007); Rocha (2001) offer a suggestion of what it would mean for a material to be
symbolic, and one of the criteria they offer is that it inform processes that in turn reproduce
it (more detail in section 6.1).
To discuss incipient semiotic phenomena before symbols, this criterion is considered on
its own. Some portion of a physical process, a material, a state, or an event, is informative
to interactions that (may) in turn reproduce it. As discussed in section 4.2, opportunities for
interaction between processes exhibit features of signs. Thus, a process is a candidate to be
seen as semiotic when it unfolds depending on whether and how some opportunities for in-
teraction are realized, while the process itself regularly produces such opportunities. Once
a natural occurrence reliably depends on and reproduces a (proto-semiotic) assortment of
potential interactions, we can say that it functions as an information channel, in which the
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source and target vocabularies consist of sign(s) that represent these ways to interact.
This is easiest to exhibit on a natural phenomenon that cycles, a few examples of which
will be presented below. The exercise, however, amounts to little more than assigning sym-
bolic labels to stages within a repetitive process, which is a long way from claiming moving
matter is capable of arbitrary symbolizing. General purpose representation originates with
life, with repeating processes that are versatile, able to interact with many features of their
environments, and reproduce, and thus eventually compete for materials. Matter first forms
signs when natural selection, in effect, condenses information from lives of many individu-
als over evolutionary history into a single organism over a lifetime, as discussed in the next
chapter.
This chapter, in preparation, considers the incipient semiotics of interaction vocabular-
ies in the non-living world. The discussion draws on and parallels Deacon’s (2012, ch. 5–
8) proposed dynamics of constraints, the basis for his argument for material efficiency of
intentionality. The following section reviews this topic. Section 5.2 introduces some exam-
ples, while the concluding section addresses underlying assumptions and epistemological
concerns of representing physical processes as information channels.
5.1 Affordances of Constraints
Deacon (2012, ch. 6) begins his discussion of intentionality as a natural phenomenon with
the notion of constraint. Per Deacon, constraints, limitations on what can be realized in
a given situation, are lacunae that possess causal efficacy. They interact and propagate,
generating new restrictions on what can happen when one goes up in dimension, and we
recognize the result as emergent dynamics. Equipped with this, Deacon charts a sequence
of emergent dynamics with respect to how constraints change and interact, culminating in
intention (chs. 7–10). This essay instead locates causal efficacy conventionally, in matter
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and energy, and argues that the novelty brought forth by emergent phenomena is indeed
where it seems to be on its face, in the organization of processes (Deacon 2012, pp. 167–
181; Kitcher 2011, p. 108). Deacon’s dynamics of constraints provides very valuable in-
sights, however, so it behooves us to attend to it and consider some of its advantages and
shortcomings.
Bound to Be Throwable Deacon (2012, p. 183) invokes C. S. Peirce’s ontological start-
ing point of tychism, complete spontaneity, in which constraints correspond to habits that,
for Peirce, underlie all regularity. A completely spontaneous universe, however, is im-
possible to realize and not easy to characterize. For example, it is not at all certain what
length or duration would be in a tychist world, as our notions of these properties depend on
non-spontaneous acts of repetition and comparison (section 3.2). Tychism is and remains a
metaphor, its value in what it helps clarify.
The actual instances of constraints Deacon (2012, e.g. p. 198) offers are restrictions on
specific interactions, which are in turn contingent on additional conditions. For example, a
cylinder restricts a gas explosion to apply pressure in only one direction, but the for gas to
ignite we need the right amount of oxygen and fuel in the air, the pressure of the mixture,
the temperature of the spark, and so on. It seems thus that the physics of constraints is first
and foremost a way to reformulate concrete interactions available in given circumstances.
Even the physical phenomenon most akin to and arguably anticipated by tychism, quantum
uncertainty, itself amounts to a restriction on what can happen in a given context rather than
to an unrestricted possibility.
If, however, constraints are just a way to reframe what actually goes on, it is not certain
at all that Deacon’s dynamics avoid reductionism, which is one of the main gains he claims
from the approach. The reasoning goes approximately as follows. What is present at any
moment in matter and energy can be decomposed and accounted for in terms of physical
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laws without residue. Suppressed possibilities, what could be but is being hindered from
taking place, are not a part of this material account. Thus, constraints are “not ... reducible,
because there are no components to what is absent” Deacon (2012, p. 204).
On the other hand, Deacon (2012, pp. 194–195) also notes that constraints apply to
natural processes so they can be expressed explicitly in terms of physical properties. This
means, though, that constraints and their interactions are reducible to physics: simple ones
can just be written down, while their combinations can in principle be analyzed and de-
composed.
Here is how Deacon envisages causality arising from interacting constraints:
To illustrate, consider this list of negative attributes of two distinct objects:
neither fits through the hole in a doughnut; neither floats on water; neither
dissolves in water; neither moves itself spontaneously; neither lets light pass
through it; neither melts ice when placed in contact with it; neither can be
penetrated by a toothpick; and neither makes an impression when placed on a
wet clay surface. Now, ask yourself, could a child throw both? Most likely.
They don’t have to exhibit these causal incapacities for the same reasons, but
because of what they don’t do, there are also things that both can likely do or
can have done to them. (p. 190)
We can immediately see that characterizing these properties in negative terms is partly
contrived. Instead of saying what neither of the objects can do, we can say that both of
them, for example, are at least as big as a golf ball, sink in water, remain whole in water,
stay still when undisturbed, and so on. Whether we talk about these conditions as enabling
or limiting does not make a difference to the objects or to the child throwing them; neither
should it make a difference to us. Thus there is no necessary causal link from the fact that
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these properties can be seen as restrictive to what we can do with the objects: in the final
sentence, “because” denotes correlation rather than causation.
These attributes can be thought of as fuzzy ranges of physical quantities, and indeed
they mostly involve uncomplicatedly material features: size, density, composition, speed,
and so on. The physical requirements for the composite quality they enable, throwable by
a child, could be specified in similar detail, for example by a blueprint for a robotic arm;
but the intentional description is simpler and more informative about what else we can do
with the object in a social context. This, indeed, points to what needs to be explained: how
complex intentional properties (throwable) arise from the simpler ones they entail or are
entailed by (size, density, etc.), and what they tell us in addition to them.
Thus no matter how we represent the attributes, what we communicate by them are
relationships, conditional or mutual information, between different ways of interacting with
an object. We say that for a child to be able to throw something, it helps if the object sinks
in water and stays still when undisturbed. Instead of constraints, then, the conditions can
be seen as precursors to affordances.
Properly the term affordance applies to the perspective of a living being, and in this
example the focal action does involve one, a child throwing an object. In general, we can
extend the notion to the perspective of a process: what can events in an action context C
interact with and how? Take, say, the above example of a horizontal shot as part of the
Rube Goldberg device (section 4.2). A certain range of masses of the cannonball and the
explosive charge will result in the shot traveling at just the right speed to hit the dolly
waiting for it. From the perspective of the dolly there are three kinds of horizontal shots:
those that hit at the desired speed, those that hit at other speeds, and those that miss. These
three possibilities thus represent what is salient about the cannon shot at the level of the
device.
Whether conceptualized as constraints, affordances, or ranges of physical quantities,
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these attributes correspond to opportunities for interaction. They are not causal in their
own right but serve as building blocks, mediating and organizing the interplay of material
causality to give rise to broader phenomena. As argued in section 4.2, opportunities for
interaction also have semiotic characteristics, so they figure in defining and moving be-
tween vocabularies in different contexts. In this example, the contexts are those of physical
measurements on the one hand, and of the contraption on the other.
Layers of Efficacy In studying relationships between parts and wholes, Deacon (2012,
p. 166) adopts the guideline that there should be no double counting of causal influences.
This leads him to address the arguments, notably by Kim (1993), that because we can
reduce emergent phenomena to underlying physics, higher level concepts such as intention
are redundant heuristics, colloquial shortcuts for what really goes on: “merely a description
of some relationships between components ... inevitably a simplification and an abstraction
... a comparative assessment or idealization ... physically epiphenomenal” (p. 179). Thus,
for Deacon, simply establishing domains of interaction and devising appropriate languages
for them is insufficient, because they do not guarantee that what we describe is causally
efficacious. On the other hand, Deacon claims (pp. 203–204), constraints ensure that the
account is causal, as they are absent from reductionist explanations yet supposedly actively
shape what goes on.
As just argued, it is an open question what substantively new is added to an account
of a phenomenon by casting it explicitly in terms of restrictions, and whether doing so
avoids reductionism. By questioning the special role of constraints we also give them up as
possible carriers of causation. Deacon invokes causality without defining it and we cannot
treat it here at length. Typically, a causal relationship implies an asymmetric dependency
between two events, the effect somehow contingent on the cause (e.g. Rosenberg 2016,
pp. 13–14, 59–61); causal explanations are seen as preferable to “mere” descriptions to
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the extent they are more likely to refer to what reliably takes place regardless of us. In
this essay, the notion is interpreted in light of the assumption that all that is knowable is
material action. A causal account can thus be seen as a plausible explanation, an answer to
the question “why?”, that describes material efficacy, ways the world is affected by physical
interaction. (Also, causation is easily misunderstood and best invoked sparingly; “efficacy”
is here preferred.)
Causal explanations are taken to be accounts of physical efficacy in some domain of in-
terest. This accords with the response Kim (1993, ch. 14) offers to the criticism that coarser
descriptions are merely epiphenomenal. The targets of Kim’s discussion are several articu-
lations of nonreductive materialism, the claim that, while the mental is supervenient (fully
dependent) on the physical, it is not nomologically reducible. Nonreductivism holds, in
other words, that even though the mind is fully physical, there are mental properties and
entities that cannot be reduced to the physical realm in terms of strict bridging laws and
definitions such as in Nagel (1979, ch. 11). Against this, Kim argues convincingly that
either the mental is not fully dependent on the physical, or that mental processes can in fact
be reduced to physical ones. As an alternative, he offers the possibility of “supervenient
causal relations”: that macroscopic processes are causal in virtue of being supervenient on
microscopic physical causes. The sentence “[h]eating the water [in a kettle] caused it to
boil” is just as causal as the respective statement about movements of H2O molecules, as
they both describe physical efficacy (Kim 1993, pp. 282–283), one in terms more infor-
mative for the kitchen and the other for the lab. We do have the benefit of understanding
quite closely how “heat,” “water,” and “boil” are physically realized, but this not crucial for
the present argument. Kim adds that such an answer is not likely to satisfy nonreductivists
because it logically implies that macroscopic terms are nomologically reducible (ch. 4).
However, Kim (1993, pp. 68–78) also demonstrates that nomological reduction, while
logically entailed by supervenience, is not easy to achieve, as bridging laws and definitions
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may involve an infinite number of statements. This agrees with the empirical observation
by Longino (2002, pp. 93–94) that although there is one world under study, each scientific
theory defines its own conditions of truth and falsity that are always different and often
incompatible, even while leading to useful and informative findings. Kitcher (2011, p. 108)
argues on the example of meiotic division that mapping explanatory levels one to another
is anything but straightforward. While one can account for every atom, one cannot easily
express the principles of classical genetics from molecular biology, as the language of
molecules has no easy way to discern which entities are genes or what events count as
meiosis, let alone derive the fact that genes on different chromosomes assort independently
during division.
Given these limitations, it is prudent to give up the quest for a description somehow
more real than others past what we can demonstrate empirically, and accept that multiple
informative causal explanations may be given for the same phenomenon. A slip of the
pen by Deacon (2012, p. 165, emphasis added) suggests this is quite alright: “[i]t’s all just
quarks and gluons—or pick your favorite ultimate smallest unit—and everything else is
just descriptive simplification.” This in effect suggests that what counts as causal and what
as a mere description may well be in the eye of the beholder.
Science offers many fundamental accounts. At various points in history different the-
ories counted as basic, and at any one time there are always many equivalent or closely
related explanations. In fact, physical relationships lend themselves to multiple concep-
tually disparate mathematical interpretations, and practicing physicists keep track of them
because each is informative in its own way (Feynman 1965, pp. 50–55, 168). The require-
ment that instead one set of relationships be taken as ultimate and smallest runs counter
to our experience of how scientific descriptions actually relate to the material world, and
thus needs to be treated with skepticism. As Rorty (1998, p. 57) pointed out, philosophy
is cultural politics, a set of suggestions of what perspectives we should try. In this case
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the recommendation is to privilege one explanation, “pick your favorite” as long as it can
be argued to be fundamental and is only one. One should feel free to refuse this advice as
unrealistic.
Bringing in multiple informative accounts naturally includes perspectives away from
physics, as discussed in section 4.3. Once explanations are taken to describe events or pro-
cesses, “framing emergence in dynamical terms does not necessarily favor either bottom-up
or top-down priority of causal influence” (Deacon 2012, p. 180). Wider phenomena, while
compatible with and arising from more basic dynamics, are expressed in their own terms,
so events at different levels can be seen to proceed in parallel without contradiction, their
descriptions causal in virtue of describing material interactions in their own context. Put
simply, more is different; at wider scopes there are qualitatively new properties and dynam-
ics, requiring new theoretical languages over and above the ones we consider fundamental.
An analogy from computing is here apt: computers are organized as multiple levels of
virtual machines, one implemented in another, each operating with concepts suited to its
task, whether it is basic digital logic, or the operating system, or applications programming
(Tanenbaum and Austin 2013, pp. 2–7). Unlike in computing, science constructs theoretical
vocabularies by, in effect, reverse engineering reliable naturally occurring relationships.
Guided by our own decisions of what is interesting to study, the languages we come up
with are often inconsistent with each other, transitions between them tenuous (Longino
2002, pp. 93–95). In physics our job is easier because the relationships lend themselves to
mathematical representation, and because different kinds of phenomena are segregated by
large differences in dimension (Anderson 1972; Deacon 2012, pp. 200–201). In general,
the connections between levels are more complex.
As Deacon (2012, p. 166) accepts that there should be no double counting of causal
influences, he finds it necessary to posit constraints as an entirely new avenue of causality
so as to argue that emergent dynamics are both novel and causally efficacious. This essay
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instead accepts the suggestion by Kim (1993, pp. 282–283) that more complex phenomena
be seen as causally efficacious in virtue of being reducible to and dependent on physics.
New domains of interaction give rise to new explanatory levels, yielding information about
what matter can do that it cannot under other circumstances. Explicit nomological reduc-
tion between different domains of interaction is usually difficult to accomplish so it is not
generally available in practice, but what we can realize instead are bridging conversations
suggested by Longino (2002, p. 94).
Put another way, the difference between which explanation is causal and which one
“merely” a description is not decided by establishing one or the other account as funda-
mental. What is at issue instead is that an account is consilient: that we can plausibly claim
that statements formed in a given vocabulary are informative about a realm of material
interactions, and establish bridging conversations with other relevant domains of study.
Thus, accounting for intentionality in the next chapter will involve demonstrating a
basis for it in ways moving matter can organize. This is done, to paraphrase Kant, by
keeping track of natural phenomena as communication among materials (Deacon 2012,
p. 302). For now the phrase is just a metaphor, although it suggests we may fruitfully
employ concepts from information theory in the explanation as begun in chapter 4. The
next section extends the approach and applies it to several examples, while the last one
considers in more detail the implications of doing so.
5.2 Before Signs
Chapter 3 introduced the sentence form for describing action in context, A ýC B, and
the previous chapter showed on two examples that interpreting such sentences as about
information channels reveals semiotic features, in form of opportunities for interaction on
both ends. To put the two together, knowable natural phenomena can be represented as
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events of information transmission that can be described by sentences of form A ýC B.
C, the action context, reflects conditions that circumscribe events. Interactions within the
context are represented by vocabularies of terms that express messages A and B. Contexts
C are thought of as information channels, configurations of material action seen (by us)
as communicating by “sending” a source message A describing one interaction in C, and
“receiving” the target message B describing the same or another interaction, occurring at
the same time or later. As argued in section 4.2, reciprocal relationships between ranges
of outcomes that mediate interactions have proto-semiotic properties. We can treat these
ranges as signs and use them as terms in vocabularies that express A and B.
We now briefly turn to characterize transitions between domains of material efficacy
before the origin of life. If we take the above model and the discussion in the previous
chapter as a basis, we assume we can represent known physical relationships as proto-
semiotic information channels, representing interactions available under given conditions.
We will briefly characterize the nature of the conditions, when the relationships hold; and
of the vocabulary, what kinds of interactions are available and how diverse they are.
Starting with the very small, we can say from what we know at present that a basic
vocabulary can comprise the standard model of particles and their interactions. Some par-
ticles combine, which opens up new possibilities for interaction and new contexts. There
are 17 elementary particles we know of; only three of those form most matter at moderate
energies and temperatures (neutrons and protons are composed of up and down quarks, plus
electrons); but they in turn form 90+ elements; a few of which can in principle form arbi-
trarily complex structures. In case of molecules, the number of possible composites grows
too large to ever be realized, requiring the right conditions: temperature, materials, energy
sources, and so on. As shown in the example of combustion (section 4.1), vocabularies
in contexts involving chemicals and particles are to an extent discrete, as they represent
localized, distinct bundles of affordances.
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On the other hand, moving to aggregate states of matter e.g. in solid state physics or
thermodynamics, the difference in dimension is so large that all information about individ-
ual particles is lost (Anderson 1972; Deacon 2012, ch. 5–7). Overall statistical properties
are reflected in the opportunities for interaction on wider scopes. The relationships be-
tween micro- and macro- processes can be stable or animated through energy input. As
they aggregate over many interactions, they are usually continuous.
Deacon (2012, ch. 7) discusses how, as a fluid in a compartment is heated on one side,
the energy is first conducted uniformly; the entropy (variation) of molecules on the micro
level is reduced reflecting a macroscopic influence. Deacon examines the relationship as
interacting constraints across scales, introducing new terms to distinguish processes that
unfold spontaneously and those that require energy expenditure elsewhere. For our pur-
poses, the salient fact is that, despite many orders of magnitude of particles in the heated
compartment, the informational relationship between the micro and the macro is very sim-
ple.
It does not stay so if we turn up the heat. Not all the energy can be absorbed into the
movement of molecules, and it gets expended as large swaths of the substance start mov-
ing. The liquid starts convecting, forming macroscopic cells of circulation. Bénard cells,
weather patterns, stars, formations such as stone circles (Dennett 2017, pp. 44–45) and
snowflakes, dubbed by (Deacon 2012, ch. 8) morphodynamic, are dissipative structures,
requiring a steady expenditure of energy to sustain, or at some point during their forma-
tion. Dissipative processes require energy gradients, which form in environments subject
to regular change, such as due to planetary cycles.
From the present perspective we consider dissipative and cycling processes together as
one step toward semiosis. Repeating processes such as day and night structure time scopes,
and drive energy fluctuations that helps interactions diversify over multiple extents, from
climate patterns to chemical reactions. Put another way, if we know enough, states within
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cycles are informational about their own reappearance. Eclipses can be predicted with
a finite number of calculations, and geysers can be modeled (O’Hara and Esawi 2013).
What such disparate processes share is bringing about a specific set of opportunities for
interaction at (semi-)regular intervals, and they do so over multiple scopes.
A repeating opportunity for interaction in a cycling process means we know that it will
appear next time. If it has several possible outcomes, this does not necessarily mean we
know how it will appear. In other words, if the interaction is Pi and the way it is realized
is xpPiq, discrete or continuous, the value of xpP1q at one appearance may not be related to
xpP2q next time. The notional text xpP1q that describes how an interaction took place is not
informational about similar future content xpP2q, and so the content cannot be considered
a repeating phenomenon of the same kind as is the physical cycle. In general, in other
words, these processes lack memory. The Old Faithful geyser “remembers” insofar that
short eruptions are followed by short heating periods, but the pattern is not reported to
persist.
Cycling processes on planetary scales do, however, help create environments where po-
tential interactions are diverse enough so that processes reproducing their choice of path-
ways are possible (Dennett 2017, pp. 44–48). (King 1982) argues that in a network of
chemical reactions sustained by an energy inflow, that recycle their materials, reproducing
autocatalytic reaction networks can originate spontaneously. These are seen as the first
kind of reaction that undergoes natural selection, and so the first (section 6.2).
5.3 Communication among Materials
Representing physical interactions as proto-semiotic information events presented above
adds only a thin layer of abstraction on top of natural sciences: information channels for
action contexts where we expect certain kinds of phenomena, signs and syntax for oppor-
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tunities for interaction. The constraint-centered account by Deacon is rearranged but still
holds up well. Deacon (2012, p. 318) notes that “information is ultimately constituted
by preserved constraints;” here we invert the order, viewing informational relationships as
fundamental and constraint as one way to express them. To do their explanatory work in
propagating restrictions constraints need to interact; we view this directly as processes re-
acting and combining to give rise to collective dynamics with new kinds of interactions,
requiring new vocabularies. Constraints still play a central role, as the boundary conditions
for when a vocabulary is relevant, as well as the ranges of physical quantities that mediate
interaction, now assigned to proto-signs.
Times Calling a set of circumstances an action context and treating it as an information
channel makes several assumptions about the time dynamics in what is being described.
(Time periods come up often from now on and are marked by the hourglass¥.)
If the substance of what we say about events in an action context C is to be of any conse-
quence, some aspect of the conditions that bring the occurrences about, even if tangentially
related, needs to recur in whole or in part. For the sentence A ýC B to be informative,
on the one hand, we need to have grounds for understanding it, which means we have en-
countered some of its aspects already; on the other hand, if what we learn is to make any
difference, we anticipate facing some of its features again. In particular, repeating events
are assumed in the mathematical formulation of Shannon information. Channels are spec-
ified by mutual probabilities of random variables, which represent or are drawn from a
stream of repeated or related interactions.
In general, A ýC B can refer to any correlation or pattern in physical properties of
spacetime, with C detailing when, where, and how it obtains. Any statistically signifi-
cant relationship reflects mutual information, established through repeated measurements.
For example, two random variables with Pearson correlation ρ, |ρ| ‰ 1 carry at least
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I “ ´1{2 lnp1 ´ ρ2q bits of mutual information (Reza 1961, p. 283). Reliable relation-
ships in physical sciences can be represented as channels, representing interfaces between
measurements (chapter 4).
The sentence A ýC B is a statement about differentiation in time scales: whatever
the conditions for C, we can say that they obtain as long and usually longer than the flow
of interactions we are observing, which in turn lasts as long or longer than any particular
incidence. Formally, the least we need to occur to say A ýC B is one action, c from
context C, and one interaction with it, a described by both A and B, though typically there
are two interactions at different times, a before b (chapter 3). Actions are taken to be of
finite extent in time and space, possibly very small but not non-dimensional or infinitesimal.
Thus the sentence implies three time scales: of¥ durations of a and b described by A and B,
of¥ a and b together with times between them, and of¥ conditions giving rise to C.
For example, the firing and the impact of the horizontal shot (chapter 4) are nearly
instantaneous, its flight takes time, and the cannon can presumably fire again afterwards in
clement conditions: in Earth’s gravity field, if the neighbors do not complain, and so on.
Longer phenomena may be treated as actions in another situation: the cannonball flight is
a component of the Rube Goldberg contraption.
The durations of action, of time between interactions, and of channel conditions reflect
whatever relationships we choose to represent in the channel. I will argue later on that
living beings can be seen as naturally enacting complex information channels. In organ-
isms, the three time scales are reflected in three explanatory stances: physical causation,
development, and evolutionary history (section 6.3 below, Tinbergen 1963).
Setting the boundaries for the circumstances we want to examine, or for any phe-
nomenon we wish to describe, is often an inexact exercise. Our knowledge is limited, and
conditions can change or be affected by external events. With respect to Circumstances’
recurrence or comparability in time, and continuing the alphabet game, we can distinguish
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Disturbances, occasions that affect the context quite significantly or put an end to it, trans-
forming or voiding the applicable vocabulary; and Events, all occasions that somehow
register in the action context, some of which we choose to represent by vocabularies. Both
can be thought of as probability distributions of occurrences in space and time, possibly
unknown.
Words We take that action in the world can in general be described by sentences of form
AýC B (chapter 3), which can be seen as akin to information transmissions in channel C.
If so, signs that comprise the messages A and B need to be some from somewhere. As
discussed in section 4.2 and again above, opportunities for interaction between physical
processes have semiotic features, so we can represent them with (continuous variables or)
vocabularies of terms. As A ýC B can, in principle, be any sentence, this leads us to ask
whether any concept we use can be tied to some, possibly complex, range of opportunities
for material interaction. According to this view, messages A and B would reflect potential
interactions inside the focal context C, and between C and other contexts, at some semiotic
level: of the entire sentence, words and syntax, or individual letters.
The present argument expands on Deacon’s (2012) reasoning to suggest that this can,
in part, be done, if we recognize that one reliable physical manifestation of our concepts
are the social activities we learn and use them. Messages A and B can indeed refer to any
concepts we use, as long as C is a moving target, a range of social activities in which or
about which, to our knowledge, the terms that comprise A and B make sense. Consequently,
our terms remain fuzzy: they need to be learned and mean different things to different
people, and any settled meanings are achieved in ongoing interactions through education,
negotiation, and use. There are social practices we have initiated, such as sciences, which
construct and use concepts that articulate more explicitly their relationship to the world.
However, ultimately, no matter if it is a word in everyday language or has a technical
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definition, any term is tied socially and historically to communities of practice within which
it has meaning.
I now lay out in more detail why tracing arbitrary concepts to opportunities for material
interactions leads to society and culture. Consider first the cannon shot example. When
stringing up components into a larger contraption, one action context provides a proto-
affordance to another; the cannonball imparts a given momentum to a dolly. Opportunities
for interaction can be represented, in simpler cases, by overlapping intervals of (i.e. con-
straints upon) physical variables that mediate the relationship. In this case the terms are
not intrinsic to the processes but imposed externally, by a human with designs on what the
entire device should accomplish. These ranges can be seen as precursors to referents, signs
in the target vocabulary for one channel (the cannon), or proto-symptoms in the source vo-
cabulary for the other context (the dolly). Each such lump term, represented at simplest as
an interval, probability function, or a fuzzy set, can be treated as a category, and depends
on the properties of the two processes.
This poses the question whether and how any category or concept we use could in prin-
ciple be traced to some material interactions, potential or actual. Deacon (2012, ch. 6), re-
sponding to the metaphysical debate between nominalism and realism, indicates that it can.
Ontological realism, dating back to Plato, holds that all concepts we come up with are ac-
tual entities, although they may exist in a physically inaccessible realm. Nominalism on
the other hand claims that words are just sounds fallible people make up, referring to any-
thing out there partly or wholly by chance. For Deacon (p. 189) responds to the dilemma
by recognizing that the mental is also material. A property needs to exist as some kind of
patterning in the brain, a Peircean habit of mind, for one to assess whether another pat-
tern in the phenomenal world fits the description. The concepts we use exist, at least, as a
relationship between our neural firings and patterns in the rest of the world (p. 202).
Any realized interface between our neurons and the world is bound to be sociocultural;
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Deacon (1997) elsewhere discusses at length the social underpinnings of our terms, but
does not pursue this fact in his ontology. However our concepts may be stored in our
synapses, the only way the mental can make any difference to the materially observable
is by influencing what we do, and what what we do does. Our concepts are performed
in our actions, which in most cases involve other people immediately, and if not typically
include some expectation of what others will do. Also, each of our terms passes through a
sociocultural filter in which it is dissolved and rebuilt. What we understand a word to mean
is largely learned from others; it can change, if a little, any time it informs our and others’
actions and experiences.
Take the example by Dennett (2017, pp. 122–123): Daniel walks into a room and yells
“Put on the kettle!” One person infers he wants tea, the other that he probably lives in
the house, the third is Hungarian and only understands an English-sounding phrase has
been shouted, the last one knows the speaker has a nefarious purpose. Linguists distin-
guish among propositions expressed (“put on the kettle”), justified (“the speaker speaks
English”), and implicated (all others; pp. 123–124).
If the words we use are viewed as information transmissions, the channels that carry
them contain all characteristics of the context that may affect how the messages are un-
derstood. Many of these are social and cultural. People abridge, interpret, and creatively
improvise on what they hear; there is no such thing as simple one-way transmission and
no firm line between senders and receivers, though the social occasion may be managed so
as to approximate it. The linguistic categories of propositions thus refer to the properties
of the activity as the channel wherein the message is interpreted: expressed meanings rely
on a listener understanding the literal meanings in the language, implicated ones on what
she knows or guesses about the social context, and so on. We need social information to
surmise the meaning an utterance has for each person in the room.
Perhaps anticlimactically, all this tells us is that the meaning of any word relates to,
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though does not necessarily amount to, a regularity in what some people may do. The
observation does not seem to say much and appears prone to infinite regress, explaining
a concept with more terms about the social occasion, which need more terms to explain
them, and so on. What it does is pass some off the load off an ontological inquiry into
concepts to an empirical one about society. We can flesh out, to the extent possible, how
we understand a term with observations of how it is learned and used. When Deacon
(2012, pp. 187–189) asks, for instance, what we mean by a spiral, what it is that galaxies,
hurricanes, and vortices have in common, we can answer that at the very least they together
provide affordances to mathematicians to model them as spirals. We can ask next, what do
exactly the mathematicians do when they model spirals?
Conversations Describing who mathematicians are, what they do when they study spi-
rals, what kinds of patterns they look for, and so on, involves adopting new vocabularies,
presumably ones relevant to the topic and shared with desired interlocutors. This appears to
pass the load yet further, the infinite regress of concepts turning into one of conversations.
However, for every concept, the buck stops at some store of shared notions and practices.
While the folk ontology of the manifest image by Sellars (1963) is culturally naive, the
point taken is that any conversation requires common concepts, which have to come from
somewhere. Rather than from what is manifest, however, terms can more modestly be
drawn from social activities where they make sense. The basic implications, as I discuss
next, are that our concepts are fuzzy and negotiated; we can maintain conversations relating
them to what we argue is material and observable, but assigning terms to anything real may
be a fool’s errand.
Shared meanings within a culture (can be seen to) express messy clusters of oppor-
tunities for interaction, imperfectly negotiated common affordances: they imply answers
to questions such as what we can or cannot do with X, or what we think X does or not
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regardless of us. We differ in our answers to these questions; mapping opportunities for in-
teraction onto words and vice versa is uncertain, and it is neither usual, possible, nor always
desirable that the correspondence be clear and distinct. The example Dennett often invokes
are day and night: usually we can tell when it is one or the other, but there are times when
different people would disagree or be unsure. Setting a sharp boundary is never completely
satisfactory and always partly arbitrary. It is also potentially political, as it typically prefers
someone’s views and leaves another’s out.
Clarifying our concepts, if desired, is thus inevitably a social and cultural enterprise,
and the Babel of perspectives and politics cannot be avoided. Presently, we seek to navigate
the accounts with respect to how informative they are about observable phenomena, and so
we employ Feynman’s Babylonian approach (see chapter 2). Whatever agendas statements
may advance, we can at least be sure they overlap to the extent they recognize and refer
to related physical phenomena. We start from the many points we have and attempt to
reconcile the accounts insofar as they (claim and aim to) talk about the material world. We
can initiate conversations with the aim to translate, reinterpret, and interlink vocabularies
with respect to what we observe about the overlap, agree or not. In physical sciences this
tactic has held up quite well, although translating the terms between fields of study is by
no means easy (section 5.1).
The overall picture of accounts produced by interlinking conversations parallels in
many ways the dialectics articulated by Harvey (1996, ch. 2). A detailed comparison is
beyond present scope, but a common orientation is quite apparent. As in Harvey, processes
and relations (actions and interactions) are here taken as fundamental; things or perma-
nences are physical processes offering stable assortments of affordances (opportunities for
interaction), parts and wholes constitute each other, and space and time are considered
relational even if they are represented and modeled quantitatively.
Of the differences, the broadest is that, while Harvey does not commit to presenting
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his dialectics as the nature of reality (ontology) or of knowledge (epistemology), here we
note specific domains of observables that can be fruitfully understood as dialectical, both
bearing on how we represent what we know. One, every term we use is dialectical to the
extent it is learned and used in conversation, i.e. uttered in interaction. Two, our accounts
of the world are in a dialectical relationship to the extent they can shape one with another,
agree or not. Topic three, what we can know about the relationships of entities “out there”
in the world, depends on choosing who and how can produce claims about reality (that we
trust), which requires addressing dialectics both one and two.
Without making claims about reality, we can say that our terms are dialectical insofar
they are continually renewed in social activity, and that much of their meaning manifests in
(socially negotiated) relationships with other terms. This distinction can, for example, help
clarify the claim that there is “no basement” (Harvey 1996, pp. 51–53), that all “things”
and putative basic units are heterogeneous and decomposable all the way down (also Levins
and Lewontin 1982, p. 278). Here an attempt is made to relate the statement to observables
as appropriate. Whether there is a conceptual basement in reality boils down to whom and
how we can trust to check and report; while we can never be sure, for example, physics
may well have already landed upon a few fundamental phenomena. About inquiry, it is a
trivial observation: of course we can keep asking questions, indeed the only way to remain
reasonably certain of anything is to keep unsuccessfully undermining it. The universe may
or may not have a basement, but our representations of it and efforts to dig beneath them
remain dialectical.
The assumption taken on trust in chapter 3, that we can describe action in the world, can
now be separated into questions in three domains. The question of origin, how come any-
thing symbolic ever appears, is addressed in biosemiotics and is taken up in the next chap-
ter. Next, why we humans are beings that can produce signs nearly at will, is approached
from evolutionary biology in the following chapters. The final one, how come some of
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our practices result in trusted symbolic claims about reality, is largely out of scope. A few
previous points about the relationship between scientific accounts and “nature,” however,
bear reviewing with it in mind.
One way science and mathematics secure trust for their claims is by formalizing notions
such as movement and number that are widely shared across cultures, by relating them to
actions and symbolic manipulations that can be described and repeated in desired detail.
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, this is why, rather than as a privileged conversation, the
present paper chooses natural science as a starting point about whose claims we may have
an easier time agreeing, subject to this actually being true. Moreover, while the practice
of physics privileges mathematics as enormously useful in describing natural phenomena,
it rarely produces unique accounts. More typically, it lands on multiple compatible articu-
lations that are conceptually quite distinct. Faced with empirically equivalent accounts we
cannot meaningfully distinguish which is “real” and in practice do not attempt to; we do try
to pursue their different implications further afield (Feynman 1965, pp. 53–54, 168). Which
description is reliable and which of the concepts it employs is real are separate issues.
We thus do not expect or aim to seek any simple relationship of correspondence be-
tween representations and reality. Instead we turn to the natural origin of intentionality




The word intention conjures many meanings, such as active conscious expectation and legal
responsibility. This essay uses the term in a broader formal sense, common in philosophy
and linguistics, of aboutness. Intention is a quality that can be ascribed to someone or
something of having a topic or an aim, of being about something.
Deacon (2012, p. 27) thought the potential for confusion with everyday meanings great
enough to use his own coinage entention for the formal sense. I tend to find unfamiliar
words more perplexing and stick with the accepted technical meaning. To avoid ambiguity,
I call teleonomic the non-cognitive intentional properties of living beings (Mayr 1974), and
prefix intention with “conscious” or “collective” in cognitive and sociocultural realms. In
addition, I use intentionality for the capacity of anything to exhibit intention.
The examples of intention Deacon (2012, pp. 1–2) gives are the meaning of a sentence,
the function of a shovel, the reference of waving in greeting, and the purpose of writing
a book. In all these senses, intention holds causal information about future states of the
world related to their topic. It can be seen as representing complex but partly predictable
physical consequences, and it does so even if the referent physical states are absent or never
come about. This is in reversal to physical laws, which act with respect to the present state
and move reliably forward from it with no notion of the future. Since intentionality is in
addition usually attributed to living beings, it is often overlooked in scientific research as
hopelessly inexact and subjective. Deacon (ch. 0) argues that this is an omission, that it is
exactly because it appears so unusual that intention calls for scientific explanation.
I aim to demonstrate that intention can be associated with physical processes that can
represent and transmit information in their own right, such as living beings, their artifacts,
and wider dynamics involving either or both. In this chapter, I argue that intentionality and
symbolic representation originate together, along with life.
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6.1 Life and Semiotic Closure
To tease out the nature of intentionality I start at the origin of life, then follow the gradual
elaboration of intentional dynamics through transitions in evolutionary history (Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry 1995). The discussion of the origins parallels the accounts of Den-
nett (2017) and Deacon (2012). Like Dennett, I argue that intentional properties appear
along with life at the very onset of natural selection; Deacon (pp. 136–137) holds that such
features are refined through evolution but precede it. With Deacon (pp. 114) I argue that
intentionality of living beings and designed artifacts of comparable complexity can not be
easily analogized, as the former is integrally incorporated into bodies managing the phys-
ical resources for their growth and upkeep. Dennett affirms the distinction but is more
concerned with the results arising from different methods used by the “designer,” mindless
evolution or a thinking engineer.
As mentioned, the origin of intention will be argued to parallel that of representation.
Pattee (1969, 2007); Rocha (2001), responding to von Neumann (1966), suggest that matter
becomes text as a part of a process that achieves semiotic closure. (Pattee originally called
the property “semantic closure” but later adopted Rocha’s wording.) Recapitulating the
several definitions, we can say that a string of molecules is symbolic when (1) it is not in
direct interaction with the environment, forming an inert part of an encompassing network
of processes; (2) it is transcribed and translated, directly recognized by other molecules
that manipulate the string and execute some specific though in principle arbitrary actions;
and (3) these actions include the synthesis of the transcription and translation molecules as
well as the reproduction of the code itself in the wider environment.
Requirements (1) and (2) boil down to saying that there is in an information channel
mediated by the transcription and translation processes, in which the putative symbolic
string is the source message, and ultimate actions the targets. Condition (3) can be seen as
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ensuring the information channel where the molecule string is a message occurs again: it
asks that the source encode the channel which can in turn both interpret and reproduce the
message. These three conditions are taken to mark the appearance of representation where
before there was none: (1) and (2) together define the syntax, (2) also provides semantics,
while (3) amounts to pragmatics (Rocha 2001).
Pattee (2007, pp. 275, 283) does not account for the origin of semiotic closure, indeed
assuming that the symbols are irreducible to physical laws. I proceed to present a heuristic
argument of how representation does indeed originate in a consilient manner, as chemical
processes that begin to undergo natural selection become representational as soon as the
four explanatory stances given by Tinbergen (1963) become applicable, and before they
evolve explicitly symbolic means of encoding. Following the account through to the ap-
pearance of genetic code, three aspects of informational dynamics at the origin of life are
discussed, following the analyses by Kauffman (1993, ch. 7–10).
1. Versatile self-reinforcement (e.g. autocatalysis). A set of mutually reinforcing inter-
actions appears that can, given the needed inputs, keep going indefinitely, multiply,
and incorporate a large variety of new interactions. In chemical terms, the reaction
is collectively autocatalytic and its graph is near-critical or supracritical. Natural
selection sets in and gives rise to intentional properties.
2. Stabilization and differentiation (autopoiesis). Subsets of interactions evolve to dif-
ferentiate and specialize for separate tasks, notably the management of energy flows.
In biology, we can say the process now has organs and a metabolism; in system
theoretic terms, it is self-maintaining or autopoietic. If the substrate allows for estab-
lishing boundaries, the process forms individual entities, with respect to which we
should be able to point out periods of reproduction and growth.
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3. Coding. A part of the process specializes to represent information about how organs
(specialized subsets) and competences are formed. While many actual developments
during growth are particular to parts of the process in interaction with the environ-
ment, the bulk of information, of differences that make a difference in growing a new
being, is passed on during reproduction. Over time, the representation evolves to be
more discrete and general.
These three elements are idealized, and in realistic situations they are apt to manifest
concurrently; various models of the origin of life accord them different priority. The or-
der follows logically from more diffuse semiosis to more specific, focusing on the ability
of living processes to respond and specialize in light of diverse affordances in their envi-
ronments. Versatile self-reinforcement, such as autocatalysis with a supracritical reaction
graph (Kauffman 1993, pp. 312–318) allows the evolving process to interact with virtu-
ally any new affordance it is presented with. As autocatalytic sets multiply, spread, and
compete, they also grow to incorporate new chemical reactions, and the combinatorial ex-
plosion of possibilities is balanced by the capacity of the living process to sort them out
and refine them. Specialized organs evolve to deal with matter and energy flows, to interact
with the environment, and to store and reproduce information. Symbolic codes and syntax
are then favored to evolve, as they can represent the information most generically.
These dynamics are generic; Kauffman (1993, ch. 7, 8) frames his models in terms of
peptides or RNA sequences, but the argument is combinatoric, and can apply in any context
with sufficiently diverse and frequent interactions. New processes that come into being with
life, such as specific behaviors or entire lives, can in principle interact and manifest these
dynamics in part or in entirety. Also, the genetic code is a symbolic representation, using
four discrete chemical letters to encode proteins comprising cells of all living beings we
know. The three aspects of semiotic closure dynamics are thus a potential blueprint for
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evolution of symbolic representation in any context.
I now turn to these dynamics in detail.
6.2 Autocatalysis
A process coming alive needs to be both responsive and variable enough that its behavior
can make a difference to its success under a wide range of environmental conditions it
encounters. This happens only if there are multiple alternative pathways the reaction can
incorporate, so that it needs to be versatile; perhaps not supracritical, able to react with
nearly arbitrary new compounds, but nearly so (Kauffman 1993, pp. 312–318, 330).
Explore and Remember The argument for the origin of intentionality and representation
(section 6.3) is demonstrated most clearly on autocatalytic sets, which belong to the wider
category of metabolism-first models of the origin of life. Such models have known prob-
lems; for example Vasas et al. (2010) suggest that just compositional information (compo-
some), i.e. the organization of the process, does not preserve information faithfully enough
from one generation to another for evolution to start. Nonetheless, for life to start there
needs to be a certain self-reinforcing set of interacting compounds, no matter their nature.
Some are perhaps already good at preserving information in ways such as template repli-
cation, while others may be better at garnering materials and catalyzing reactions needed
to replicate information. Autocatalytic sets assume the least about such internal structure
so they are suitable for discussing information dynamics in any hypothetical case of a self-
reinforcing set of reactions leading to the origin of life.
An autocatalytic process cycles, so within the context a state “refers” to itself by way of
a series of symptoms from one reaction to the next, ultimately bringing itself about again
























reactions simplified in the example
Figure 6.1: An example of a small autocatalytic set. Each ellipse encloses a chemical
inside the set, a polymer of two monomers, a and b. Reactions are indicated by black
dots and can unfold in two directions, toward a longer polymer (ligation) or toward two
shorter ones (cleavage). Catalysis is represented by dotted arrows pointing from the catalyst
to the reaction. Red arrows indicate some of the reactions involving the food set (green
ellipses) that are, for the purpose of the example, taken to run only toward longer polymers.
An alternative starting set is marked in blue from which the whole autocatalytic set can
regenerate, given the food supply. Adapted from Kauffman (1993, p. 323).
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a ýcatalyze pa, b ýreact abq˚
b ýcatalyze pa, bb ýreact abbq˚
ab ýcatalyze pa, bb ýreact abbq˚
ab ýcatalyze pb, a ýreact baq˚
a ýcatalyze paa, ba ýreact aabaq˚
bb ýcatalyze pba, b ýreact babq˚
abb ýcatalyze pba, ab ýreact baabq
abb ýcatalyze pbaab ýreact ba, abq
baab ýcatalyze pba, a ýreact baaq˚
b ýcatalyze pbaa, bb ýreact baabbq
b ýcatalyze pbaabb ýreact baa, bbq
aa ýcatalyze pbaa, a ýreact baaaq˚
baa ýcatalyze paaba, a ýreact aabaaq
baa ýcatalyze paabaa ýreact aaba, aq
aaba ýcatalyze paa, aabaa ýreact aaaabaaq
aaba ýcatalyze paaaabaa ýreact aa, aabaaq
ba ýcatalyze pbaa, bab ýreact baababq
ba ýcatalyze pbaabab ýreact baa, babq
aabaa ýcatalyze pbaa, bab ýreact baababq
aabaa ýcatalyze pbaabab ýreact baa, babq
baaa ýcatalyze paaba, ab ýreact aabaabq
baaa ýcatalyze paabaab ýreact aaba, abq
baab ýcatalyze paabaab, bb ýreact aabaabbbq
baab ýcatalyze paabaabbb ýreact aabaab, bbq
aabaabbb ýcatalyze pab, ab ýreact ababq
aabaabbb ýcatalyze pabab ýreact ab, abq
aabaabbb ýcatalyze pbaa, a ýreact baaaq˚
abb ýcatalyze pbaabb, bab ýreact baabbbabq
abb ýcatalyze pbaabbbab ýreact baabb, babq
baabbbab ýcatalyze pbab, b ýreact babbq˚
Table 6.1: The autocatalytic set from figure 6.1 as an information channel. Asterisks ˚
mark the reactions that are reversible in the original example, and here taken to run only
toward longer polymers; in the figure, they are shown as red arrows.
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(a) Reproduction. The component contexts are discrete and separable (like in a geyser);
and the process can sustain itself and spread given the right conditions (like convec-
tion). Hence, it spreads by each discrete component facilitating the production of
more than one copy of itself. Seen semiotically, each component signals via interme-
diates more than one occurrence of itself later on. The process as a whole also refers
to more than one copy of itself.
(b) Variation. Components are not set in stone, and the structure of the process can
change. New polymers or sets of polymers can be brought in and impact what is
already going on, so an autocatalytic set can reach many stable behavior patterns
(Kauffman 1993, pp. 331–332). The semiotic representation changes along with the
process.
(c) Competition. As the process both reproduces and can vary, its copies can differ in
how quickly or successfully they obtain necessary materials and multiply in turn. The
semiotic representation is of consequence to (is informational about) how successful
the process is.
These are the preconditions for evolution by natural selection. Kauffman (1993, p. 330)
argues that the threshold to evolution is crossed as a phase shift when the reaction is supra-
critical, when it can interact with and incorporate almost any new chemical. However,
Kauffman’s models are idealized, for example they assume an unlimited food set, which an
autocatalytic reaction in reality may not have available. It may be more realistic to assume
that a reaction set leading to life is just near-critical or versatile. If such a set of reactions
can reproduce and sustain itself, say in balance with another Deacon (2012, pp. 302–323),
then near-critical evolving lineages can cross the same threshold.
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Internal Logic The phase shift to life becomes possible with reaction sets of some mini-
mal complexity (Kauffman 1993, pp. 340–341). Going back to Kant’s expression, to have
competition among reaction sets, there needs to be sufficient communication among their
materials for each to sustain itself, multiply, and adopt varied possibilities. In living be-
ings, Kant’s turn of phrase is no longer metaphoric. Although there is no specific part of
the process tasked with the representation, by treating the reaction as a semiotic informa-
tion channel one can express the signaling among reacting polymers quite explicitly. The
matter can be seen as performing over and over a simple task in rump implicational logic.
To see how this takes place, consider more closely the internal structure of an autocat-
alytic set. Take the example from Kauffman (1993) reproduced in figure 6.1, and treat the
entire set an information channel. There are two natural ways to do it. In one, ýcatalyze,
the channel is catalysis, the sources are the catalysts, and the targets are the reactions they
catalyze. In the other,ýreact, the channel are the reactions, and the sources and targets are
the polymers on each side of a reaction. The entire autocatalytic set is represented in this
pseudo-code in table 6.1. (For simplicity, I take some of the reactions involving the food
set to run only toward longer polymers. This does not affect the argument at this point and
is realistic if the food is abundantly resupplied. More below.)
Recall from chapter 3 that ýC in general just means “accompanies or is followed by
in time in context C.” We adopt the strict time direction, “followed by,” for both catalysis
and reaction channels. Let p denote one of: a polymer a, a reaction a ýreact b, catalysis
a ýcatalyze r, or any complex furtherance p ýF q combining these components. Let the
logical proposition p be true when the empirical statement “p can recur” (or alternatively
“p can reproduce”) holds. We can then replace both channel symbols with horseshoes
Ą denoting logical entailment and get true propositions about the autocatalytic set. The
chemical reaction that comes alive behaves like a logical circuit with reactions implement-
ing the operation “implies.” (The similarity between the two symbols was the other reason
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to chooseý to denote action moving forward.)
The resulting partial implicational propositional calculus resembles the early statement
of mathematical logic by Russell (1903), which predates symbolic logic and the better
known Principia (Whitehead and Russell 1927). Russell takes implication as primitive, and
distinguishes formal and material implication, the former between propositional functions,
rendered as “if-then”; the latter between propositions, “implies,” here Ą (Russell 1903,
p. 14). If we give Ą the physical interpretation of one component or reaction eventually
furthering the recurrence (reproduction) of another through one or any combination of the
two pathways ýcatalyze and ýreact, most axioms and definitions can be checked to hold
(pp. 16–18). Not all; discrepancies occur because we can readily move from statements
representing physical relationships to logical ones but not vice versa without relaxing the
physical interpretation of Ą under some circumstances. The parallel points in favor of
Russell’s original realist interpretation of logical relations, that they are not purely mental
constructs, which he later abandoned in favor of a more nominalist view (Feibleman 1944).
If one takes any model, whether metabolism-first or replicator-first, of a self-reinforcing
set at the origin of life, one should be able to find a way to carve it into components (“propo-
sitions”) and relations of furtherance (“implications”), treat it as an information channel,
and proceed to draw analogous analogies. The idealization is, of course, only approximate;
for example, the relations of furtherance are not nearly as certain as logical entailments.
It may not be immediately apparent, however, what is gained by the exercise. It has no
immediate explanatory power; the reason we can draw a parallel between chemistry and
logic is because catalyses and reactions are reliable relationships we understand very well.
The experimental method we use to study chemistry assumes that underlying relationships
have the structure of logically connected isolable causes, and so there is no surprise some
chemical reactions can be compared to logic.
The analogy helps clarify semiotic relationships present at the origin of life. If we take
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any component of the autocatalytic set, we can trace a path from it through consecutive
other components all the way back to itself. If H is a component (compound or process)
that participates in autocatalysis as above, then if we take “H is true” to correspond to “H
can recur (reproduce)” in the context of an autocatalytic set (if the necessary minimum
concentrations are present), every component of the set is “true.” Every component of the
set thus partly satisfies criteria for semiotic closure, as it successfully gets “interpreted” and
reproduces with help of others; the one condition not directly represented is memory. If,
in addition, we expand the perspective to include environmental interactions, they can be
distinguished with respect to whether they aid, hinder, or have no effect on the recurrence
(reproduction) of a semiotically closed reaction set.
In considering the semiotics of an autocatalytic set in its environment, we need to dis-
tinguish occurrences with respect to how they react with it. Continuing the alphabet game,
events with which the set can interact are possible aFfordances or food. Products of re-
actions with and within the set not incorporated back into it are results of its Growth.
Interactions within the set that immediately feed back into it are Home.
Events in these categories can be semiotic not just in relation to us (we describe them
symbolically) but with respect to the reproducing autocatalytic sets. Let F,G,H are respec-
tively a potential affordance, a product, and a component reaction. Events H are signs with
respect to the set because they are partly semiotically closed, both produced and interpreted
by the set. Informally this can be seen to mean, for example, that if an autocatalytic set fails
to realize a component reaction H, it both produces and receives a “sign” that it may have
trouble reproducing later on. Similarly, interactions F can be signs received by the set if
they are actually affordances, if they make a difference to its reproduction. Meanwhile,
products G can be signs produced by the set if there is another semiotically closed process
whose reproduction they help or hinder.
The interaction between an autocatalytic set and an affordance F is semiotic and in-
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formation about it persists, so we can meaningfully say that F actually functions as a sign
every time the set interacts with it (this is consistent with Sebeok 2001). In addition, supra-
critical autocatalytic sets can initiate and incorporate a wide range of interactions, and
information about (variations in) interacting with any of them can be favored to persist,
as long as it can be represented. Living beings thus populate the environment with affor-
dances, their Umwelt, events seen by whether and how they help or hinder reproduction
(Lewontin 2000, pp. 52–57; Dennett 2017, pp. 78–80). On this view, a semiotically closed
process defines a perspective with no need to assume panpsychism, that every piece of
matter has a rudimentary sense of awareness. Particles by themselves can no more than
change and affect change, while a point of view is an emergent phenomenon associated
with a particular way changing matter can organize.
The semiotic representation of the autocatalytic set thus helps clarify the transition be-
tween chemistry and biology. It maps how self-reinforcement, with it semiotic closure,
is implemented in simpler interactions, by delineating relationships among them forming
a larger entity. It functions as an extension of the semiotics of cycles from the previous
chapter (section 5.2). The most important difference from the simpler cycles is that auto-
catalytic sets, and living beings in general, are able to enter into, vary in, and reproduce
a wide range of interactions, only a tiny fraction of which can ever get realized. Since
reproducing organisms also compete, they are bound by pragmatic constraints of their en-
vironments. At every later point, thus, surviving beings carry the evidence of what practical
approaches worked in the past. While this is true by the simple fact of their survival, an
internal representation that remembers and reproduces successful traits is a favored asset.
Organisms become representational slowly, at the pace of individual selection events.
At the same time they become intentional, anticipating future environmental interactions. I
turn next to outline how this takes place on a scenario of a single evolutionary event.
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6.3 Why Write?
FourQuestions The appearance of intentionality is the moment when the question “why?”
about some natural process becomes equivocal. Before, it means only how come?, and af-
ter, it can also mean what for? (Dennett 2017, pp. 40–52). With help of the above syntax,
going through the account step by step, I aim to demonstrate that the appearance of living
beings involves a differentiation of phenomenal and (thus too) explanatory time scopes,
and that they involve not just one, but three new senses of “why” we can start asking.
This gives the total of four questions outlined by Tinbergen (1963): immediate causation,
development, evolutionary history, and survival value.
For visual clarity, in the rest of the text the four questions are tagged with a capital letter
in angle brackets, xAyxLyxHyxDy, in the above order. The tags anticipate the meaning of
the questions applied to society. The more usual ways to refer to them are given at the end
of each item before the example.
1. If we look at the autocatalytic set at any moment or over a short period, we see just
chemistry. In the ¥ short term of physical xAyction within the autocatalytic set, the
salient answer to “why?” is that to how come? referring to what we take as immediate
causation (mechanism):
“Why aabaabbb?” “But of course, baab ýcatalyze paabaab, bb ýreact aabaabbbq!”
2. In Kauffman’s model of autocatalysis, after catalytic closure there is always a certain
nonzero concentration of every polymer. We can treat the whole set, call it `A, as an
action context providing catalysis, and focus only on the reactions, taking catalyst
action as a part of the channel conditions. Letý`-react denote this context.
Suppose now that for an autocatalytic set there is a subset that can, given the food set
and itself as a starting supply of both catalysts and raw materials, gradually synthe-
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size the whole set. In the example in figure 6.1, the entire set `A can be bootstrapped
from the food set `0 “ ta, b, aa, bbu or, say, from `10 “ tab, bab, aaba, baaa, baabbu
(see figure 6.1). With a smaller starting set of catalysts only a few reactions are avail-
able, but the products in turn expand the set. With ` “ `0 only the first two reactions
can occur, then after the first reaction increases the density of ab, the first four open
up. We can write this as
a, b; `0 ý`-react ab; `1 “ `0 Y tabu
a, bb; `0 ý`-react abb; `2 “ `0 Y tabbu
a, b; `1 ý`-react ab; `1
a, bb; `1 ý`-react abb; `3 “ `1 Y tabbu
b, a; `1 ý`-react ba; `4 “ `1 Y tbau
and so on. (The middle reaction in the right column represents two possible reac-
tions going from a, bb; `1 to abb; `3 using different catalysts.) Writing everything out
would quickly get complicated, as we would need to specify all reactions for every
intermediate realizable subset between `0 and `A.
This exercise yields one or more sequences `i,A that trace all the way from `0 to
the whole set `A, say `1,A “ p`0, `1, `3, ..., `Aq. Call them life paths. On the scope
of ¥ a xLyifetime of an autocatalytic set, we can ask how come? and expect a life
path as the answer, recounting the steps of development (ontogeny) from a supposed
beginning:
“Why ba?” “Well you know, p`0, `1, `4q.”
3. Self-reinforcing sets of reactions modeled by Kauffman (1993) exist in simulated
chemical universes where they can, once versatile enough, evolve to flexibly track
different food sets (p. 330) or settle on a choice of stable behavior patterns (dynami-
cal attractors) producing different autocatalytic sets (pp. 331–332). Kauffman notes
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the open questions about how a diversity of autocatalytic sets can come into being
and track their environments (pp. 332–333), and recent research is skeptical of how
faithfully metabolism-first models can preserve information. For present aims, as-
sume the universe, simulated or real, is such that self-reinforcing reaction sets can
both diversify and remember the new configurations well enough to fulfill the crite-
ria for natural selection.
Say that in environment E0 there is a population of self-reinforcing reproducing sets
of reactions proceeding from similar starting points, so all are variants of some set `A.
Over time, two new stable patterns appear, `B and `C, and there is a change in the
environment to E1. The new variants do about equally well in E1 but better than `A.
Eventually, after variants of `A die out as they can not compete and, say, those of `C
dwindle due to bad luck, the whole population ends up consisting only of variants
of `B.
Over the time of¥ many life cycles of the reproducing sets we can look at the entire
population, ask “why?”, and expect as a reply a part of this xHyistory, a how so? over
a longer chunk of time. The answer comes in form of a sequential narrative about
change through evolution (phylogeny), both selective and random:
“Why `B?” “Once upon a time, in environment E0, there was a population of self-
reinforcing reproducing sets [...] the whole population ended up consisting only of
variants of `B. Just so.”
4. The above history can but need not need to refer to any reasons, e.g. “`B got selected
for the environment E1.” There was no forethought in the process, and concentrating
on selection events leaves out the brief but hopeful tenure of `C.
However, if we know or can surmise enough about this history, we can look again
at the scope of ¥ a life time or shorter, and offer an answer to what for?, what
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xDyifference `B or some feature of its makes to survival value (function):
“Why such part of `B?” “We think, for such feature of E1.”
Time Slip When we can say a living organism is capable of representing what it does
to a large extent depends on what we decide constitutes representation. Dennett (2017,
pp. 84–94) argues that representation means comprehension: an animal can represent when
it understands its options and actions and uses its cognitive competences to articulate and
manipulate a model of them. Dennett argues that we can claim this capacity with any con-
fidence only for humans. Other animals may be imagining and running through practical
scenarios, but do not have anything that corresponds to actual terms (pp. 94–101).
Generalizing on Pattee (1969), the present essay adopts a considerably more inclusive
notion of representation, Simply, wherever there is intention, there is representation. In
other words, whenever there is information in one part or at one stage in a (living) process
that in some way anticipates its features at a future time, there is or has been some kind
of representation. This perspective will help clarify the origin of symbol use in humans by
letting us consider simpler cases first.
To argue there is intention, we need to establish the physical basis for the claim that
information about future interactions is a part of a present living being. To do this, we revisit
the four questions (see figure 6.2). Recall that, in the question about ontology or growth
over xLyifetime (item 2 above), the initial sets `0 “ `0,A and `10 suffice to generate the entire
set `A. They can be seen as “codes” for the set: they contain all the information needed to
rebuild it given the materials and the known chemistry of the simulated universe. Measured
in bits, they do not contain as much information as the entire set; this is reconstructed,
enrolled from the environment in shape of food and chemical relationships. The initial set
`0,A suffices to decode the entire autocatalytic set `A from the environment, and by itself
does not contain any additional information.
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Now consider the set `B from the question about function or xDyifference in survival
value (item 4) and let `0,B be an analogous initial set for it. Taken on its own, it functions
quite similarly to `0,A, just generating the set `B instead of `A. However, if we consider
the entire population at some point after `B became predominant, by knowing or surmising
the xHyistory of how this transpired we can claim that `0,B also contains information about
what makes `B do better than `A in environment E1.
Here is why. Seen individually, `0,A and `0,B decipher their respective sets `A and `B from
the environment. After the change in the environment, individuals resembling `A and `B
exhibit differing degrees of success. The population thereby becomes informational: the
reproducing population in the environment holds information about some aspect of how
to xAyct in E1 that resides in whatever difference in the sets’ interactions with E1 makes a
difference to their respective success. Then, the environment and the population together
forward this information to the future over evolutionary xHyistory by stochastic search,
reducing the proportion of those members of the population that do not know the beneficent
trick. There is no mystery about this: with tools of population genetics, we can estimate
how well and how quickly this information is stored, inscribed in the population.
Any initial set `0,B in the new population still generates `B from environment and chem-
istry. However, what was before just a chance difference in success in E1 became a part of
every individual; through evolution, what was optional became obligatory (Dennett 2017,
p. 178). From the point of view of any single set’s xLyifetime, the information about how
to interact with the environment slipped back in time. Of course, these are entirely new
sets, each starting anew without the benefit of knowing the history. However, as long as
the environment changes more slowly than it takes for a trait to come to fixation, what-
ever distinction between `A and `B made the difference in their success in E1 ends up in
the descendants of `B and in any initial set from which they may spring. This means that
a set such as `0,B now anticipates those aspects of the environment E1 that have made a
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difference in the past. Just as `0,A above, it can decode the entire set `B from the surround-
ing materials and chemistry, and in doing so it will also decode whatever feature made the
difference for `B in its relative success over history.
The additional information in `B that made a difference for its predecessors and antic-
ipates features of E1 can be considered (defined as) its intention. Note that we can only
know what kind of intention `B manifests by investigating beyond the life path of any sin-
gle set. We may know the history, or have fossil remnants of `A, or maybe `A is a common
mutant that does not persist any more and we can study why. Perhaps there is another set
`D which does as well as `B in environment E1 but in a completely different way, and we
guess that there had to be a less well adapted common ancestor from which both diverged.
Maybe the adaptive fit, the look of design, between the features of `B and the environment
is highly suggestive, or maybe it has appeared in other lineages. Or we may know that
the organisms we are studying have a specialized way of storing information about their
development, such as the genetic code, which itself is evidence for evolutionary favoring
of memory embodied within living processes.
The apparent time slip appears because the population records information faster than
the environment changes. After a selection event, nearly every organism, unbeknownst to
oneself but ready to be decoded, has information about what interactions with the environ-
ment it can expect in the future. However, every life also starts from scratch, and there is
no guarantee the environments will be the same. Intention is inexact precisely because it
depends on physical causation to manifest. It is causal in the sense discussed in section 5.1
because it (literally) represents information about future interaction in ways unavailable to
basic physics alone, by spelling out a far from certain bet that a future may unfold in some
particular way.
Text in Matter Pattee (2001) discusses the epistemic cut between text and matter, offer-
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Figure 6.2: The origin of representation in a selection event.
A population P of autocatalytic sets are reproducing in an environment, which at start
(bottom) has just changed to E1. A minority of sets formed from the initial set `0,B, via
some subset of reactions HB, interact better in the new conditions than the more prevalent
HA starting from `0,A. The population P holds information about which of the two growth
paths works better, in form of the difference in the practical effect interactions HA,B; E1 have
on the respective sets’ proliferation.
At a later time (top), reaction sets descended from `0,B have come to predominate. The
population is no longer informative, as all sets interact similarly with their possibly changed
surroundings E11. With the benefit of additional information, however, such as the history
of selection or the purposeful appearance of interaction, we can infer that the starting set
`10,B is informational about a better way for H
1
B to interact with some feature or event in the
environment that has persisted in the past.
Relationships salient to all four explanatory stances by Tinbergen (1963) are represented.
These are: immediate causal interxAyction in the environment pHx; E1q; ontogenetic xLyife
paths forming Hx from `0,x; xHyistory of a selection event unfolding from bottom to top;
the teleonomy (function) in pH1B; E11q and the representational role of `10,B corroborated by
the xDyifferential past pragmatic consequences of pHB; E1q that favored the spread of `0,B.
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ing the criterion of semiotic closure for when a molecule becomes a message (Pattee 1969).
As argued above (section 6.1), the first two of the three requirements, that a molecule string
is symbolic when it is transcribed and translated into some specific arbitrary actions, boils
down to requiring that there is a physically realized communication channel where the
string is the source message. The abbreviated criterion just employed, that representation
requires intention, i.e. information at one stage of the process anticipating future features,
says effectively the same thing.
Indeed, it is easy to see that the initial sets such as `0,A and `0,B satisfy both the require-
ment of intentionality and for semiotic closure: by interacting with the environment, they
decode (and thus anticipate) a larger set of reactions which includes their own decoding
and replication. Therefore xLyifetime development of an organism can be seen as a channel
with a native source vocabulary inferred but not imposed by us. The epistemic cut in expla-
nation between matter and symbols is thus accounted for by more of an epistemic outflank
in reality, switching focus along two dimensions: between momentary action and change
over time, and between one organism and the population [diagram]. The focus moves from
xAyction of one organism over short times; to xLyifetime of one organism, changing over
time; to xHyistory of population in the environment, changing over time; to xDyifference a
trait in population makes in the environment, over shorter times.
Interpreting phenomena as information channels can be seen as establishing different
levels of explanation (section 5.3). Informational relationships are probabilistic, they model
repetition or require repetition to establish. If we are saying we have established the ex-
istence of a kind of an information channel, we are in effect saying that we have found a
new way we can expect phenomena to recur, in whole or in some aspect. To complete the
argument why the answers to the four questions yield explanations, we now attend to what
kinds of repeated phenomena each question accounts for.
To begin, causal xAyction relationships in physics and chemistry (item 1) are lawlike,
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reliably repeat given starting conditions. They can be seen as unproblematically informa-
tional as discussed in the previous two chapters, with vocabularies worked out in the lab.
As just discussed, xLyifetime development, precursor to organism growth, is also a
channel, and comes into being at the origin of life. Any one organism from a population
undergoing natural selection is a repeated information channel. Of the requirements for
natural selection, heredity entails semiotic closure, so we can say that growth is informed
by (some kind of) representation, while variation and differential reproduction ensure that
the representation makes a difference. The developmental channel in effect bootstraps itself
from an initial core of messages and processes, successively opening up new interactions
in the environment (item 2).
Explaining how this self-reproducing core comes to be and persist requires further ex-
tending the perspective in time and ecology. Evolutionary xHyistory at base views the
population of self-reinforcing sets as a genetic search algorithm (initially without recombi-
nation), looking at what it takes to store a bit of information in the proto-organisms (item
3). How informational a population can be depends on its genetics: population sizes, ac-
curacy of replication, mutation rates, fitness differences, and so on. Information capacity
can be estimated on models of population biology by representing them as channels, in
a manner similar to examples in chapter 4. In this way we can account for one or a few
evolutionary flips, selective or random. Sequences of such events over longer periods, phy-
logenies, are conveyed as narratives, recounting the changes along with contingencies that
have led to them. What reliably recurs are evolving populations, for each of which we can
meaningfully describe the history in this way: by population genetics over shorter times,
by sequential narratives over longer periods.
These three channels closely correspond to the three different time scopes implied in
representing the living being as an information channel (section 5.3): specific interactions,
time between them, and context conditions. In addition, environmental interactions that
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percolate through the selective events manifest as teleonomic or adaptive. They are useful
intel, anticipating aspects of the environment relevant to the organism (affordances), such as
how to find a meal or avoid becoming one. Whenever an organism uses such information,
it xDyistinguishes parts of the environment with respect to itself (item 4). A living being
inherits useful intel. Answers to the question “what is it for?” comprise a qualitatively
new account, an additional layer of explanation of causal and developmental events. What
repeats between specific cases are the intentional semiotics of these explanations, in which
an organism action is about an event in the environment.
These explanations are all applicable at the same time and ultimately refer to physical
processes. Every one gives qualitatively different information about organism behavior:
xAy its physical manifestation, xLyife path that brings it about in a single body, xHy one
or many information fixation events in a population that led to it, and xDy what it is for.
In addition, I submit that the argument in this section functions as a bridging conversation
among them. As discussed in section 5.1, this is sufficient to establish the four questions as
accounts of material efficacy consilient with natural sciences.
This reveals the gap between matter and text as less categorical than in Pattee (1982);
Rocha (2001) and ultimately bridgeable. Rocha (2001, sec. 4.2) claims that “biological
organisms, subjected to natural selection, gained control of precisely those aspects of the
environment which can be molded and which physical law does not describe.” The present
claim is quite the contrary: populations of organisms maintain memory of successful physi-
cal interactions, evaluated and recorded through stochastic search. In a manner of speaking,
populations do simple science with symbolic and practical resources at their disposal, using
themselves as hypothesis, experiment, and publication.
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6.4 Autopoiesis
As Dennett (2017, p. 31) noted, the first living organisms may well have been akin to
Rube Goldberg contraptions, surviving and reproducing successfully but none too ele-
gantly. Kauffman (1993, p. 330) argues that autocatalytic sets start evolving when they
become supracritical, when they can interact with almost any chemical presented to them.
In his models, supracriticality is a phase transition beyond which evolution becomes well
nigh inevitable. While such a state may not easily appear in nature, the models suggest
that self-reinforcing reaction sets at the outset of evolution are likely to make up for their
lack of elegance through versatility, by being able to get over evolutionary humps through
exploring a wide range of alternatives. And humps are there; to begin with, a living being
needs to keep going past the point where a simply dissipative process would run out of fuel.
Once a population of self-reinforcing reaction sets comes to sustain natural selection, it
becomes less important to explore all the possibilities than that already used biochemical
pathways do their job well (Deacon 2012, pp. 268–271). The stakes, opportunities, and
problems facing an organism, as we may now start calling it, differ in time, space, and
topic, and so similarly differentiated responses are favored to evolve in new generations.
The communication among materials becomes more conservative, with discernible parts,
organs, integrated into the growing organism. Between lineages, we can talk of quasi-
species, populations that follow similar environmental strategies; species require sexual
reproduction. Each quasi-species is subcritical, while the biosphere itself remains supra-
critical (Kauffman 1993, pp. 336, 390–393).
In particular, an organism differentiates as it evolves enclosure. A membrane separates
the reactions inside from the outside; unwanted materials are kept out and the metabolites
kept in proximity, making it possible to regulate reaction rates. Also, information-bearing
chemicals (eventually genes) are kept together, and are then favored to evolve to cooperate
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(Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, p. 99). Criteria for life and the related concept
of autopoiesis, dynamic self-maintenance and reproduction, often include boundaries as
an explicit requirement (Koshland 2002; Maturana and Varela 1972, p. 81). If physically
realizable in the medium, enclosure is an affordance favored to evolve: it is easier to know
what is Home.
We can speak of organs rather than parts, relevant to specific circumstances while in-
tegrated into the self-maintaining growing process. For example, let us say that a lineage
has evolved enclosure, and that it makes a difference to the reactions inside an organism
whether a particular chemical m is kept in or out based on its concentration inside the
membrane. Another compound that can be built into the membrane reacts to the gradient
in concentration of m by tightening or loosening the enclosure. The compound is favored to
become part of the membrane, and comes to perform the function of a rudimentary valve.
As a population evolves to differentiate, from a semiotic perspective, different contexts
and concepts by which we may represent the operation of each organ evolve as well. For
example, a membrane divides the outside world from the inside of a proto-cell, and dif-
ferent kinds of chemical reactions tend to occur on each side. Each side of the enclosure
is its own information context with a separate vocabulary, its own frequencies of events,
umwelts of affordances, and so on. Moreover, if we zoom in closer, we can represent spe-
cialized features as information channels with their own vocabularies etc. For example,
the membrane valve communicates the concentration of the molecule m to the state of the
valve, open or closed.
Differentiation, specialization of parts and of organisms, introduce new kinds of choice.
Every choice between chemical pathways, growth timings, or behaviors during an organ-
ism’s lifetime can be seen as an information channel with its own vocabulary of affordances.
The organism, of course, cannot represent what it does in nearly as much detail as we can
when we analyze it, but in the above sense of embodied implication it can be said to contain
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lumped terms for its basic components and capacities. With specialization, we can now say
that various parts of a body handle information differently. There are different vocabular-
ies, corresponding to the different tasks the organism undertakes, stakes that organs handle,
that differ physically and are spatiotemporally segregated.
In general, as Csete and Doyle (2002) report, an organism’s metabolism behaves in
very similar ways to robust control systems invented by human engineers, accomplishing
self-regulation in a range of tasks. As elaborates:
1. Organisms depend on and utilize energetic and material gradients in their
environment in order to perform work to sustain the constraints of their
persistent, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and to maintain constraints
that are critical for countering the tendency toward thermodynamic de-
cay.
2. Organisms actively reorganize their internal dynamics and relationships
to the environment in ways that specifically counter or compensate for
any depletion of the gradients that is necessary to maintain their dynami-
cal integrity and their capacity to so respond.
3. Many organisms have evolved means of gradient assessment and spatial
mobility that enable them to anticipate and avoid conditions of depleted
gradients and to seek out more optimal gradients.
4. Organisms and ecosystems evolve toward forms of organization that in-
crease the indirectness of the “dissipation-path length” of energy and ma-




I turn to the origins of genetic code briefly, in light of the previous discussions.
One way to look at the origin of coding is as differentiation of organs tasked with
storing and interpreting evolutionary information. Organs differ by how much energy and
matter they command, over what periods of time, and for what purposes. If we look at
different time slices and bodily parts over an organism’s lifetime, different regions and time
periods are more consequential in bringing about subsequent states; some are relatively
peripheral, while others are central in building much of the organism. Although organs are
interdependent, we can talk about their relative power over time in summoning matter and
energy to move the living process forward. While the relationship is likely to be anything
but exact, parts that are more powerful in this material sense can be seen to hold more
information about the subsequent states.
Those organisms that can better coordinate the interplay of their organs over space and
time, along with where consequential information resides, are likely to be more successful.
The special role in this is played by the moment of replication, when matter that gives rise
to each new being is at a bottleneck. As, in comparison to other periods over lifetime, the
newly reproduced organism enrolls the most matter and energy, the materials that replicate
are the most likely to be the specialized for information storage. Over time, such storage is
favored to become more efficient, both by becoming concentrated in one physical spot, and
by evolving to more generic, symbolic forms of representation. As atoms and molecules
are discrete units, they provide a natural medium that for forming symbols. Ultimately, on
the organism level, genes have the basic information that can encode the requirements for
almost every living process. The rest of the body gets to decide on a “need to know” basis
(Dennett 2017, pp. 49–50).
This argument, in effect, extends the concept of gene power by Dawkins (1999, 224–
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225) to putative reproducing organisms prior to the origin of specialized information stor-
age. As Vasas et al. (2010) note, some kind of specialized information storage may be
necessary for the origin of natural selection; as argued here, it would be favored to evolve
anyway.
With the advent of generic symbolic representation in genes, we can distinguish be-
tween two different kinds of intentional, or teleonomic processes. One are those informed
by genes; in them, intention is expressed over time scopes of ¥ organism growth through
enrolling matter and energy to build bodily features which enable certain competences:
“grow cilia.” We can talk about i-reference (I as myself, symbolically in-formed). The
other kind is the embodied implication discussed above, and amounts to exercise of teleo-
nomic competences, delegated to body part and times of its¥ use, and reacting to informa-
tion from the environment: “run away from chemical Z.” This can be termed h-reference
(H for home, as above).
Semiocycles What is remembered in living beings and acted upon in evolution may be
called (new word) semiocycles. They are physically realized as networks of interactions,
collectively autocatalytic, informed by some representational medium, such as nucleic
acids, translated into a cascade of reactions downstream. At the same time, while we can
read the information encoded in molecules letter by letter, what is recorded in it is evaluated
in the interactions it affects in the environment. Natural selection in a population can, with
luck, discern affordances at any level or at any part of the reaction network.
Typically the semiotics of the genetic system is construed as follows: all pro-
cesses taking place before translation (from transcription to RNA editing) de-
fine the set of syntactic operations; the relation between mRNA (signifier) and
folded amino acid chains (signified), through the genetic code, implements a
semantic relation; and finally, the selective pressures on the obtained proteins
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and their developed products as the pragmatic evaluation of the genetic sign
system (Rocha 2001, sec. 4.2).
In the example of the simple autocatalytic set, the representation is expressed dynam-
ically, distributed over the entire process in a way resembling the (aptly named) material
implication of symbolic logic (section 6.2). While this is just a restatement of the fact
that the underlying chemistry unfolds reliably, it also anticipates the claim by Varela et al.
(1991) that cognition is enacted and embodied.
For Dennett (2017, p. 122, emphasis removed), pragmatic implication describes the
way animals represent “semantic information about how best to fit in ... mindlessly gleaned
from the cycle of generations,” at least when it does not need much cognitive work (likely
per Grant 1958). This is true in that teleonomic properties of living beings manifest prac-
tically, their intentional nature to us “conveyed by circumstances” of a particular environ-
mental context, in general as a competence without comprehension (Dennett 2017, pp. 56–
57). However, the information, the potential and proclivity for interaction, resides at all
times in the relationships of bodily processes, able to recognize the context and ready to
be used if needed. By the manner of its representation in the context of immediate use, we
can talk of embodied implication. While we supply the words to explain it and describe it,
the living process itself materializes the implication “when close to F, eat it and grow” for
some range of substances F in its environment.
These practical purpose-like features and behaviors of living beings depend on special-
ized symbolic representation in genes in several ways. First, the variation in fitness needs
to have a genetic basis and be salient enough over enough many lifetimes for a popula-
tion to be selected for a trait. Second, genes hold relatively little information but allow
for arbitrary representation (“unlimited heredity”). The translation apparatus interprets the
message to bootstrap the living process from the environment by anticipating features it
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can react with, affordances. Third, there is a continuity of material interactions between the
genes and the phenotype. Despite the phenomenal distance the number of steps is finite,
and selection can act at any one.
Absences The dynamics of representation in semiotic closure, from autocatalysis to au-
topoiesis to coding, also close out the wider account of the three emergent dynamics by
Deacon (2012), from homeodynamics to morphodynamics to teleodynamics, articulated in
terms of semiosis rather than constraints.
The contexts corresponding to homeodynamics are those in which there is only physical
change with no intrinsic semiosis, and any representation of what is going on is gained from
outside through study. Morphodynamics can be associated with the contexts where inter-
action between two or more physical influences produces behavior that repeats in space or
cycles over time, resulting in maintenance of opportunities for interaction and thus notion-
ally in simple forms of reference, but without capacity for versatile representation. Finally,
teleodynamic processes can be understood as those where a generic internal representation
plays a major role in influencing how matter interacts with its environment.
Deacon (2012, p. 0) sets off at the task of explaining intentionality with the paradox of
constitutive absence. A shovel is for (“about”) digging but exists quite independently of it,
and any single shovel may never be used for digging at all. This in part motivates Deacon’s
choice of constraints as efficacious absences upon which intentionality is based. This essay
instead puts forward two claims about the nature of intentionality. First, intention is rep-
resentation in some information channel, so to explain it we need to identify the channel.
Second, representation arises with living beings, and intention is a reply to one of the four
questions that apply to any feature of life, what is it for? To find the channel, we can ask
the other three questions: how its manifest physically, how it develops individually, how it
came to be over history.
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In the present account, constraints are not a constituting absence but a resource, af-
fordances and necessary preconditions for realizable patterns of interaction. Absences do
come into play when intention appears, at the origin of life. First, as per Deacon, precise
details of the future life of an organism are absent from the information needed to build the
body. Second, symbolic representation brings forth a range of possibilities too wide to ever
be realized except for a tiny bit. The design space described by Dennett (1995, pp. 75–76,
rendered as “Design Space” in the original) comes into being, too big to ever be explored
fully, and there are beings that inhabit and wander around it. Absent are potential life paths
unrealized, parts of the design space not yet or ever reached by evolving histories.
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CHAPTER 7 SEMIOTICS IN EVOLUTION
This chapter establishes the requirements for discussing the semiotics of human symbolic
interaction, addressing three related issues. First, if we take that living processes are sym-
bolically informed by the genome, what constitutes the referent of a message? What can
the genes be about? Second, what is the semiotic nature of organism processes? Specif-
ically, what would it take to evolve a response to a set of affordances that uses symbolic
representation in addition to the genome, and what would it take for these symbols to un-
derlie separate evolutionary dynamics? Finally, what are the potential prerequisites for and
implications of humans evolving symbolic interactions on a channel separate from genes,
in effect starting a sociocultural evolutionary process?
7.1 Explanations
The previous chapter has argued that with natural selection living beings become informa-
tional about environmental interactions, and that this representation evolves to a symbolic
form due to the bottleneck at reproduction. With representation originates, the four ex-
planatory stances by Tinbergen (1963) become salient to understanding how a population
evolves to embody information about interaction fitness. We now turn to consider the
semiotics of the four stances as they now apply to a living process informed by a known
symbolic code, and discuss the implications in light of the debate between gene-centered
and interactionist views of organic evolution (e.g. Dawkins 1999; Lewontin 2000, respec-
tively).
Each of the four explanatory stances offers information about specific material interac-
tions the evolving organism or population enters into (section 6.3). Viewing these phenom-
ena as information channels requires establishing circumstances (ecological and temporal
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scopes) when a channel applies, and source and target vocabularies (section 5.3). In organ-
isms informed by the genome this raises the question as to what interactions are symbol-
ically guided, in other words, what vocabularies can contain parts of the genetic text. We
now consider the semiotics of the four explanatory stances while incorporating the genome.
For each we review the question it answers and the kind of explanation it offers, note the
relevant ecological and temporal scopes, and suggest semiotics.
In the formalism, upright letters a denote parts of the genetic message along with ap-
paratus necessary to transcribe and translate it. Capital letters refer to different kinds of
processes: environmental events E in general, affordances F with which the organism can
interact for good or ill (e.g. food), processes H comprising the organism (home), their prod-
ucts and effects G (e.g. garbage). Pairings of organism and environmental processes H; E
stand for some combination of interactions H ý E and E ý H at scopes relevant to the
explanatory stance considered. The four questions and associated information channels ap-
pear in angle brackets: xAy, xLy, xHy and xDy; while additional time scopes are presented
in parentheses: pMqolecular interactions pGqrowth processes, pEqcological processes.
1. xAyction (mechanism). How come H is doing this right now?
Reply: Chemical reactions and other lawlike processes.
Scope: one organism in its environment,¥ immediate causes at pMqolecular scopes.
Semiotics: H1; E1 ýxAy H2; E2, with E1 P tFi,Hiu , E2 P tGi,Hiu (7.1)
The interactions comprise occurrences in the non-living world such as those dis-
cussed in chapters 4 and 5. No material realizations of symbols enter into them.
2. xLyifetime (ontogeny). How come H grew this or came to be able to do this?
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Reply: Developmental life paths bootstrapping themselves from core sets of symbols
and interactions.
Scope: one organism in its environment,¥ range of durations of pGqrowth processes
from immediate to the full life span.
Semiotics: a; E ýxLy H; G, or in short aýxLy H (7.2)
The symbolic genetic message informs a range of possible life paths in indirect ways,
resulting in different phenotypic expressions. Developmental outcomes aggregated
over possible environments comprise the ecological reaction norm of the genotype.
3. xHyistory (phylogeny). How come H evolved this? Just so.
Reply: Accidents and selective influences stringing into sequences related as narra-
tives in evolutionary time.
Scope: population environmental interactions ¥ over the number of lifetimes, dura-
tions differ for any specific evolutionary xHyistory event depending on how and how
quickly distributions of genetic information change.
Semiotics: ρs
`













Selective and random influences ρs of H; F on reproducing the allele a1 affect the
population probability distribution ρt of alleles a informing the growth of H. H; F af-
fect reproduction over periods shorter than lifetime pGq, and influence the population
over pEqcological times. The uneven pace of changes in ρt comprises evolutionary
xHyistory.
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Consider the semiotic closure of a single organism, a ýxLy H; F ýpGq a1. At start,
information about the effect of interaction H; F on reproduction is in the second
part of the expression, H; F ýpGq a1, distributed over the population in form of
differences in reproduction chances ρs. In a selective event, the information moves
to the initial part, a ýxLy H; F, now residing in every organism (assuming directed
selective influence ρs drives an allele a in the distribution ρt to fixation) in proclivities
to grow H. As discussed in section 6.3, allele a informs ontogeny of H in anticipation
of H; F aiding reproduction of a1.
4. xDyifference (function). What for is H’s action or organ?
Reply: Claims of teleonomy or intention in an organism’s recognition and responses
to environmental affordances.
Scope: individual environmental interactions ¥ at periods from immediate to life-
time, resulting from past selection,.
Semiotics: a; E ýxDy,xLy pH; F ýxDy,pGq a1q, or in short aýxDy H; F (7.4)
Allele a informs growth of an organism in environment E, in expectation of a fu-
ture teleonomic interaction H; F. In it, a bodily process H meets an environmental
affordance F, promoting allele reproduction a1.
Dawkins (1999) and Dennett (2017) discuss the nature of teleonomic properties of liv-
ing beings, suggesting that adaptive explanations are contextual and provided by us. For
example, for Dawkins, to call an allele a one “for” reading, a needs to make a difference
whether and how a person reads; the argument may have been made as easily, say, for
criminality or obesity. Dennett calls these inferred relationships “floating rationales,” in-
tentional hypotheses about observations we can invent by informed guess. This, however,
99
glosses over two assumptions. First, how come we humans can infer the rationales and
expect the guesses to be serviceable; and second, how do the phenomena the explanations
refer to, such as reading and obesity, come to populate the environment? Dennett’s (2017)
proposed replies rely on the duality between the manifest and the scientific images, which
as argued in chapter 2 bring in assumptions about society.
Rather than assuming too much about the context to which teleonomic organism pro-
cesses respond to, we consider more closely the nature of semiosis in occasions of use. The
simplest example of a functional process discussed by Pattee (1973) is enzyme recognition
and binding. An enzyme interacts with a substance and changes its shape to bind to it,
continuing to the next interaction. For enzymes, H; F can be unpacked as
H
F
,/./-ýpMq HF ýpMq E (7.5)
or F ýpMq H ýpMq HF ýpMq E (7.6)
The enzyme H recognizes a substance F and binds with it, producing HF and further
interactions E, such as effects in the body, a functional response, or byproducts.
While Pattee (1973) discusses the statistical (informational) properties of the fit be-
tween the binding site and the compound, by itself H; F is just a chemical reaction. How-
ever, it is not independent: it affects and acts constrained by a larger process it is a part of.
Per Pattee, H; F takes place within
a collection of element types that may combine or interact with each other
individually in many ways, but that nevertheless persist as the same collection
when looked at in detail over a long period of time. (p. 103)
Pattee, pp. 107–108 recalls that sets of such interactions come to persist through pop-
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ulation dynamics, which select specific “internal, detailed dynamics,” and rely on internal
arbitrary representations. The enzyme interaction, in other words, is semiotic because it
aids reproduction of “time-dependent, rate-control processes in populations of elements,”
by providing a microscopic degree of freedom.
To illustrate the relationship between the competence and the genome, extend the ex-







H1; F 1 ýxDypGq ...
˘˘˘
. (7.7)
There are two semiotic cycles in this expression, two loci that are informative about each
other by way of affecting each other’s reproduction. A symbolic, semiotically closed cycle
goes from allele a to a1 and reproduces with the organism, informing the ontogeny of
competence H every time. The other is semiotic as well (at least a simple sign), runs
from competence H to H1, mediated by the effect of its pragmatic use in environmental
circumstances F on reproduction of a1.
Competence H is grown in anticipation of future interaction of a complex process with
an environmental event F. It is semiotic because it is informative, if in a rudimentary way,
about a specific interaction and its own future reproduction at the same time. We argued at
some length in section 6.3 that the information about meeting the affordance is embodied,
materially represented by the component providing the degree of freedom.
The intentional response to the affordance portrayed in expressions (7.5), (7.6) is straight-
forward, but there is no reason outright why an embodied representation would not be more
elaborate. Symbols can be costly to represent in matter, but as reviewed in the previous
chapter, sometimes they are favored to evolve. Genes, for example, are symbolic; can
complex representations arise as a somatic or behavioral competences, and how?




Figure 7.1: Semiotic relationships for a generic competence of an organism. Allele a
informs competence H in anticipation of affordance F, aiding reproduction of a1 and future
reappearance of interactions H1; F 1. Discussion in the text along with expression (7.7).
evolutionary transitions in partial competition with genes. Also, a variety of animal behav-
iors have semiotic content (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003; Mayr 1974). The next section
considers circumstances under which a versatile structured representation, employing syn-
tax and symbols, can arise somatically and in their ecological and social interactions.
7.2 Matter and Text
Throughout the history of life, living beings have evolved a wide range of ways to represent
and produce signs other than in their genes, as well as to combine their informational fa-
cilities by forming larger entities. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) analyze a number
of such evolutionary transitions, and Beach (2003) argues that they take place as represen-
tational structures available to a population of organisms compete. The present account
agrees; however, such representations usually need genes to reproduce and vice versa, so
their relationship is not only competitive. Semiotic structures differ in what they can repre-
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sent, and new ones take over as they can gather relevant information more efficiently, which
points in favor of division of labor; Beach argues similarly.
This section proposes some features of representations other than genetic during evo-
lutionary transitions, arising through semiotic closure of interactions with the environment
in addition to the semiotic closure of the genome. The previous section has argued that
somatic competences already are representational, anticipating a future interaction of a
semiotically closed process they are a part of, and cyclical, as they indirectly affect their
own recurrence. However, their semiotic structure as well as their physical realization can
be very modest. For example, a stimulus-response mechanism such as the example of a
membrane valve (section 6.4) works as a simple pre-semiotic state switch (section 5.2).
Organism competences, though, can become representational in more than this simple
sense, evolving counterparts to syntax and symbols. While Beach (2003) analyzes fitness
and metabolic considerations in major evolutionary transitions (Maynard Smith and Szath-
máry 1995), the present focus is on how the representation manifests materially and over
time, and what kind of syntax and symbols it may have evolved.
As with representation in autocatalytic sets discussed previously, the evolution of phe-
notypic semiotic structures requires semiotic closure. Any competence affecting repro-
duction also influences its recurrence, and so satisfies one criterion for closure. The other
criteria, such as that the representation can inform a (nearly) arbitrary set of interactions,
are not in general satisfied. What kind of a representational structure evolves that meets
them, in whole or part, depends on the nature of affordances being met and the properties
of the substrate.
To approach the transitions, recall from the previous chapter the three aspects of evo-
lution of representation in semiotic closure: self-reinforcement, specialization, symbolic
encoding. The latter are logically dependent on the prior, but all may be manifesting at any
time. The dynamics are substrate neutral: originally considered for interactions of organic
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molecules, but applicable to interactions of any kind that achieve semiotic closure. Deacon
(1997, pp. 84–88), for example, discusses similar representational changes in the studies
of primates learning symbol use, moving from simple signs, one per referent; to symbolic
terms, their relationships reflecting real-world relationships among referents.
Each of the three aspects also suggest broad observables as to whether and what kind
of a representation is indeed evolving; more detail in chapter 6.
1. Versatile self-reinforcement. Processes such as autocatalysis that abet initiation of
multiple instances of themselves, can incorporate a wide range of new interactions,
as well as vary and reproduce the variation, initiate natural selection. To the extent
they can reproduce faithfully, a population can over time become representational
about past environmental interactions.
Semiosis is favored to originate when self-reinforcing networks of interactions are
also versatile, meeting a wide range of possible interactions within their context.
Living beings already are self-reinforcing, so the ingredient more significant in the
evolution of secondary semiotic structures is the diversity and acceleration of possi-
ble interactions in some relevant domain not readily selected for genetically.
2. Specialization, stabilization, autopoiesis. Living processes evolve specialized com-
ponents, such as teleonomic (uncomprehendingly competent) features, regulatory
feedbacks, and metabolism. Component processes can be seen as representational
of their competences, and of how they communicate to maintain the whole. The
living process forms individuals, if it can.
Autopoiesis can manifest in two ways. First, to the outside the process forms bound-
aries, and we can discern individuals. Second, on the inside it differentiates, and we
can at least in part infer the function of specialized component processes.
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3. Symbolic encoding. A part of the living process evolves to specialize for representing
and decoding information. Methods of representation are favored that are partly or
entirely discrete, exhibit syntax, or employ symbols, which can in principle represent
an arbitrary range of (capacities for) interaction.
At this point we can identify parts of the process that function as symbols: discrete
or partly separable entities that can, transcribed and translated by other interactions,
represent and inform a wide range of the process’s features and actions. We can
expect to find symbols at material bottlenecks in reproduction, where they are favored
to evolve.
There are many options where a phenotypic representation could reside. Recall the
semiotics of adaptations (section 7.1) extended to the growth of the child organism, here
shorn of parentheses:
a; E ýxDyxLy H; F ýxDypGq a1; E1 ýxDyxLy H1; F 1 ýxDypGq ... (7.8)
The statement is a shortcut for a long string of interactions, from genes to tissues and
behaviors and back and again. It describes a semiocycle (section 6.5), a materially contin-
uous cyclical process involving the genome and an environmental interaction, integrated
into the wider living process. The two legs of semiotic closure are shown: genetic, from a
to a1, mediated through reproduction; and phenotypic (pragmatic), from H to H1, mediated
by the development of the child organism.
Secondary representation may appear at any point in this cycle, manifesting the above
three aspects to differing degrees. It can appear at different distances from genes: develop-
mental switches are in the genome, cognitive structures in the brain, letters patterns on the
screen. In particular, a phenotypic semiotic structure not tied to genes would comprise a
potential reproduction channel for additional evolutionary dynamics.
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Most of the representations in evolutionary transitions are somatic, residing in the body
H, and so still materially tied to genes, as the signs or a proclivity to form them needs to be
rebuilt every time during organism life time. The parts of the cycle most remote from genes
are outside the body, the environment E where the organism develops and affordances F
it addresses. Living beings indeed pass information to others through the environment, by
active signaling (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003) or by modifying their environments
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
In the next chapter, the three aspects are considered for major evolutionary transitions
(Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995). For each new semiotic structure, or mode, we dis-
cuss the variety of affordances it meets, whether it forms components and entities, whether
and how it is encoded. We also look at the materials and events that represent the signs, and
the periods over which they are interpreted and have effect. Finally, we evaluate whether
and how the semiotic structure can support evolutionary dynamics in addition to genetic.
The following section anticipates the conclusion of this discussion, that there is likely
an additional, sociocultural evolutionary process, communicating via both active signals
and environments, mediated through persons and activities. A heuristic argument follows
as to why it is reasonable to expect this is so, and implications are discussed for the gap
between “standard” and evolutionary social research.
7.3 Persons in Activities
The expression “socially constructed” is a root of much anguish, often wielded as a blud-
geon by its proponents and a target of gratuitous dismissals by its critics. I will argue,
broadly in this section and in more detail later on, that the term expresses the fact that
culture underlies a semiotically closed evolutionary process, symbolically reproduced by
humans in social activities, that writes its text both in our bodies and in our living environ-
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ments.
It is not necessary to know precisely how information is represented and reproduced to
infer that evolution may be taking place in a domain of interest. By analyzing patterns in
observable differences over time, we can say that information of some kind persists between
occasions and infer much about it. Indeed, Darwin and Wallace both first characterized
organic evolution almost a century before the discovery of DNA as the information carrier.
They did so by reasoning from observed similarities in gross morphology between parents
and offspring, both in the wild and in the experience of animal breeders.
Suppose we did not know much about human societies, and wanted to start formulating
possible theories on the basis of what we can observe directly, with some advice from
evolutionary biology and the preceding discussions. We would likely note the immense
diversity in what people do; no single species on Earth engages in such a wide range of
behaviors. This is the first hint that evolutionary explanation may be applicable, as it is
the most general natural scientific framework we have to explain the origin of variety in
some phenomenal realm. The second hint is that we use symbols, which, as argued in the
previous chapter, are closely associated with evolving processes.
If we were then to tally the prima facie patterns in human action, we would notice two
main regularities. First, by person: any one person engages in a range of actions she or he is
likely to reenact, if never exactly; a randomly selected other person would likely reproduce
a different range of actions. Second, by activity: similar people do similar things in similar
places at similar times. We would find out considerably subtler patterns once we delved
deeper, but these two are the most apparent.
Moreover, extending the time frame, we would recognize two circumstantial pieces
of evidence for evolutionary processes, paralleling ontogeny and evolutionary history in
Tinbergen (1963). First, history: if we track similar cultural behaviors over many people
and longer time periods, we can see that they change in complex ways, which we convey
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in narratives. Second, ontogeny: what humans do is learned, how a person acts today is
related to and took shape over activities one took part in earlier, possibly over a long time.
This also identifies the activities as a channel of reproduction.
From this, we would be justified in making the educated guess that evolutionary ex-
planation is a candidate approach to making sense of human societies. We do not know
much of the details of the process, seeing that they depend on the details of reproduction
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, pp. 346–357). We do know that social interaction is a
reproduction channel, and that the four explanatory stances by Tinbergen (1963) would be
salient to explaining any evolving phenomena so they can be a fruitful initial approach.
On this basis, we can take socially constructed to denote any phenomenon about which
we can ask the four questions and expect an informative answer in terms of human social
activity. In particular,
1. xAyctivity: one person, immediate social and biological causes. How come X is
doing this right now? What does X experience and mean to do? How does S, a social
phenomenon we are trying to account for, manifest?
2. xLyearning: one person, learning over lifetime. How come X came to learn this?
How is S learned and by whom?
3. xHyistory: interaction over a number of lifetimes. How did X’s social context come
to include this? How did S come to be?
4. xDyialectics: interaction and influence in a social activity, times from immediate to
lifetime; social power. What is X responding to and what does s/he aim to accom-
plish? What social or cultural reason are people doing S for? What shapes S at any
moment?
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These questions, of course, are nothing new, in fact they pervade the so-called standard
model of social sciences. The questions are often explicitly anticipated, for example by
Mills (2000, pp. 6–7) at the very beginning of his well known discussion of sociological
imagination poses three questions we can ask about societies and their features. The first
of Mills’ questions is xDy, the second is xHy, and the third combines xAy and xLy. The
questions may be obvious, which may also make them important. By the present argument,
much work in “standard” social sciences is already pursuing, qualitatively, explanations
corresponding to Tinbergen (1963).
If this picture of sociocultural evolution is true, it offers an alternative framework to
the current work on the topic (e.g. Smith 2013), a point of comparison and evaluation. For
instance, models such as biased transmission in dual inheritance theory (Boyd and Rich-
erson 1985), while based on population genetics, crucially differ in how closely they can
approximate the dynamics. The biases due to success, prestige, majority influence, and so
on, are not direct quantitative skews on our learning of new cultural traits, but mediated by
attributes of human activities. The dynamics suggested by the models apply to the extent
these influences are reflected in the details of the sociocultural reproduction channel, sym-
bolic interaction. Population genetics models very closely reflect details of information
transmission such as ploidy and zygosity; in society we generally know far less. Although
this essay does not offer an alternative formal model of sociocultural evolution, it does dis-
cuss general features such a model may have and how they reflect current research (chapter
9).
Next, I offer a more detailed argument as to why human symbolic interaction is a plau-
sible basis for an evolution-like process. This requires tracing the origin of representations
other than genetic through the history of life, informed by Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
(1995); Beach (2003).
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CHAPTER 8 BIOSEMIOTICS OF EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITIONS
the first fact to be established for the study of history is the corporeal organiza-
tion of human beings and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. (Marx
and Engels 1975, as quoted in Fracchia 2017)
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) analyze a sequence of transitions in evolutionary
history, from the origin of life to that of complex societies. The changes they track involve
an elaboration of ways living beings handle information (p. 6). Indeed, the idea for their
book came when the two realized they were researching similar issues in widely different
areas of biology, both concerning information.
This section briefly reviews evolutionary transitions, tracking in more detail the dynam-
ics of intentional representation in each. The aim is to show there is a continuity of semiotic
processes from the first living beings to human societies and cultures, and establish inter-
mediates between DNA-informed ontogeny, where a symbolic representation is contained
deeply within an organism and expressed in physical form over a life, to human symbolic
interaction, where symbols are performed, in principle available to all participants, and
often refer to their own use.
The resulting picture portrays a sequence of changes, each building on the previous
and exhibiting several overall trends, such as shortening of time of symbolic production
and expression. However, no one transition happens necessarily; each is contingent on the
existing material conditions and affordances, and has likely evolved only after many false
starts. At any point in history all intentional dynamics that have evolved up to that point
exist alongside each other. Thus the language of progression through stages associated
with orthogenetic evolutionary theories is misleading. I will call the kinds of semiotics that
appear with each transition intentional or semiotic modes.
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(1993) and Eigen (1992), teleon-
omy Mayr (1974), design and inten-
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sentation Pattee (1969).
Eukaryotes





Morphological variation. Linear chromosomes.
Channel: nuclear DNA
replication
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
(1995, ch. 8); Lane (2015, ch. 5)
Sexual Species
Population genetics. DNA
refers to alleles in a pool of
beings with similar¥ lives,
and to how to¥ act to
exchange them. ¥ Evol
choice: speciation, greater
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haploid gametes of two
organisms.
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
(1995, ch. 9).
Table 8.1: Transitions in matter and text, part 1: From Physics to Sex and Species.
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Transition Info Elaboration Environment Syntax and Text Sources
Multicellular
Bodies
Germ and soma, tissues,
body plans. Intention in one
part of DNA to affect
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activity. Text in roles,
crafts, norms, stories.
Shared intentions Tomasello et al.
(2005); Moll and Tomasello (2007),
cumul. culture Boyd and Richerson
(1996), social nets Hill et al. (2011)
distributed cog. Hutchins (2004),
norms Hill (2009)
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Dennett (1991) multiple drafts ex-
tended to societies. Semiotics,
identity and control, actor net-
works, social fields, biopower, in-
stitutions, human ecology.
Table 8.2: Transitions in matter and text, part 2: From Soma to Societies.
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After each evolutionary transition, there are living beings and processes that exhibit the
newest intentional mode. Further intentional modes evolve as organisms adapt to this envi-
ronment, and their own internal representations come to inform interactions with similarly
shaped living processes. In this way, phenomena in the newest mode become affordances
to be referred to. If mutual intentional affordances are beneficial, originally independent
living beings become a part of larger entities such as multicellular organisms, or of broader
sets of relationships such as animal societies (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, p. 9).
Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995, p. 10–14) discuss the kinds of evolutionary
changes that lead to the major transitions: increases in genetic complexity, division of
labor, emergence of new languages. From the semiotic perspective, we can pare down the
major mechanisms of intentional elaboration in each transition to two:
• Mutual reinforcement: intention to interact in partly cooperative ways with inten-
tional processes shaped by different representations.
• Self-reference: intention to interact with the same or a similar representation directly.
The transitions associated with eukaryotes and sexual reproduction, respectively, can
serve as paradigmatic examples of these two mechanisms (figure 8.1). In many cases, such
as the origin of multicellular organisms, the two mechanisms operate at the same time.
The major transitions are listed in Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995, table 1.2,
p. 6); for brevity, only those from genetic code onward are here considered. The main
ones, along with the preceding semiotic modes associated with physics and simple cycles
(chapter 5), are outlined in tables 8.1 and 8.2, and their semiotic features illustrated in
the figures accompanying this chapter. The information in these tables and the ensuing
discussion are partly speculative.
The transitions are reviewed with respect to the following main points:
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Figure 8.1: Semiotic relationships in eukaryotes and sexual reproduction.
In eukaryotes (left), two formerly independent living beings, one marked in teal, have
evolved to form one by providing mutual affordances. Their genomes a and b reproduce
together, though still partly independent.
In sexual reproduction (right), alleles a1,2 inform capacities for mating M1,2, which refer to
the breeding population P and the interaction pm1; m2q, mating, performed with another or-
ganism. The common action anticipates and precipitates recombination of genes a1 and a2
and reproduction. Indirectly, an organism’s genes refer to a population of similar ones. Ex-
change of information through gene flow creates and maintains wider formations, breeding
populations and species.
• Mechanism. Which of the above two mechanisms of elaboration likely underlies the
evolutionary transition.
• Syntax and code. The new ways of representation, if any, that evolve.
• Channel. How the new representations are reproduced.
• Expression. The nature of the processes the representations refer to: how long they
take, how they manifest, e.g. in the organism, in behavior, in symbol production.
We consider the semiotics of some of the modes in more detail. The starting point
are teleonomic (evolved adaptive) relationships from the previous chapter (figures 7.1; 8.2,
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left):
a; E ýxDyxLy grow H; F ýxDypGq use a1; E1... (8.1)
or just a; E ýxLy grow H; F
Genetic message (allele) a informs ontogeny of competence H addressing the environmen-
tal affordance F so as to help reproduction a1, and so on (more detail in section 7.1).
In the notation, tags xLyife time, pGqrowth (lifetime or shorter), and xAyction indicate
¥ time periods of the relationships. To simplify, we can drop the reference to the next
generation as well as xDy indicating teleonomy, which can be assumed.
Living Cells As discussed in chapter 6, living beings come into being through persistent
mutual reinforcement of chemical processes. The code is genetic, represented in the DNA,
and it reproduces as DNA replicates. It is expressed over the cell’s lifetime, in building
the cell and its specialized capacities. Enzyme action is a basic example of short term
intentional action (section 7.1).
Prokaryotes, bacteria and archaea, have thoroughly explored the biochemical and metabolic
pathways available to single cells. Compared to them, eukaryotes are chemically less ver-
satile, while they vary greatly in their form (Lane 2015, ch. 5).
Eukaryotes Eukaryotic cells arose via mutualism (figure 8.1, left), with endosymbiosis
(one organism becoming a part of another) of two or more prokaryotes, likely a bacterium
and an archaeon. Symbionts have evolved into organelles, mitochondria and chloroplasts,
that have mostly relinquished genetic information to the nucleus, although they keep lim-
ited DNA sequences (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995, ch. 8). Nuclear DNA consists
of multiple linear chromosomes, which can divide in parallel and hold more information;
most prokaryotes are limited by a single circular chromosome, copied sequentially. Nu-
115
clear and organelle genomes are reproduced in cell division, and expressed over the cell’s
lifetime, as above.
Sexual Species Sexual reproduction involves a direct shuffling of similar messages (fig-
ure 8.1, right). There are no new codes, and to the extent there is new syntax, it is in the
mechanisms for recombination. Once recombined, the code is reproduced as above, in di-
vision of the fertilized cell, and expressed in growing the organism and its capacities. One
of the capacities is mating, intentional behavior toward organisms assumed to hold similar
DNA messages. As a result, in addition to the interactions of a single organism, the DNA
indirectly refers to its instances in the entire interbreeding population.
Multicellular Bodies The origin of multicellularity can be seen as combining the two
above mechanisms, of versatile specialized capacities of tissues achieved in part because
the same genetic message gets copied to all somatic cells (figure 8.2, right). Nuclear DNA
reproduces in all tissues of the body, where different parts of it turn on or off depending on
local conditions in the organism and its surroundings. There is a new code, developmental
switches, which still resides and is reproduced in cellular DNA. According to Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry (1995), epigenetic inheritance of tissue cells allows for unlimited
heredity, or arbitrary representation. Regulatory switches are expressed over developmental
and shorter times, reacting to environmental changes as well as current interactions, by
affecting the portions of nuclear DNA that are active in each cell. There are limited cases
in which environmental changes affect DNA transcription directly, such as gene editing in
cephalopods (Liscovitch-Brauer et al. 2017).
Developmental switches are a secondary representation that is reproduced in genes, but
acts over shorter periods, affecting organism growth. The start of a life cycle may be tied
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to the change of daylight or weather, for example. A simple way to represent this is
a; E ýxLy copy d; Fd ýpGq grow H; Fh (8.2)
Genetic message a informs organism growth and passes the developmental switch d into
all cells. At some later point, the switch is activated in response to the environmental affor-
dance Fd, informing growth of tissues H, in expectation of further specific interactions Fh.
As Beach (2003) argued, there are two kinds of encodings, each more efficient for a domain
of phenomena.
The secondary encoding d is partially in semiotic closure: it is translated into in prin-
ciple arbitrary actions, informing the growth of tissues and organs, which ultimately help
its reproduction. However, developmental switches do not code for their immediate trans-
lation and reproduction. While an informationally distinct from other parts of the genome,
they depend on the same molecular machinery and reproduction channels.
Ecological communities, especially ones that comprise living beings with multicellular
bodies, include a wide range of potential points of view (figure 8.3). Environments are
interactive, with living beings reacting to an assortment of both living and non-living affor-
dances over a diversity of spatial and temporal scopes. As Stephens et al. (2007, p. 31) put
it,
A rufous hummingbird perches on a prominent branch and surveys a flower-
covered slope. Most of the time, it waits and watches. Occasionally, it flies
off its perch to probe the hanging flowers of scarlet gilia within its territory.
Scarlet gilia is a classic hummingbird flower. An inflorescence consists of six









Figure 8.2: Semiotic relationships in simple teleonomy and multicellular development
compared. See discussion accompanying expressions (8.1) and (8.2).
In the general case (left), allele a informs a teleonomic competence H anticipating affor-
dance F. The information about how H is formed is in the details of the growth process.
In multicellular development (right), developmental switches d are copied into all cells.
They anticipate bodily growth stages and environmental affordances Fd, such as chemi-
cal and temperature gradients, to time the growth of H anticipating Fh later in a similar
environment.
Each inflorescence makes up a clearly defined patch in the sense of classic for-
aging theory—even more so than most patches because it consists of discrete,
visitable entities; i.e., flowers. ... Inflorescences vary: some consist of mostly
empty flowers, while others have mostly full flowers. Our hummingbird’s own
behavior partially creates this pattern, but some other actors are involved as
well. Robber bees move methodically from one flower to the next, making
neat incisions in the corolla that allow their short tongues access to the nectar.
(p. 31)
Approximately by the length of time over which an affordance is available, we can
distinguish between ecological interactions, involving continuous exchanges of materials
or sequences of similar behaviors over longer times, and behavioral ones, necessitating
short-term choices.
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Ecological Interspecies Interactions There are multiple opportunities for interac-
tion between species, such as feeding, predation, parasitism, and mutualism, combining
into complex and often stable webs of relationships (Allhoff et al. 2015). The bulk of infor-
mation about how to engage in these interactions is still encoded and reproduces with DNA.
However, there is a possibility for rudimentary information storage in the environment, via
niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The stability of food webs and the ubiquity
of ecological patches with similar combinations of species may be evidence of mutual rein-
forcement among regular material interchanges between species, and of incipient semiosis
in a medium that cannot easily establish boundaries (section 7.2).
Complex Behavior Choices Given a complex environment, a single organism, es-
pecially a heterotroph with motor skills (i.e. an animal) may need to evaluate any of a
multitude of momentary options. Any syntactic structure within our cognitive processes
would evolve to aid in sorting out these options, interpreting rich sensory information and
responding with complex bodily movements. Cognitive representations affect behavior in
particular situations over short time scales. Information about what to in an environment
can be learned by the organism during its lifetime.
Individual animal cognition as a teleonomic competence could be stylized as:
a; E ýxLy grow K; AýpGq expect
`
k; Fk ýxAy act A; ak
˘
(8.3)
Genetic text a informs the development of cognitive capacity K for use in situations (ac-
tivities) A. Environmental events Fk are anticipated by the internal representation k, which
guides the response action ak with respect to the current activity. The representation k can
be of any complexity as long as it possesses some recollection of previous interactions. On
Dennett’s (2017) account these can be both Skinnerian creatures, remembering trial and
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Figure 8.3: Semiotic relationships in interspecies interactions and cognition.
In ecological interactions between organisms (left), both between and within species,
byproducts of one Ga influence the affordances of the other Fb and vice versa. The in-
teraction shown is the most indirect possible, of mutual shaping of niches in an ecological
community. It suggests, however, that the environment can potentially carry information
between organisms (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
With cognition (right), an organism represents a multitude of potential affordances in the
immediate environment (activity) A, meets affordance Fk with action ak, and adjusts its
internal representation. In this way, organisms carry information between environments.
See expressions (8.3), (8.4), and accompanying discussion.
error outcomes; and Popperian ones, modeling scenarios.
Individual learning in a single interaction can be shown thus:
H; kýxAy act A; pak; FkqýxAy learn H1; k1 (8.4)
The living being represents previous interactions from its lifetime, and learns through new
ones. Cognitive content k is a representation that has a chance to get updated every time it
is used; unlike genes, it does not need to wait for population dynamics. The¥ time period
of both expressing the content and of updating it can be as short as a single xAy behavior.
However, the representation is tied to an individual organism, and cannot outlast it.
Social Groups Animals evolve to live in groups, spending their lives in each other’s
company (figure 8.4, left). Genes of social animals in effect refer to sharing one’s lifetime
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with lifetimes informed by similar sets of genes. While sexually reproducing organisms
anticipate an interaction with similar beings, mating, that can occur relatively rarely, social
animals anticipate many diverse interactions with conspecifics. New cognitive capacities
evolve relating to social cognition, such as theory of mind. Social learning is a new channel
of information exchange within the group that facilitates adopting others’ behaviors, and
can give rise to animal traditions.
a1; E ýxLy grow S 1; AýpGq expect
“pH1, s1q; pH2; s2qýxAy act A; pH1; a1q; pH2; a2q‰ (8.5)
Social cognitive capacity S 1 in the organism H1 maintains the representation s1 in antic-
ipation of interaction with H2 in the activity A. The content represented can include both
organisms, potentially as well the other participants’ representations s2, inferred through
theory of mind.
H1; s1 ýact 1
H2; s2 ýact 2
,/./- A; pH1; a1q; pH2; a2q









A single interaction demonstrates that content can be learned from conspecifics. The social
cognitive representations s1 and s2, whichever form they take, influence one another. They
can reproduce from one organism to the other, although in non-human animals they cannot
refer to arbitrary interactions, and what is learned does not persist faithfully enough (Boyd
and Richerson 1996).
Cultures and Societies A fundamental ability humans use to interact is that to form
shared intentions (figure 8.4, right): two or more people can direct their attention and
actions toward arbitrary commonly recognized objects or goals (Tomasello et al. 2005;
Moll and Tomasello 2007). This capacity is symbolic, as the association between actions
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and goals can in principle be any.
Common characteristics of the evolution of such abilities (section 7.2) direct us to look
for an increase in number and speed of interactions in a domain that cannot easily affect the
genome. Great apes can already learn many behaviors socially, forming group traditions
(Whiten 2000), which represents the domain. On top of this, recent research suggests
several ways these interactions could have intensified and diversified: a rapidly changing
climate in the Pleistocene (Richerson and Boyd 2000), wide ranging exchange networks
(Hill et al. 2011), or, more speculatively, cooking (Wrangham 2009). The reproduction
bottleneck is the interaction itself, which is where we expect symbols may evolve; and
language did.
This is an innovation. Human culture is not the first time an arbitrary representation
evolved after the the genetic code: as noted, developmental switches that regulate the
growth of multicellular bodies allow for it. Switches, however, reside in the DNA and
depend on the genetic channel to reproduce. On the other hand, the crucial part of socio-
cultural reproduction, human symbolic interaction, takes place in public. This is the first
case a new self-reinforcing process has become supracritical, giving rise to an arbitrary
symbolic representation, on a channel of reproduction other than genetic.
With both a symbolic capacity and another reproduction channel other than genetic,
a new, sociocultural evolutionary process comes into being. Its structure is very unlike
organic evolution: cultural information is expressed, reproduced, and shaped at the same
time, in symbolic interaction in social activities. In fact, our symbolic acts often represent
and anticipate themselves.
H1; s1 ýenact 1
H2; s2 ýenact 2
,/./- pA;Pq; pH1; a1; p1q; pH2; a2; p2q










Figure 8.4: Semiotic relationships in social animals and humans (8.5, 8.6, 8.7).
In animal social interactions (left), conspecifics H1,2 engage in a common activity A and
perform actions a1,2. The participants represent each other and their actions as intentional.
Their cognitive representations s1,2 change based on common activity, and organisms can
later reproduce learned actions with others, giving rise to animal traditions. In most social
animals interactions are simpler than in the diagram, and learning takes place gradually,
extending over many interactions.
In human symbolic interaction (right), social learning takes place within activities, in-
scribed with cultural text P relatively to their participants. Their actions are informed
by internal (partly) symbolic representations s1,2 and publicly perform symbolic messages
p1,2. Persons and activities together carry the information reproduced during interactions.
The core difference from animal social interactions is that human are at least partly sym-
bolic in all of their components. Our embodied representations s1,2 employ symbols (marked
by the slight change in font), our actions a1,2 perform symbols p1,2, our activities A contain
inscribed symbols P for people to interpret.
Overall, during evolutionary transitions semiosis in living beings speeds up and be-
comes more elaborate in several respects:
• The period one living being or the population needs to encode a preferred choice
of response to an affordance shortens. At the very start of life this took place in
populations over evolutionary time, relying on stochastic search. Baldwin effect,
thanks to which the chance of a group of organisms to learn a new behavior increases
if one of them learns it, the effect still requires a population but the learning is done
by individuals over shorter periods (Dennett 1995, pp. 77–80). Other animals such as
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primates and dolphins learn over shorter periods, maintaining group traditions (Galef
2009).
• The actions the new representations refer to shorten. Genes are expressed over life-
times, developmental switches over growth periods, cognitive representations in be-
haviors.
• The semiotic content used to represent actions becomes more elaborate. In section
7.1 we noted that teleonomic behaviors are semiotic in virtue of contributing to the
reproduction of the whole, but that their informational structure is in general as sim-
ple as a stimulus-response mechanism. With cognition, our actions are represented
in some structured way; while our cultural practices are both represented by and
manifest symbols.
These sequences meet in human interaction and our capacity for arbitrary symbolizing, and
possible sociocultural evolutionary dynamics. In the next section we turn to discus what
kinds of phenomena arise on this basis.
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CHAPTER 9 CROOKED TIMBER
The origin of culture can be tentatively explained as the first complete realization of the
three aspects of semiotic closure (self-reinforcement, specialization, symbolic encoding)
in a new phenomenal domain, human social practices, on a reproduction channel depen-
dent on but separate from genetic, social learning combined with niche construction. The
previous chapter has suggested one way this could have happened: primate social learning
became faster and more versatile, so that symbolic representation was favored to evolve, in
our capacity to establish and act on arbitrary shared intentions (Moll and Tomasello 2007)
and eventually in language (Deacon 1997).
Theories of sociocultural evolution are a third rail in social sciences for some good
reasons, one of which includes their use in political projects that suggest certain social
outcomes are inexorable and predetermined, such as domination of a “less evolved” social
group by another. In the present essay, stating that evolutionary reasoning can be applied
to society amounts to claiming (a) there is a process of sociocultural reproduction through
symbolic interaction that (b) gives rise to a very wide variety of representations, practices,
and phenomena, which (c) are socially learned and enacted, (d) at least partly rely on sym-
bolic representation to persist, and (e) exhibit possibly diffuse wider intentional properties.
This is in line with “standard” social science claims, and indeed anticipates critiques of
sociocultural evolution such as by Fracchia and Lewontin (1999); Ingold (2007), as will be
discussed toward the end of this chapter.
To approach explanation on this basis, section 7.3 suggested to ask the four questions,
and now expect answers that involve human symbolic interaction. This then amount to the
study of, in order, social activities; learning; history; and dialectics, understood as mutual
shaping of our symbolic actions.
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9.1 Closures
Asking Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions about a social phenomenon requires that we se-
lect one of interest. In this we face a task that is particularly difficult in society, that of
drawing explanatory boundaries and choosing categories. What is a city, a town, a village?
As discussed in section 5.3, categories typically cannot be expected to be exact and are
based on some range of shared affordances, such as what one can usually do in a city. Yet
this says little; social science terms central to public discourse have no settled meaning
precisely because disagreement on the common attributes they reflect. What is fascism?
Are fascists people who adhere to certain shared attitudes (Eco 1995), members of a def-
inite range of movements in interwar Europe, or is it “a rather imprecise but nonetheless
justifiable term of abuse” (Mann 2004, p. x), pending elaboration?
A closely related issue is articulated by Rosenberg (2016, p. 22), that of choosing natu-
ral kinds. For example, if by “fish” we mean just any aquatic animal, we will be including
many species with incongruous attributes and inquiries into fish will be impeded. If, in-
stead, we choose scaly aquatic vertebrates, we are closer to carving the subject at the joints.
Rosenberg continues to restrict natural kinds to those about which “there are laws,” con-
trasting for instance fake gold with gold, whose properties we can examine and describe
with much more precision. The present essay does not assign a special role to lawlike
relationships (section 5.1 and elsewhere), but the criterion can be relaxed along the lines
suggested in section 2.1: the categories we need to seek are those more informative, about
which we can meaningfully ask more questions. The question is, then, what do the analyses
earlier in this essay propose about common characteristics of wider dynamics and entities
in society and culture?
Rosenberg’s (2016, p. 22) example with fish is salient, as it points to why we can tell
more about one category than another when studying living creatures. Fish have common
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characteristics not because they are aquatic vertebrates with scales, but ones that can be
traced to a common progenitor and have no land dwelling ancestors. The category chosen
is both materially and informationally connected; the excluded vertebrate species are those
that (had) significantly modified the fish body plan to meet the exigencies of life on land.
Informational and material continuity discerns smaller biological entities too, if trivially.
In a work arguing that phenotype stretches far beyond a body, Dawkins (1999, p. 258–
259) points out that “[a]n organism is a physical unit associated with one single life cycle,”
“the unit which is initiated by a new act of reproduction via a single-celled developmental
‘bottleneck’.”
Seeking entities would thus involve identifying an “act of reproduction” at an informa-
tional bottleneck, standing at the beginning of a physical expression. The tactic does not
transfer easily from biology to society and culture, as the primary phenomena we are try-
ing to categorize are sociocultural performances: disjointed, interspersed in space and time,
accessible only when in progress. The reproduction channel are social activities which are
physical media, but the information is not encoded and copied materially. Instead, it is
performed, carried between people, interpreted, and reinscribed, to be performed again.
Because of this, the meaning of reproduction is ambiguous. It may refer to one person
repeating a practice they knew before, or to another person learning, or to someone per-
forming a new practice for the first time. For embodied sociocultural information, repro-
duction strictly speaking takes place in the act of learning, while repeating a performance
can be referred to as reenactment. A performance, however, is typically necessary for
learning to take place, and constitutes reproduction of outward symbolic content. Thus the
accepted meaning of reproduction in social sciences can be adopted, subsuming all three
senses (e.g. as in Bourdieu 1977).
Recall, now, that we take an arrangement of matter to be symbolic when it achieves
semiotic closure (Pattee 1969; Rocha 2001). In addition, as discussed in section 6.4, semi-
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otic closure can favor evolution of entities or dynamics approaching them, as mutually re-
inforcing interaction sets evolve to become more individualized. Dawkins’s (1999, p. 258–
259 and above) characterization of organisms as life processes starting from the informa-
tional bottleneck of reproduction, in fact, amounts to defining them as semiotically closed.
Thus, while underlying processes in society and culture are vastly different, looking for
semiotic closure of sociocultural information can point to dynamics approaching entities.
This is, on the view presented in this essay, the closest analogue in society to the criterion
that a category be materially and informationally connected.
Reviewing from section 6.1, a piece of matter is considered semiotically closed when:
it is specialized, meaning that its interactions are limited; these can be seen as semiotic,
such as transcription and translation, because they manipulate the message to initiate fur-
ther actions; these in turn include the semiotic actions themselves as well as the capacity
to reproduce the message (section 6.1). The criteria do not apply easily to embodied so-
ciocultural text. We cannot say how the messages are represented materially, so we cannot
easily tell whether their immediate interactions are limited and semiotic. However, if we
do assume that the text indeed is (partly) symbolic, we can take as given that there are
corporeal processes that represent, interpret, and enact it. To demonstrate semiotic closure,
it remains to identify the outward practices that reproduce the message.
To repeat the reasoning in brief: embodied messages are symbolic, symbols are in semi-
otic closure, semiotic closure includes (capacity for) the symbols’ reproduction, semiotic
closure can point to entities, thus realized sustained reproduction of symbols can point to
entities. As symbols reproduce in interaction, semiotic closure is achieved through (sets of)
social interactions reproducing and reinforcing cultural representations. We now consider
a single interaction in more detail to suggest a semiotically closed building block for wider
dynamics, social relation.
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Interactions Sociocultural reproduction takes place in human activities, whose semiotics
are hard to disentangle, as they appear in streams of overlapping symbolic events. We also
do not, as of now, understand the full range of ways information can be inscribed on and in
physical persons, actions, and surroundings. We do know that our cognitive capacities play
a major role, but our bodies also represent information in complex ways. Despite this, we
can assume that embodied representations are to a significant extent symbolic. One, many
of the actions humans perform manifest symbols, and two, people are capable of learning
and performing an enormous range of sociocultural practices, suggesting use of a generic
and thus likely symbolic underlying representation.
Simplifying slightly from (8.7), a single symbolic interaction can be stylized as:
H1; s1 ýenact 1
H2; s2 ýenact 2
,/./- pA;Pq; pa1; p1q; pa2; p2q





ýinterpret 2 H12; s
1
2 ýenact 2
,/./- pA1;P1q; ... (9.1)
Two people H1,2 with embodied text s1,2 are engaging in a common activity A holding a
store of inscribed cultural information P. Within A;P each person performs actions a1,2
with outward symbolic content p1,2 (parole), changing the activity. Every person then
interprets the interaction, updates their embodied representation to s11,2, and can be affected
in non-symbolic ways, hence H11,2.
As discussed, we can only infer the embodied cultural representations s1,2 by how they
inform actions a1,2. Consequently, we can tell that H2 learns s1 from H1, or that information
s1 gets reproduced in s12, only by a change in H
1
2’s proclivities to perform symbolic acts in
ways typically associated with s1. Some of the texts represented in the actions p1,2 and
inscribed in the activity P are outwardly discernible as symbolic, while many others are
not. External inscriptions exist only for someone who can read them; here, P, p1,2 are
considered as relative to everyone taking part and likely to take part in the activity.
129
There are two paths to semiotic closure illustrated above, for s1,2 from person to per-
son, and for P, p1,2 from activity to activity. While the latter are more readily accessible, we
concentrate on the presumed embodied messages s1,2 because they are attached to living
beings and thus more readily activated. The two sets of representations are interdependent:
s1 can reproduce only when H1 performs a1; p1 in a context where it is understood, so semi-
otic closure requires that participants possess the cultural background needed to interpret
the performed text p1 in the context A;P. Focusing on reproduction of s1 thus assumes fur-
ther social reproduction is continuing apace, both of the activity and of the understandings
participants bring to it.
In the above interaction, s1 can be seen as semiotically closed with s11 any time it in-
forms an action a1; p1, indeed any time it is invoked in any way. We can say this for two
reasons. First, the representation changes materially insofar the interaction reinforces or
otherwise affects any neural connections involved in it. Second, as s1 is socially learned,
every enrollment of s1 in action amounts to a (partial, imperfect) production of “a physi-
cal unit associated with one single life cycle,” and typically a chance for others to learn it
as well. The cycle of actions implied in semiotic closure: decode, perform, reproduce, is
achieved: future chances of reenactment are likely to be affected, and anyone else present
has an opportunity to learn. In other words, the semiotic closure of the act of social learn-
ing, s1 to s12, is the reason why s1 to s
1
1 can be seen as semiotically closed.
Social learning, however, only accounts for reproduction of cultural traits from person
to person, meme-like, allowing for individual level changes such as misunderstanding and
creativity. It does not allow for the general case, in which texts s1,2 are performed with
reference to a common activity, one in which both play part and can change if slightly. In
such an interaction, two semiotic closures through social learning are effected: s1 to s12, and
s2 to s11, so we can say that s1,2 are semiotically closed with s
1
1,2 through mutual influence
in a given context. Repeated, such occasions amount to what we call a social relation.
130
Social relations can be associated with the symbolic content, distributed between their
participants, that shapes and is reproduced by the repeated interactions. In this example,
formally, we can tell that the text combines messages s1 and s2. The symbolic content of
relations can, however, impact whether they need to be performed at all. To have a grocer
I need to shop with him on occasion, but I can have an aunt without ever meeting her.
Relations, seen as symbolically marked kinds of (potential) interactions, are the smallest
semiotically closed “wider dynamic” in society and culture.
Human cultural capacities indeed are set apart from similar abilities of other primates
by being relational. Moll and Tomasello (2007) report that, unlike other great apes, hu-
man children 12-18 months old can: establish joint attention, such as through pointing;
recognize the perspective of another; commit to shared goals; and take and reverse roles in
reaching them. Similarly, Hill (2009, pp. 275–280) argues that human culture differs from
animal traditions in shaping social relations. Hunter-gatherer societies establish and keep
norms and rules in areas of human activity that affect biological fitness, such as mating,
food production and redistribution, and political power, then signal their adherence through
symbolic markers and rituals. These comprise the outward expression of the ethnic group,
and function thanks to regular shaping of social activities.
Persistent wider dynamics in societies and cultures require repeated symbolic interac-
tions and thus lasting relations. Interactions, and by extension social relations, are a pri-
mary material manifestation of our evolved capacities for somatic representation (chapters
7 and 8). Relations established and maintained through symbolic social learning, as well
as wider processes into which they combine, are proposed as the closest to a “natural kind”
(Rosenberg 2016, p. 22 and above) in explanation of any social phenomena.
The next section turns to consider regular structuring of our activities, and to the overall
properties of social processes that may result.
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9.2 Infrastructures
Social activities are a reproduction channel for sociocultural information, the way it man-
ifests, and the environment that shapes it. Analogues to phenotypic expression, reproduc-
tion, and selection take place in the same context at the same time. Understanding what
comprises and shapes social activities is thus necessary to explain the nature of any wider
dynamics in society and culture. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981, pp. 346–357) sup-
port this, evaluating a range of models based on epidemiology and population genetics and
concluding that the mode of cultural transmission, i.e. the structure of the reproduction
channel, is of central importance to predicting the changes traits undergo.
In general, social activities are too complex for us to identify such detail as to allow
for the explanatory power of population genetics. Exceptions to this are the situations that
can inherently be formally modeled or those that we design that way. What we can say is
that any persistent aspect of social activities is likely to (a) affect other aspects of the same
activities, (b) be reflected in regularities in what is learned, which means it will in turn (c)
have recurring consequences further afield. When these regularities can be anticipated, a
persistent aspect of social activities becomes a potential affordance for other practices. One
persistent affordance we avail ourselves of is language, integral to symbolic interaction.
Others we introduce. Informed by Frischmann (2012), Anderies et al. (2016, p. 8–9)
suggest a focus on infrastructure in the study of social-ecological systems (SESs). Infras-
tructure is taken to be “a coherent structure of any kind”; meaning, a clearly discernible
structure that is geographically, socially, or otherwise bounded, that in tandem with other
such structures shapes action situations, providing affordances for production of “a vari-
ety of mass and information flows we value” (emphasis removed). The authors proceed to
name five types of infrastructure: hard, such as roads and canals; accepted arrangements
and instructions, such as institutions, for handling other kinds of infrastructure; environ-
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mental, ecological and geological assets; available knowledge; and social relationships.
The examples are heterogeneous, and the lines between some types of infrastructure are
blurry, but all comprise sets of lasting shared affordances in given domains.
Anderies et al. (2016, p. 9) point out configural properties of infrastructure, which they
depict in two ways. Infrastructure acts as an input for downstream activities, and it inter-
acts with other infrastructures to produce “interesting higher-level organizational patterns.”
Interactions among infrastructures can be messy or misdirected, such as in the examples of
representing resource use as Prisoner’s Dilemma and commodification of ecosystem ser-
vices (pp. 15–16). Baggio et al. (2016), moreover, analyze multiple observed relationships
between Ostrom’s (2005) design principles and properties of resources.
To characterize configural influences from the present perspective, first note one salient
feature of any infrastructure, direct human engagements with it that form the pragmatic
interface to its affordances, in the broadest sense. These are, for example, learning the
use, daily uses, development, maintenance, innovation, and so on. Anderies et al. (2016)
consider some of these practices downstream activities, while others are infrastructural, as
accepted arrangements and instructions for use. However, immediate uses are obviously
present for each infrastructure, representing the front from which its influence spreads.
The practices of use of any infrastructure and the affordances they meet are social con-
structs. A wetland presents one set of opportunities to the sewer treatment utility, another
to a bird watcher, and so on: infrastructural affordances are tied both to the ecology and
to human activities, which change. Meanwhile, one particular set of our practices, sewage
treatment, reproduces (its representations and performances are semiotically closed) with
respect to one affordance of the wetland, its filtering capacities.
If we were to trace the material connection from the wetland to the first point of contact
with human activities, we would grab a multitude of disparate social and cultural practices.
Interaction with sewage over a day reflects individual, cultural, and organizational rhythms
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of work and hygiene. City sewers then aggregate such information with respect to what the
wetland filters, establishing an information channel between the ecosystem and our daily
lives. By effecting a simple interface between hard (sewage treatment plant) and environ-
mental (wetland) infrastructure, some ways to interact with the ecosystem are closed off,
while our daily activities benefit from convenient access to the water cycle as need arises.
Infrastructure thus shapes human activities: while mediating influences from away, it
flattens itself into specific situations. It becomes inscribed in A;P, sometimes to the point
participants are unaware of it. The configural nature of infrastructure amounts to a regular
simplification in information at one or more points between human activities and opportu-
nities tied to the infrastructure. Streamlining activities encourages their reproduction and
opens opportunities for other pursuits, which speeds up sociocultural evolutionary pro-
cesses, whatever they may be.
In the previous section we argued that persistences in societies and cultures are likely
to be semiotically closed, reproducing symbolic representations: individually, as when one
learns a word; and relationally, realized in repeated interaction. Just now, we discussed reg-
ular shaping of human activities by coupled infrastructures that mediate access to coherent
sets of affordances, which simplifies and accelerates interactions further away. We now
turn to characterize semiotically closed dynamics that can arise on top of multiple mutually
reinforcing symbolic interactions.
9.3 Flywheels
Social relations, regular opportunities for symbolic interactions of a given kind, are semiot-
ically closed, as their representations reinforce each other transparently every time people
engage (section 9.1). Relations are also a building block for wider phenomena. As just dis-
cussed, infrastructure is configural: it clarifies particular social activities, which simplifies
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existing interactions, and makes room for further relations for people to enter into.
Accelerating interactions can become mutually reinforcing, leading to semiotic closure
in an autocatalytic fashion. This, it was argued, took place earlier in the history of life, at
its origin and in the evolution of somatic and cultural representations (section 7.2, chapter
8). The question arises whether and how it can occur among our relations. The reply is
inevitably equivocal, as boundaries between visible relations and persistent emergent dy-
namics are blurry. In fact, common social entities such as organizations reproduce through
a continuum of explicit and tacit means (Nelson and Winter 1982, ch. 5).
On present view, human cultures and societies are engines for overlapping semiotically
closed networks of interactions of multiple kinds and sizes. Every infrastructure and every
common practice simplifies different aspects of activities and encourages further interac-
tions in some way. The shape of wider dynamics depends on how the original interactions
are simplified and on how they relate to others. Thus, we cannot say much in general about
overall contours of SESs, although we are acquainted well with specific cases.
Some purchase on general features of wider semiotically closed sociocultural dynamics
can be gained from the view of evolution of representation presented in section 7.2. Semi-
otically closed, autocatalytic-like sets of interactions tend to exhibit to varied extents the
trio of self-reinforcement, self-maintenance through differentiation, and symbolic marking,
along with aspects of distributed intentionality. Rather than a ratchet, a better mechanical
metaphor for complex phenomena arising in sociocultural evolution are flywheels (as a
shorthand, although a non-mechanical metaphor would be preferred, say flydances).
Flywheels are ways human activities can feed into each other and back over any so-
cial, physical, and temporal scope. An elementary example from archaeology are chaînes
opératoires, networks of interdependent activities involved in the production of stone tools.
Such dynamics, it is suggested, are a candidate causal explanation for social and cultural
persistences, and can be said to manifest social power. Depending on the context, any of
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the three aspects of evolution of representation can be manifested to any degree. Models
of random grammars, strings of letters operating on each other in a virtual chemistry, in-
dicate the range of forms flywheels may take (Kauffman 1993, pp. 372–374). Just to list
the names of different geometries: Jet, Lightning Ball, Mushroom, Egg, Fixed, Traveling,
Wobbly Ergodic and Hairy Egg, Filigreed Fog, Pea Soup (Kauffman 1990, p. 10).
Human examples are likely to be more down to earth. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983)
characterization of Foucault’s biopower bears quoting in full, as they may be describing a
human Filigreed Fog:
This is not a new form of functionalism. The system is not in any way in
equilibrium; nor is it, except in the most extended of senses, a system. There
is no inherent logic of stability. Rather, at the level of the practices there is
a directionality produced from petty calculations, clashes of wills, meshing
of minor interests. These are shaped and given a direction by the political
technologies of power. This directionality has nothing inherent about it and
hence it cannot be deduced. It is not a suitable object for a theory. It can,
however, be analyzed ... (pp. 187–188)
Flywheels are complex, internally connected material processes. They consist of seem-
ingly disjoint interactions, but every encounter between people is a physical medium ex-
changing sociocultural information. They take up and move matter and energy, appearing
for example as persistent supply networks in economies.
The three aspects of evolution of representation in societies and cultures (section 7.2)
are broad, and so can offer at best circumstantial clues; some bear a brief mention. The
classification by Ostrom (2005) of common expectations of others’ institutional behaviors
into shared strategies, norms, and rules parallels closely the triad of self-reinforcement,
self-maintenance, and coding. The invention of writing usually starts with pictorial repre-
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sentations and grows more stylized, syntactic, and abstracted. Overall, symbolic systems
we use such as scripts, currencies, legal codes and so on, can be seen both as evolving in
concert with, and as facilitating accelerating interactions in their domains.
Boyd and Richerson (2008) discuss one kind of infrastructure, social institutions, in
light of population models of human cultural change. The article lists six stylized facts
about institutions (pp. 307–309), which can be qualitatively accounted for if we view insti-
tutions as (parts of, partly) flywheels. The first three are basic properties of self-reinforcing
interaction sets: persistence over time in a population, lack of conscious design, and inter-
nal complexity and heterogeneity of interaction. The next two, that institutions may or may
not favor any specific social group, can be read as a statement on their uncertain intention-
ality. The last, that they are often symbolically marked, such as by a flag, reflects the fact
that flywheels are a semiotically closed process, continually producing and reproducing
texts. Flywheels are not deterministic, but mediated by the agency of people who partake
in them. People may, for example, decide to make an institution more official by producing
symbols that apply to it in entirety, such as emblems and codes.
Intentions Flywheels often exhibit intentionality: there is a meaningful (usually uncer-
tain, occasionally unpleasant) reply to the question “for what?” or “for whom?” This does
not require a complex set of events, any mutually reinforcing set of interactions can be
intentional: indeed, any repeated interaction, or a social relation, and it does not have to be
effected in person.
One example are the live-and-let-live agreements that developed between Entente (French
or British) and German soldiers across no man’s land in World War I (Axelrod 1984, ch. 4).
Without any contact, the soldiers of the two sides would time and direct their artillery
rounds in such a way to minimize or avoid casualties, effecting an undeclared cease fire. In
the literature on cooperation dilemmas, this is usually cited as an example of coordination.
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In light of the earlier discussions, it is also a distributed act with intention.
When the soldiers on the two sides realized they could coordinate, they likely also
became cognizant of it as a good idea, and continued acting on it on purpose. Similarly,
the visiting officer who “made up [his] mind to do away with that sort of thing when we
took over; such things should not be allowed” (Axelrod 1984, p. 73, quoting Dugdale
1932) clearly found the tacit agreement in violation of army discipline. Plausibly deniable
but glaringly apparent, it is an intentional act to be countered by another: “These people
evidently did not know there was a war on. Both sides apparently believed in the policy of
‘live and let live’ ” (p. 74).
Intention implies representation (chapter 6), and in this case, the tacit truce is repre-
sented in two ways. First, the soldiers on each side are quite aware of it and intend to
follow it through. Second, soldiers on both sides are quite aware of it and intend to follow
through: the two aims are in concert and are confirmed by any successful joint action. If
this ceased to be the case, for example if a visiting officer enforced discipline on either
side, the awareness and good intention of the opposing soldiers would be in vain. The truce
intent is represented both by the content intended by each side, realized in specific actions,
and by the relationship between the contents.
The nature of intentionality in larger self-reinforcing sets of interactions (flywheels) is
proposed to be similar. Individual conscious aims and actions partake in wider intentional
dynamics, never entirely independent but rarely fully overridden by them. Thus, paralleling
poststructuralist notions, a person is at the same time being made by the different (textual
and disciplining) flywheels she or he takes part in, while too shaping them (Foucault 1984).
It is not necessary for people to be aware of their participation: “[p]eople know what they
do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what
they do does” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, p. 187, quoting Foucault).
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Dimensions The semiotic perspective allows for more internally structured dynamics
than Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) paint Foucault’s biopower. With evolving representa-
tion, we can expect that certain flywheels exhibit partly functional internal structure, and
that for others people develop symbolic codes specific to the dynamic.
Consider mutually reinforcing networks of symbolic interactions that are not just dif-
fuse, but to some extent manifest autopoiesis. We would expect such flywheels to be dif-
ferentiated, to link up interacting heterogeneous components in a self-maintaining fashion,
possibly exhibiting attributes of function. Because they are distributed social processes,
we do not in general know much about their contours. A flywheel can be clearly marked,
but we cannot rely on one to have boundaries, and it does not “die” or necessarily leave a
tangible trace if the people who partake in it stop doing so.
The foundation for such dynamics, it was proposed in section 9.2, is the configural na-
ture of infrastructure. Communication with some coherent structure in society or on the
landscape is streamlined, providing affordances for material and information exchanges,
and structuring our activities. This creates and provides a social field, allowing for diversi-
fication and acceleration of other interactions.
The simplifications provided by infrastructures in action situations can be related to the
notion of social dimensions in organizational ecology. McPherson (2004, pp. 264–269)
does not say how to observe flywheel dynamics, but provides valuable intuitions about
what actually takes place on top of infrastructural affordances. McPherson considers social
dimensions, relational affordances, “quantities that locate social positions in relationship to
one another.” In early humans, on his view, these have been status and material accumula-
tion; one could add gender, ethnicity, and geography – and later came to include education,
occupation, income, race, and many others. Dimensions, in turn, facilitate organization of
entities: “firms, groups, associations, events, cultural artifacts, markets, social circles” and
so on. As noted by Ostrom (2005, pp. 269–270), interactions within a (discernible) coupled
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infrastructure system (CIS) encourage creation of nested enterprises.
Recall that flywheels are semiotically closed: whatever else they do, they reproduce
symbolic representations. This does not require people to intentionally inscribe a social
dynamic as an entity, such as by a flag or laws. Texts exist within processes that interpret
them, so steady interactions with infrastructure tend to stabilize such cultural understand-
ings of them as are particular to persons and groups taking part.
Methods that may indicate this patterning can be found in cultural domain and cultural
content research. For example, Mohr and Neely (2009); Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (2010)
categorize self-published descriptions of work by charities, asylums, and social service
agencies in New York at the turn of the 20th century. The studies map structural similari-
ties among the texts across several dimensions, such as a person’s status, the social problem
they experience, and potential technology to address it. Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (2010)
point out partially intentional historical patterns, specifically the competition between set-
tlement houses and scientific charities.
Finally, while infrastructures persist, their footprint on societies and cultures, the ways
they direct the “flows we value,” is both diverse and uneven. No infrastructure reaches
everywhere, or everywhere equally, or in the same way. According to McPherson (2004,
pp. 267, 276–277), these differences represent dimensions along which interaction with
CISs sorts people into positions. Similar profiles of access to amenities result in similar
life histories, which makes it more likely people meet. The interplay between available
infrastructural affordances thus gets reflected in social relations. The consequence are do-
main dependent networks of relationships on multiple scopes, among people, communities,
research disciplines, organizations, industry sectors, and so on (White 2008, ch. 2). Wider
relationships between network positions occupied by social groups are reflected as struc-
tural similarity, tendency to form similar links, studied by methods such as blockmodeling
(Burt 1983).
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Social network positions, however, can be involuntary, relationships among them un-
equal or coerced. We now compare the semiotic perspective with articulations of social
power by Wolf (1999); Mann (1986); Ortner (2006); Kondo (1990). In the next section, we
continue to consider possible parallels and differences with critical studies.
Powers Wolf (1999, p. 5) distinguishes “four modalities in how power is ... woven into
social relations”: individual, interactive, contextual, and structural. In part anticipated
by Wolf’s (pp. 6–7) attention to the importance of communication and symbolic codes,
the four modalities all have semiotic interpretations, associated with the different loci of
sociocultural inscription.
The first, the “capability that is seen to inhere in an individual,” characterized as “Niet-
zschean” (Wolf 1999, p. 5), perhaps modestly parallels embodied symbolic representations,
s1,2 in expression (9.1), along with a person’s ability to enact them. The second, “the ability
of an ego to impose its will in social action upon an alter (the Weberian view),” expresses
the public interaction of performed representations p1,2, the differences in their immediate
public visibility, along with the embodied and contextual representations thereby learned
and inscribed. The third, the “power that controls the contexts in which people exhibit
their capabilities,” is the ability to affect inscriptions P in activities. Finally, the power
that “organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves, and that specifies the direction
and distribution of energy flows,” is represented in sustained relationships between differ-
ent realms of interaction, whether between regiments in opposing trenches (relation), or
among infrastructures in social-ecological systems (flywheel).
These four loci of sociocultural inscription are mutually materially constituted parallel-
ing the explanatory stances by Tinbergen (1963). Successful enxAyctments of s produce
p, prevailing performances p inscribe activity contexts P and shape what is xLyearned, and
structures arise over xHyistory through sustained mutual reinforcement of activities.
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The analysis of sources of social power by Mann (1986, and later volumes) focuses on
the interplay between the most encompassing of these dynamics, the contextual and the
structural. Mann characterizes primary social dynamics as “overlapping and intersecting
... networks of social interaction,” which provide “institutional means of attaining human
goals” (p. 2, emphasis removed), in accord with the view of flywheels as heterogeneous
sustained relations across coupled infrastructures. Mann (pp. 11–14) criticizes the view
of societies as functional systemic wholes formed in symmetrical levels or dimensions,
as per Marx or Parsons, offering instead the view of networks of intensified interactions
with blurry boundaries. As discussed above, dimensions such as they exist arise along
these boundaries, as differences in infrastructural uses and effects sort people into groups
(McPherson 2004). Much of this structure is outside Mann’s purview, as it is reflected in
communities’ cultural representations.
Mann’s (1986) approach has been fruitfully employed in analyzing social change in
historical times and the archaeological record, such as to compare conditions favoring the
rise of chiefdoms in Denmark, Hawaii, and Peru (Earle 1997). In every historical era, Mann
contends, there are power networks using one or more of four main sources of social power,
both dominant and interstitial, in coexistence or opposition. The four sources of organiza-
tion can in the terms of section 9.2 be seen as the main interfaces of human activities with
infrastructural affordances that shape societies on the widest level. These are, per Mann
(pp. 22–30): ideological (transcendent and everyday beliefs), military (concentrated coer-
cion), economic (circuits of production and exchange), and political (negotiated territorial
control).
The reach of any exercise of power is shaped by the logistics of its material spread,
which Mann (1986, pp. 6–10) analyzes with aid of heuristic dichotomies. Power can be col-
lective (enhanced by joint action) or distributive (power over, zero sum), extensive (wide
reaching and minimally stable) or intensive (tightly committed and organized), authori-
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tative (consciously willed) or diffused (spontaneous and decentered). These oppositions
afford semiotic interpretation, respectively: relations can be maintained through mutual re-
inforcement of cultural texts versus their exclusion by one side; there is a trade-off between
the complexity of shared symbolic representation and the reach of interactions it can in-
form; intentionality can be expressed explicitly by persons and groups or distributed across
relationships comprising flywheels. Semiotically similar power dynamics reinforce each
other; for example, diffuse religious practices are helped by the spread of universalizing
means of symbolic exchange such as literacy and currency (p. 23).
On the opposite end from Mann’s (1986) focus are the expressions of power Foucault
(1976, pp. 96–97) termed capillary, those tied to persons and interactions. One source of
social power likely on par with others is thus overlooked, family and gender dynamics,
owing their influence to their central role in social and cultural reproduction. The exami-
nation of gender identity allows Ortner (2006); Kondo (1990) a more nuanced look at the
symbolic formation of persons in intersection with other power relationships.
Ortner (2006, pp. 129–153) associates power with the capacity to express one’s own
representations. On the one hand, this amounts to people’s ability to formulate and en-
act their cultural projects, pursuing “desires that grow out of their own structures of life”
(p. 147). On the other, it manifests as the power to impose one’s own cultural aims, includ-
ing by denying others the right to view themselves in an active role entirely; as well as in
ways such impositions are neutralized and resisted from below. Serious games, sustained
heterogeneous sets of practices constituting and performed by cultural actors (pp. 129–
130), inhabit the continuum of power dynamics between mutual coordination and suppres-
sion of participants’ represented projects.
In her partly autoethnographic field study of work in a family owned confectionery
in Japan, Kondo (1990) charts the connection between the daily performance of serious
games and structural (infrastructurally mediated) power dynamics. Kondo (pp. 304–308)
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notes that wider influences, such as family, community, and workplace, all intersect on the
ground of personal identity, shaping contexts in which different “selves” can be asserted.
Every action has multiple meanings, partaking in and reproducing multiple broader config-
urations of relationships. Ultimately, theorizing cannot fully be separated from experience,
as Kondo’s own identity as a third-generation Japanese American is challenged by her self-
perception as an employee in a Tokyo neighborhood factory.
In the next section, we examine more closely the ways social exclusion can itself work
as infrastructure, and discuss epistemic and ethical implications raised by critical studies.
9.4 Front and Back
The continuum of power expression Ortner (2006, pp. 129–153) foregrounds in serious
games, between (positive) enactment of projects and (negative) suppression, aims to counter
dualistic notions of false consciousness in Marxian materialism. These, Ortner contends,
tend to obscure both reasons why people in subordinate positions follow along, as well as
ways they transform and challenge the impositions in the space they are afforded.
Dual oppositions with normative implications do appear frequently in critical and Marx-
ian work, such as between false and true consciousness, or common and good sense (Gram-
sci, cited by Cox and Nilsen 2014, pp. 8–9). They refer to attitudes of a person respectively
conforming to and challenging wider power relationships she or he partakes in, in thought
and in deed. However, the question of how one gets from one to the other is rarely clarified.
In Freire (1970), for example, this manifests in the figure of the revolutionary leader, who
is assumed to originate in the elite or the middle class, has seen through the obfuscations of
power, and is committed to enter into an equitable dialogue with the poor about revolting
against their condition. There is little discussion, however, on how these individuals gain
their awareness and commitments, save for the account of Freire’s own experiences with
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hunger (Macedo 2000, pp. 12–13).
These dichotomies are here associated with the relationship between two sets of ac-
tivities tied to infrastructures. They can be seen as the generalization of Ortner’s (2006)
dichotomy, between power as performance of projects and power as relative repression,
to social dynamics wider than serious games. As discussed in the previous section, re-
current structuring of activities can facilitate movement on narrower scopes by providing
a reliable social affordance. It can also be inferred to partake in such wider semiotically
closed dynamics that sustain it. The distinction between these two kinds of dynamics, those
sustaining recurrences in social activities and those facilitated by them, can be illustrated,
for example, by comparing the entirety of operations of a store with only the front end of
interaction with customers.
The person shopping, the store clerk, one shunting boxes in a warehouse, assembling
the product, and so on, form a network of interactions, the supply chain. While the interac-
tions in the store are a part of the chain, they are also divided from the rest by a configural
interface which, by obscuring much of the complexity, simplifies and so can help intensify
further interactions. In other words, the store provides an infrastructural interface of activ-
ities that (presumably) facilitates convenience in shoppers’ lives, as well as partakes in the
wider dynamics of the market. The rest of the supply chain, while integral to the shop, is
largely out of view.
In the study of institutions, the distinction between “front end” and “whole store” is
reflected in the recognition that infrastructures both provide affordances and have costs
(Anderies et al. 2016). The “front end” dynamics of these affordances can be (although are
by no means always) quite apparent: groups and organizations supported by certain institu-
tional arrangements, tools and artifacts produced thanks to a given technology, beliefs and
worldviews arising from specific meaning systems, and so on.
The “whole store” dynamics, or “costs” in the terms used in institutional studies, can
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be harder to discern for two reasons. One, they operate farther out and can involve many
interacting and interdependent pieces. Two, sustained flywheels can be inferred to involve
social differentiation. While the relations between different people and groups can simply
amount to consensual specialization, they could also be wholly or partly involuntary, so
there can be both hidden and overt power barriers to teasing them out.
We can infer existence of (some kind of) “whole store” dynamics by the very fact
that social affordances persist, then try getting a better sense of them by asking the four
questions and employing the methods of textual and relational analysis discussed above.
As mentioned, a foundational example from archaeology are the networks of activities
involved in tool production or chaînes opératiores. A number of examples in complex
societies are given by Whatmore (2002), e.g. tracing the networks that took “leopardus”
(big cats from Africa and Asia) into Roman arenas for battles of beasts and executions. A
salient present day example is the ongoing civil war in Congo fueled by the demand for
rare metals for the manufacture of advanced electronics.
A major reason social exclusion can maintain itself is willful denial. Mills (2007)
details five ways white people’s ignorance of others’ experiences manifests in “processes
of cognition, individual and social,” which almost precisely align with the four questions
by Tinbergen (1963). These are perception (immediate activity), conception (learning),
memory (history), testimony and group interest (dialectics). The white ignorance frame
is generally applicable to many kinds of exclusion through coercion for a simple reason:
decisive violence is one way to interact without ever having to engage with other’s symbolic
representations.
This can be represented in a very stylized way by modifying the expression (9.1):
H1; s1 ýcoerce
H2; s2 ýenact











The public symbolic meaning H2 enacts is completely repressed, substituted by the in-
terpretation a2|s1 of the non-symbolic component of the other’s action in H1’s symbolic
terms.
To bring this back to institutions, one way to characterize them is that they aim to fulfill
a perceived common intention at the “front end,” providing infrastructural affordances or
services, as discussed above. These, however, may or may not be compatible with inten-
tional aspects of the “whole store” dynamics, conceptualized by Anderies et al. (2016) as
institutional costs. This discussion suggests, significantly, that some part of the web of in-
teractions may easily involve relations we would consider as asymmetric through coercion,
and that if so, there are likely to be difficulties in identifying and examining them. Asking
what these difficulties are, and indeed what we mean by asymmetric coercive relations, is
outside the scope of this essay, and the focus of critical studies.
Symbolic Performances and Evolution The previous chapters undertook a formalized
excursion across the transitions in domains of interaction in the physical and biological
worlds. This chapter has instead shifted focus to a more qualitative characterization of
persistent processes in society. One could quip that the semiotic viewpoint thus loses its
meaning, that it is easily employed with various social scientific perspectives because it
adds little to them. Saying that sustained processes in society rely on repeated interactions
can indeed be tautological, expressing no more than that there are regularities in what
takes place. In addition, evolutionary frameworks have historically been used to justify
oppression of groups across multiple lines of social difference. It is not certain thus what
is comparatively gained by employing evolution to restate the findings reached by other
means. In particular, the relationship between teleonomic traits informed by genes and
intentional social action is not clarified, in light of the sociobiological preference to attribute
our proclivities to past genetic selection.
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The main reason evolution is herein employed is to clarify the nature of symbolic pro-
cesses. Any symbolic encoding is seen to be connected to the action of living beings, and
the evolutionary perspective offers common notions to compare and distinguish different
kinds of symbolic inscription and performances. Genes as symbols inform material interac-
tions in cells, tissues, and organism behaviors. On the other hand, our cultural symbols are
performed in activities, which their participants inscribe and symbolically represent ahead
of time. The two processes differ greatly in what interactions they can represent, and what
kinds of dynamics of change each can support.
Representational systems are tied to scopes of action that can be affected by the inter-
actions that interpret the messages. While these can be very diverse, including for example
interactions with other intentional agents, the limited reach of resulting (phenotypic) ef-
fects delineates a range of uncertainty, of possibilities an encoding cannot enact. Organic
representations that evolved after the genetic code referred to interactions in those domains
that could not be efficiently selected for in genetic reproduction, for example unfolding
over periods much shorter than single life times (Beach 2003). New codes evolved rel-
atively rarely in part because representational structures are costly (Boyd and Richerson
1996; Dawkins 1999, ch. 2). However, human sociocultural interaction relaxes this barrier,
opening a separate channel of reproduction and allowing for creation and maintenance of a
diversity of symbolic texts, codes, and languages.
The kinds of change evolving interactions undergo depend on details of the repro-
duction channel. In biology, we can make statistical idealizations because we know the
accounting of genetic recombination (section 7.3). Population genetics describes overall
trends, not unbending laws; changes reflect patterns in what organisms actually do, not
built-in natural certainties. The effects of selection can indeed be quite decisive and mea-
surable over short periods, such as the preferred selection of deep beaks in Galapagos
finches that survived a yearlong drought (Weiner 1994). However, the pressures can be
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fleeting: the same drought favored larger chicks, which were at a disadvantage the next
year because they were too immature to eat enough to sustain their size. Still, non-human
animals can do little to affect the overall statistical success of their strategies.
As argued in section 9.2, any such statistical accounting of sociocultural reproduction
is in general not available. Instead, we offered a general model for sustained dynamics
comprising mutually reinforcing social relations, or flywheels. These are partly intentional
overlapping networks of sustained interactions that connect social fields, human activities
configured through infrastructural influences. Flywheels are internally heterogeneous and
maintain cultural texts, ranging in scope from Ortner’s (2006) interpersonal serious games,
to Mann’s (1986) interstate political networks, to Mills’s (2007) perpetuations of white
ignorance.
Fracchia and Lewontin (1999, pp. 67–78) criticize dual inheritance approaches to so-
ciocultural evolution, objecting to the answers current evolutionary theories offer to the
three requirements for natural selection. These are: the source and locus of variation; the
avenues of heredity; and the influences shaping differential reproduction. The criticisms
are here addressed as follows.
Random variation is seen primarily to reside in symbolic representations, embodied
(existence inferred), performed, and inscribed, always interpreted in interaction. While
internal representations are assumed to be partly symbolic, no presumption is made as to
the nature of actual cultural units, such as memes. Patterson (2014) proposes that culture
is structured in a similar way as language, exhibiting both performed regularities (parole)
and more lasting abstract structures (langue). On this account, our cognitive representations
may well avail themselves of cultural analogues to units such as morphemes. If units exist,
though, they are never enacted individually.
On heredity, the current analysis together with Fracchia and Lewontin (1999) is advised
by the results by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), that cultural change in evolutionary
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models is shaped by the details of the reproduction channels. Instead of searching for a
proper accounting of meme transmission in a population, a common framework is proposed
for sustained dynamics shaping the reproduction channels, such as “family, social class, in-
stitutions, communication media, the workplace, the streets” (Fracchia and Lewontin 1999,
p. 73). Relational and critical approaches are put forward as salient to explaining these in-
fluences. Finally, on differential reproduction, we agree with these authors that Darwinian
individualism of variants is of limited use in explaining sociocultural change. Cultural texts
reproduced in flywheels are complex and coordinated through social relations, far from the
aggregate “state of the ‘memes’ ” Fracchia and Lewontin (p. 71) criticize.
Similarly, the present argument effectively concurs with the critique of evolutionary
anthropology by Ingold (2007) on all points except that the baby needs to go out with the
bathwater. Ingold’s characterization of the blind spots in Mesoudi et al. (2006) is affirmed,
along with the defense of cultural anthropology as productive, interdisciplinary, and in-
formative about its topics, against conventional hard scientific criticisms by these authors.
Allowing that some sociocultural change may be fruitfully analyzed by models of popula-
tion genetics, here the view is that such efforts will always have limited reach. For social
scientific topics of daily concern, the focus on agency, power, and social relations Ingold
finds lacking in dual inheritance accounts indeed offers a more relevant explanatory angle.
Ingold (2007) outlines four specific shortcomings of the evolutionary view by Mesoudi
et al. (2006), all of which are here preliminarily addressed. One, historical agency is ac-
counted for by different degrees of intentionality of sustained sociocultural processes, and
by the contestation of personal and group interests over infrastructural avenues of social
influence, logistics of power (Mann 1986, pp. 9–10). Two, what evolves is recognized as
fully contingent on context. The present account notes the symbolic nature of our perfor-
mances and activities, and assumes partly symbolic embodied representations, but these
inscriptions can be animated only in interactions.
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Three, while faithful copying indeed plays a significant role in sociocultural reproduc-
tion, there are no a priori assumptions on how people learn in any single context. Indeed,
a variety of learning theories are expected to be relevant, from conditioning to Vygotskian
activity theory favored by Ingold (e.g. Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 1998). Four, the ap-
parent circularity of explanation reflects the fact that sustained sociocultural dynamics are
semiotically closed, that the reproduction of (inferred) embodied texts depends on their re-
peated enactment and performance through public messages. The present approach, finally,
has no fundamental differences with the alternatives to sociocultural evolution outlined by
Ingold (2007), such as Oyama’s developmental systems theory and Bateson’s ecological
framework. Detailed comparisons are beyond our scope.
If “standard” social scientific explanations are recast in terms of the present semiotic
perspective on sociocultural evolution, they can present a challenge to established evolu-
tionary accounts on their own terms. Human activities as a reproduction channel underlie a
domain of symbolically informed material efficacy, with its own orientations toward expla-
nation (interaction, learning, history, dialectics). Embodied and enacted representations, as
noted in section 7.2, tend to evolve in each other’s blind spots. One cannot ahead of time tell
the extent a human practice is influenced by genetic variation, or shaped by sociocultural
exchanges in regions with no certain effects on biological reproduction. A hypothesis from
the established evolutionary standpoint can be countered from the perspective of evolving
semiotically closed power dynamics on top of symbolic interactions.
In an early attempt to adjudicate the sociobiology controversy, Kitcher (1985, pp. 208–
211) juxtaposes possible sociobiological with sociological explanations of gender differ-
ences, noting that evolutionary biology has no good ways to decide between them. This
justifies skepticism about reductionist evolutionary theories, as they themselves are am-
biguous as to sociocultural mechanisms mediating supposed evolved proclivities, and do
not address at all the gender roles’ social construction. With the benefit of the present view,
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we can raise the burden of proof of such and similar accounts, to convince us of the ex-
tent the phenomena they seek to explain are biologically influenced rather than culturally
constructed. We can also separately ask “cui bono?” with respect to the researchers’ own
embeddedness in political developments of their day. Sociobiological arguments such as
those about which Kitcher expresses concerns were largely expressed by men, coincided
with debates of second wave feminism, and were roundly criticized by its authors.
The aim of the present document has been to offer a common language whereby many
of these conceptual gaps may be mapped, as a potential boundary object among research
traditions. I next turn to how the framework may be employed in practice in interdisci-
plinary research in social-ecological systems.
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CHAPTER 10 ROBUSTNESS AND POWER
The research on dynamics of sustainable social-ecological systems (SESs; Anderies 2015;
Anderies et al. 2016) combines the institutional analysis framework by Ostrom (2005) with
formal modeling techniques from biology, economics, and engineering. The quantitative
methods are employed to examine in abstract the dynamics of SESs, to suggest attributes
of institutional arrangements that can help make them sustainable. One of the stated aims
of the research is to advise policy makers and other stakeholders in deliberately shaping
institutional rules to reach sustainable outcomes.
These studies open up two perspectives on SESs relevant to the present discussion.
First, sustainable social-ecological processes are conceptualized as dependent on feedbacks
that regulate interactions, and so amenable to modeling as robust control. The approach has
been evaluated favorably on the Gordon-Schaefer fishery equations (Anderies et al. 2007)
and the Pumpa rice irrigation system in Nepal (Cifdaloz et al. 2010). Anderies (2015)
further abstracts the fishery model to a stylized mathematical representation of any SES.
Second, Anderies et al. (2016) propose that SES can be thought of as coupled infrastructure
systems (CIS), in the sense discussed in section 9.2. These are coherent structures, such as
roads, institutions, and ecosystems, which when combined provide affordances for social
and material exchanges (some) people value.
Resilience studies, the broader collection of social-ecological research efforts which
includes the study of robust institutions, gets praise from Cote and Nightingale (2012) for
adopting a holistic perspective toward their topic, and for viewing complex systems as
adapting to change rather than controlling it. On the latter point, the robustness research
is somewhat ambivalent: while control is a guiding concept, results reveal the importance
of institutional learning (Anderies et al. 2007), and of ability to cope with directed changes
and unknown shocks (Cifdaloz et al. 2010).
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Cote and Nightingale (2012, pp. 478–479) proceed to point out two sets of issues in
understanding SESs which the study of resilience has left largely unexplored. These are
first, power, the role of differential access to infrastructure in driving social change; and
second, competing value systems, as different people’s and groups’ ideas of the (prover-
bial) flows we value can be in sharp contrast. These are significant, Cote and Nightingale
point out, because resilience research aims to both describe and prescribe; yet despite of-
fering advice, it lacks attention to the influence of social power and cultural values in SESs
adaptive dynamics. As a result, while there is ample recognition that some resilient social
outcomes are undesirable, such as dictatorships and colonial extraction projects, there are
few explicit attempts to bring normative concerns into the analysis or policy advice.
This chapter considers ways to account for the significance of social power and culture
in shaping CISs in light of earlier discussions in this document.
10.1 Mind the Gap
The picture of social and cultural processes presented in the previous chapter affirms at-
tention to feedback in CISs, clarifying its nature as a social-ecological phenomenon. Reg-
ulatory dynamics, on this view, can appear as parts of “flywheels,” semiotically closed
networks of mutually reinforcing symbolic interactions, within processes of sociocultural
change exhibiting evolutionary characteristics. CISs constrain and simplify certain ranges
of activities, which can accelerate actions dependent on them.
This, first, shapes and facilitates some of our daily activities; second, offers common
paradigms of interaction for forming possible smaller entities such as organizations (section
9.2; Anderies et al. 2016; McPherson 2004); and third, leads to longer term regulation
among infrastructural uses, such as through supply chains. The narrower entities, such as
organizations; and the cyclical exchanges maintaining infrastructural uses, such as supply
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chains, tend to become heterogeneous and specialize. Incipient regulatory networks emerge
via acceleration of more diffuse dynamics (section 6.4; Deacon 2012, p. 269).
Viewed as flywheels, sustained interactions among uses of infrastructure can be ex-
pected to manifest two other properties. First, all interactions are symbolic; sustained
networks of activities are informed by and maintain cultural texts. Flywheels reproduce
symbolic representations tied to people’s practices comprising them. Second, the dynamics
exhibit intentional characteristics, explicit or vague, potentially working in favor of some
groups’ interests and against others’. Sustained wider relations cannot be assumed to be
equitable, and in fact, a degree of such skew may be involved in maintaining many of them
(section 9.4). At least in theory, the present perspective adds the two missing ingredients,
culture and power.
The flywheel picture extends the robust control framework with the notion of materially
realized semiotic closure. Possible directions for the robustness approach so extended could
be indicated by asking how the view would apply to itself. The original framework is
general, so just as one can ask what it would take for a set of resource institutions in a
SES to be sustainable and robust so as to offer proper advice to the stakeholders, one can
examine what it would take for the work of the institutions offering institutional advice to
be sustainable and robust. One can ask if institutional analysis and design can understand
themselves as institutional activities, then offer and follow their own advice.
If we apply the stylized picture of a semiotically closed feedback loop in an SES or in
a complex “real world” network of exchanges (Anderies 2015, fig. 1b,d, p. 263) to institu-
tional design, we can notice two openings. One is in singling out policy as an audience to
advise, and the other are the informational bottlenecks to providing advice resulting from
the chosen epistemic framework.
The first gap is significant insofar, as Anderies et al. (2016, p. 16) point out too, gate-
keepers of infrastructure such as policy makers and experts may not serve the best interests
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of all stakeholders. If either the interests of the gatekeepers or the complex spillovers of
infrastructure can adversely affect excluded populations, policy makers may not be the
most desirable audience to seek to inform. Prudently, the advice is to stay away if unsure
(Anderies 2015, p. 261). The research can best have impact “where political and social
structures exist that increase the will and capacity for actors to engage in collective action
(e.g. at local, regional, and national scales).”
This in effect means that political will, a component that is in the general case recog-
nized as required for institutional design, is external to the model. The present focus on
power views political will as an intentional phenomenon whose nature, duration, and social
scope are subject to study, and can be considered with the rest of intentional phenomena in
an SES. The problem, however, is how, both conceptually, and keeping in mind that formal
models need to be simple enough to provide advice (Anderies 2015, p. 261).
In the robustness framework, the component that can be seen as intentional is the con-
troller K, which corrects the plant P when its aim is off. In the extension of the fishery
model to the general case (Anderies 2015, pp. 270–272), the set of allowable controls (i.e.
power) for the controller is denoted by U, and the social choices as to how it is used by J.
On the present account, we can expect U to take a different form for every sustained set of
social interactions. In addition, Anderies et al. (2007); Anderies (2015, pp. 273–274) point
out that the choice of JpUq is not just fixed, but needs to keep track of changing conditions.
The range of SESs simple enough to allow for an informative model whose parameters
can be continuously relearned, in a place where people want to try it out, is likely to be
very restricted. The insight from the robust control framework is that discrepancies may be
addressed by a focus on institutional learning. This, however, raises another question, given
the real difference between a hypothetical benevolent policy maker and actual constraints
of existing institutions, and the importance of articulating one’s own cultural projects to
equitable relations of power (Ortner 2006). What are the capacities of communities to
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design their own arrangements?
The broader issue here is the interplay between social scientific knowledge and power
in general, the question what any particular view of social power can suggest as to how the
policy to research cycle can be neutral. Theorizing, study, and design of robust institutions
are typically conducted by members of relatively advantaged social groups, and could fall
prey to the blind spots that reinforce the social differences (Mills 2007) unless explicitly
guarding against them (section 9.4). The significance of this concern is borne out by past
experience of community-based participatory research (CBPR). In a primer on the topic,
Stoecker (2013, pp. 141–148) discusses policy prescriptions from the perspective of meet-
ing communities’ needs to research and advocate alternatives to policies actively harming
them; the example given is redlining in Chicago neighborhoods. Anderies (2015, p. 264)
does open an avenue to address this, citing Scott (1998), an analysis of failed state-centered
projects for human betterment. The opportunity is not pursued, even while Scott’s work of-
fers convincing grounds to do so. The approach, in effect, assumes a benevolent policy
maker.
There are many glib replies to the evolutionary and potentially sensitive political ques-
tion: cui bono?, who benefits in an SES? We now argue for treating social differentiation
as a potential (undesired) principle of institutional design.
Designs Ostrom (2005, p. 259) lists eight design principles, common characteristics of
institutions over a range of case studies, that were found to be best practices in success-
ful resource management institutions. Anderies et al. (2016) reinterpret these principles
as ways institutions process information, with which the present argument is in accord.
The design principles play three broad roles with respect to semiotic closure in their do-
mains: tools and tactics; instances of semiotic closure; and structural properties arising
from flywheel sociocultural dynamics. We consider each in order briefly; the numbering of
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principles by Ostrom is given in parentheses.
The tools are: monitoring; sanctioning; and conflict resolution. Monitoring (4) works
better within relations that promote semiotic closure, for example if the monitors are users
(Ostrom 2005, pp. 265–266). Graduated sanctions (5) work similarly on somewhat longer
time scales, where closure is achieved to the extent officiators are accountable. Conflict res-
olution mechanisms (6) help achieve semiotic closure between different views and values
with respect to their uses of infrastructure.
Desirable instances of semiotic closure are: congruence between conditions and in-
stitutions; collective choice arrangements; and rights to organize. Congruence between
local conditions and institutional arrangements (2, proportional equivalence between ben-
efits and costs) is closed in pragmatic interaction with ecology and the maintenance of in-
frastructure. Collective choice arrangements (3) are closed via equity and participation in
crafting the rules. Rights to organize (7) open up local innovation in institutional work; this
compensates for informational inefficiencies of wider institutional hierarchies, and reduces
the need for conflict resolution.
Third, structural properties are: boundaries; and nested enterprises. Clearly defined
boundaries (1) encourage specialized semiotic closure within them on all scales, from de-
cision making to use rights, by encouraging coordination of repeated material and symbolic
exchanges. Nested enterprises (8) reflect the tendency to form smaller structures in partial
closure, such as organizations, upon support from lasting infrastructural affordances.
The present argument indicates broad merits of considering social differentiation an ad-
ditional structural design property, one which if manifested as specialization is a principle
of good design, while if realized as exclusion can play a design role that is rarely desired.
The first is prima facie: human complex societies are usually unequal, in contrast to
smaller groups which can move between hierarchical and egalitarian arrangements (Leach
1954; Boehm 1999). Differences in power and influence are a first order variation in char-
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acterizing how humans live. Sustained practices that reproduce social differences can thus
be expected to play a major role in shaping wider regularities in interactions, including all
infrastructure uses outlined in Anderies et al. (2016).
Second, per discussions in 7.2, we would expect any self-maintaining social dynamic
to exhibit internal differentiation (section 6.4). In organisms, these manifest as metabolic
regulatory relationships (Csete and Doyle 2002). Self-maintaining sociocultural dynamics
in CISs are in general much more diffuse, although there is no shortage of visible interde-
pendent specializations in human activity. As has been argued above, differences between
social groups can be consensual or coerced, and in either case be functional for some-
one. We can expect social power barriers against giving weight to the representations of
excluded groups (section 9.4; Mills 2007), and understanding how this takes place is an
explicit need in examining sustained processes in CISs.
Finally, persistent differential uses and effects of infrastructure are avenues of social
influence, which makes them candidate vectors for conveying any system-wide influences
in implementing institutional advice. The nature of practices maintaining differential uses
of infrastructure will affect the feasibility, advisability, pace, and possible extent of any
institutional changes.
Identifying social differences and their role in sustaining interactions in CISs in em-
pirical work is likely to present a considerable challenge. The previous chapter suggested
that the semiotic perspective can serve as a bridge among research perspectives, and the re-
mainder of this chapter turns it toward this aim. The guiding concept of semiotic closure is
enrolled to motivate the discussion of transdisciplinary collaboration as closure within re-
search, research of knowledge work as efforts toward closure in the field, and participatory
methods to achieve closure between the two.
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10.2 Praxis
In the last chapter, several perspectives from across social sciences were suggested to inter-
sect with the current semiotic view. The plurality can be seen as promising, but also a cause
for concern. Any gain derived from the approach depends on how well it can be used to
compare different perspectives, and the proliferation of possibilities brings up the question
where to start, as well as whether the possibilities are so divergent that comparisons are
likely to be superficial.
To make sense of the possibilities, we again enroll the notion of semiotic closure. In
chapter 2 we noted that perspectival approaches need to be included as plausible social
scientific explanations, as long as they are not dogmatically circular (Anderson 2017). We
can now rephrase this that, to be credible, theories and methods need to be semiotically
closed with the subject of their study rather than, or in addition to, with other requirements
of their existence.
First, as relevant viewpoints in transdisciplinary research of sociocultural processes are
uncertain, infrastructural options that allow for experimentation with and juxtaposition of
various approaches are discussed on the ideal level. Next, a potential study of knowledge
work in the food movement in an area is outlined and its possible extensions examined.
Finally, potential benefits of participatory research are noted.
Reaches The previous chapter mentioned a number of avenues to the study of mutually
reinforcing interaction networks in societies and cultures. Detecting empirical proxies of
such sustained dynamics is likely to involve coordination of many methods, such as anal-
yses of cultural content, social networks, institutional arrangements, and power relation-
ships. Given the overhead of a transdisciplinary study and the diversity of potential CISs to
examine, the first issue of research design is thus infrastructural: what the options are for
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organized coordination among diverse studies, along with the realistic limits on doing so
within existing institutional affordances. To chart the ground coordinated research efforts
can occupy, consider for a moment hypothetical extremes in the dichotomies of logistics
of social influence Mann (1986, pp. 6–10): collective/distributive, intensive/extensive, au-
thoritative/diffuse.
A distributive, “power over” research approach would attempt to anticipate as many
shared protocols in advance, defining a narrow focus to future study and allowing only
gradual adjustments. On the other hand, a collective, “power with” approach would en-
courage complementary, partly independent projects. Both offer advantages in the study
of sustained relationships on CISs. The first is fairly common in academic research, and
while it encourages disciplinary fragmentation, studies following shared conventions are
more easily comparable. On the other hand, a collective approach allows researchers to
choose methods appropriate to the study and to their own predispositions. Each discipline
makes its own simplifications, and as we aim to combine perspectives that would com-
pensate for each other’s blind spots, we do not know ahead of time which are relevant.
Repeating the same combinations risks repeating the same domains of ignorance, and a
collective orientation provides room to experiment with alternatives.
Similarly, most research undertakings are intensive, requiring concentrated commit-
ment and organization. To the extent extensive organization truly is “minimally stable”
(Mann 1986, pp. 7–8), we do not expect it to play a large role in study. This, however,
points to an intrinsic barrier both to data available to an research discipline, requiring in-
tensive organization for each gathering effort; and to the lack of reach of its methods and
findings across contexts where they can be of use, the full extent of which is barely known.
An extensive research effort would need to reach outside institutional boundaries, for ex-
ample by encouraging and collaborating with citizen science initiatives.
Finally, social studies are authoritative in that they are “willed by groups and institu-
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tions” (Mann 1986, p. 8). The advantages of diffuse organization over wider scopes are,
however, suggested by the requirements for the onset of a flywheel. Once diffuse interac-
tions become frequent and versatile enough, they can reach the point of mutual reinforce-
ment and eventually become self-sustaining.
A possible horizon for coordination of transdisciplinary study can thus be proposed:
large scale semiotic closure in research, mutual comparison between different perspectives
and research efforts, lay and academic, intensifying to the point where it starts producing
well rounded accounts of sociocultural dynamics, and counteract pressures to fragmen-
tation. Such synergy is, admittedly, hard to imagine under present guiding assumptions,
requiring ways for widely different viewpoints to communicate on comparable terms. The
present essay has examined one potential set of shared concepts, subject to practical ap-
praisal and revision.
We now briefly discuss a study design that brings together several approaches consid-
ered in the previous chapter, in examining the diversity of the alternative food movement
in an area.
Knowledges Cote and Nightingale (2012) suggest that resilience studies pay more atten-
tion to the practices of knowledge creation and use: in other words, to conscious efforts
by participants to achieve semiotic closure among their own representations, practices, and
aims. Foregrounding local knowledge work also anticipates the need for future institutional
learning, as well as for guarding against blind spots to social differences. We turn now to
consider an attempt to formulate such a study of alternative food initiatives (AFIs) in an
area (Božicˇevic´ 2015), and its discuss possible insights and limitations. (Short excerpts of
a working paper handed out during the presentation of Božicˇevic´ (2015) have been carried
below verbatim.)
The main motivation of the proposed study has been to analyze the diversity of con-
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cerns and initiatives in alternative food activism (Gottlieb and Joshi 2010; Hinrichs 2014),
with the aim to discern wider patterns in social movement practices in the heterogeneous
environment of a major United States metropolitan area. The research design draws on two
prior qualitative studies: of beliefs and practices of AFIs across California by Allen et al.
(2003), and of knowledge work in intensive rotational grazing in Wisconsin by Hassanein
and Kloppenburg (1995). While the former inquiry overlaps in the subject matter and the
study area, the latter informs the conceptual approach.
Hassanein and Kloppenburg (1995) studied dairy farmers who, against the prevailing
trends, had chosen to graze their cows rather than raise them in feedlots. This reduced
the graziers’ dependence on inputs, but made it necessary to monitor the pasture and man-
age the cattle more closely. After realizing that land grant universities and corporations
had little useful advice to give them, the farmers took to creating and curating their own
knowledge, forming organizations for horizontal exchange of information. Hassanein and
Kloppenburg (1995) apply the perspective by Eyerman and Jamison (1991), who see social
movements as tied to knowledge work, or cognitive praxis. Dairy farmers’ knowledge prac-
tices are analyzed from the point of view of three dimensions of cognitive praxis proposed
by Eyerman and Jamison: cosmological (self-understanding), technological (ecological
knowledge and cattle raising skills), and organizational (knowledge exchange meetings).
Božicˇevic´ (2015) argues that the dimensions of cognitive praxis can be mapped onto
cultural content coordinates parallel to ones employed by Mohr and Neely (2009) to an-
alyze aspects of power in the work of New York carceral organizations in 1888. Four
categories of knowledge work of social movements are proposed: worldviews, issues, or-
ganizational forms, and methods (figure 10.1). In case of alternative food, the growing
range of disparate issues initiatives address include concerns about farming, technology,
trade, nutrition, health, the environment, and other areas (Hinrichs 2014; Hinrichs and Es-
helman 2014). Cohen (2014) notes the variety of innovative organizational forms in local
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food production and distribution, and compares their interactions to those of “species in a
healthy ecosystem.” Initiatives’ methods also vary, challenging prevailing practices directly
and indirectly, acting both within and outside established institutions (Allen 2004; Hinrichs
and Eshelman 2014). Finally, issues, organizational forms, and methods are informed by
AFIs members’ worldviews: systemic problems their work aims to address, and the ulti-
mate goals they envision for the food system (Allen et al. 2003; Mares and Alkon 2011;
Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011).
These domains of movement knowledge inform, in turn, cultural content analysis,
which along with the social network study of relations among AFIs, it is claimed, would
help indicate the exclusionary effects of infrastructure, as well as any differences arising
from emergent specialization. It is likely, though, that such an inquiry would fall short of
conclusively delineating relationships comprising a flywheel, although it can indicate some
of them. For example, blockmodeling analysis by Ernstson et al. (2008) of networks of
environmental organizations in Stockholm has revealed a core-periphery structure facili-
tating collective cognitive praxis. A few organizations with legal and political expertise
relied on a diffuse network of local associations, which could quickly inform them of de-
velopments on the ground, such as illegal construction, allowing for timely intervention
with city authorities. While based only on one network survey, the structure of interactions
suggests specialization by knowledge work sustained through repeated interactions toward
a common aim, proclaiming green areas of Stockholm a National Urban Park.
These and most other analyses of content and networks (e.g. Bodin and Crona 2009)
represent only momentary snapshots of effects of infrastructural influences. They tell us
little about the direction of social change, which means we cannot discern the shape of
any driving dynamic in CISs. The most direct way to address this issue is to conduct
a longitudinal study, to revisit the same study area later in time and chart any changes.



















- What are the problems
with the food system?
- Why is your work
important?
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Figure 10.1: The articulation table for social movement cognitive praxis (knowledge work),
based on Mohr and Neely (2009) is shown in blue. The dimensions of cognitive praxis
originally proposed by Eyerman and Jamison (1991) are shown in green. Adapted from
Božicˇevic´ (2015).
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longitudinal studies cannot be extensive: we cannot expect many of them will soon be
conducted and bear general results.
We note, though, that the range of possibilities is so wide that any study will have
lacunae, and that at this point we do not know which such blind spots are salient. The
question then becomes how an inquiry can compensate for its shortcomings, by anticipating
(potentially extensive) comparison with related research. For example, the above proposal
revisits a part of the same region Allen et al. (2003) examined with different methods, and
uses similar methods as Levkoe (2014) in a geographically distant area.
An intermediate approach between a longitudinal study and serendipitous comparison
would be to analyze two areas in tandem, as Baldassari and Diani (2007); Diani (2015)
did analyzing movement networks in Bristol and Glasgow. These studies have found, for
example, that network structure reflects varying levels of political polarization resulting
from different movement histories of the two cities. While the approach is insufficient to
track changes over time, it can reveal the topology of dominant power configurations. Such
patterns may be easier to detect than actual mechanisms of change, and can have analogies
in evolutionary ecology. For example, mating behaviors within species as well as some
trophic relationships stabilize into a trio of strategies in a rock-paper-scissors fashion. The
broadest networks of influence in a society could fall into similar patters.
Participations The final semiotic closure to be considered runs between research and
the field: a possible role for participatory research in building capacities for institutional
learning. The topic is extensive and would be best treated with a particular study in mind;
I will keep to a few basic observations.
The necessity of institutional learning, of adaptive change in institutions in a SES with
respect to the surrounding biophysical, political, and community conditions, points to the
need for SES stakeholders to develop capacities to scrutinize their arrangements and modify
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them. As discussed briefly above, the studies of robust feedback are very far at best from
being able to provide such advice on a widespread basis. On the other hand, stakeholders
such as grass dairy farmers have, in a period of time appropriate to meeting their need,
organized to develop knowledge about how to combine different uses of infrastructure.
This points to seeking ways for research interests to facilitate such organization through
direct involvement with the community or a close intermediate. An example from re-
silience studies are community workshops alongside agent-based modeling of land use in
Vietnam (Castella et al. 2005). Of the methods discussed above, maps of cultural content
and network relationships can easily be presented to non-experts. In addition to providing
empirical insight into wider sociocultural dynamics, the results of such research would be
well suited to informing organizations and public forums that mediate between municipal
agencies and communities, such as food policy councils.
Participatory research is also no panacea: Cote and Nightingale (2012) note instances in
which putatively inclusive management efforts have been co-opted by local elites and state
authorities. Thus, any effort that combines research and practice will require coordination
of plural ways of gaining insight and ensuring the advice ends up in the right hands, indeed
a collaborative assessment of what the right hands may be.
At this point, the following elaborations to the research directions outlined in Anderies
(2015) can be proposed:
1. Case studies informing the typology of common SESs in a complex society would
need to keep track of how differential uses of infrastructure affect SES dynamics, and
of how such differences manifest in relations among and cultural understandings of
the social groups affected.
Cote and Nightingale (2012, p. 483) suggest that, “[i]f knowledge is multidimen-
sional and processional, culture, world-views and axes of social differentiation such
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as gender, class and race are crucial starting points to understand the positions from
which actors become enrolled in decision-making processes.” The present essay
agrees, and has suggested a combination of mixed-method relational and critical ap-
proaches to charting these positions.
2. There is a need to devise techniques of formal modeling of SESs that keep track of
emergent differentiation and cultural text. A starting point discussed in chapters 6
and 9 are autocatalysis and random grammars (Kauffman 1993, chs. 7, 10).
3. Perhaps most significantly, the design methodology can best be assumed to be neutral
if it explicitly incorporates a level of analysis inquiring into its own semiotic closures.
There is a level between robust control and implementation that is intrinsically cul-
tural and political, and it needs to be considered both in research and practice. In
research, as differences in access to, use of, and effects of infrastructure mediate
social power and decisively shape human lives. They are also the first source of in-
formation about harmful effects often hidden in plain view. In practice, institutional
learning can not, and indeed has not historically, depended on robust control. Thus
a salient interest is not just how to design institutions, but how research can best aid
and build on any institutional design skills and practices already present.
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CHAPTER 11 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This essay has argued that social power manifests as self-reinforcing networks of symbolic
interactions, “flywheels,” unfolding over different scopes in time and society, exhibiting a
degree of distributed intentionality. It is suggested that this picture is consilient with natu-
ral sciences, with self-reinforcing networks appearing as wider sociocultural evolutionary
dynamics, in which information is reproduced in social interaction and inscribed in persons
and activities. This view of social power is applied to research in institutions and robustness
in social-ecological systems (SESs) (Ostrom 2005; Anderies et al. 2016; Anderies 2015).
To argue that human symbolic interactions serve as a reproduction channel for an evo-
lutionary process has required establishing more firmly the link between semiotic (repre-
sentational) and physical processes. In chapters 6 to 8, a semiotic framework is applied
to trace the nature of representation from its origins at the onset of natural selection, to
the evolution of a symbolic code in genes, to other codes such as developmental switches
and cognition (Sebeok 2001; Deacon 2012; Kauffman 1993; Dennett 1991, 2017; Maynard
Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Human symbols are argued to be the one representation apart
from genes that supports an open-ended evolutionary process, with flywheels, based on
autocatalysis, a general model for wider dynamics.
The picture offered is broader though less formally developed than the dual inheritance
view by Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005); Henrich and Henrich (2007), which is here
seen to apply to special cases. All the main objections against this and other recent socio-
cultural evolutionary approaches raised by Fracchia and Lewontin (1999); Ingold (2007)
are, however, met in the present account (section 9.4). In particular, there is a firm recog-
nition of the role of complex social relationships and textual structures in shaping human
activities. Symbolic sociocultural reproduction is seen as fully dependent on contexts of
interaction, and a range of learning theories is expected to be relevant to understanding
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it. Humans and groups can exercise agency on wider scopes through the means of social
power they have access to, implementing their culturally informed projects and potentially
leaving intentional marks on history.
There are many directions in which the account of semiotics of emergent and living
processes in chapters 5 through 8 can be extended. Of the most immediate, the analysis of
parallels with Deacon’s (2012) account of intentionality and can be deepened by consid-
ering further specific examples and models. Informational characteristics of evolutionary
events can be estimated both analytically and computationally, contributing a formally jus-
tified model of the evolutionary origin of semiosis from chapter 6 to biosemiotic analyses
(Pattee 1982; Rocha 2001). Finally, the analysis of semiotics of evolutionary transitions in
chapter 8 can be elaborated through further comparison to Beach (2003), models of infor-
mation capacity of somatic representations (e.g. Tkacˇik et al. 2008), and empirical results
(e.g. on cephalopod gene editing, Liscovitch-Brauer et al. 2017). Finally, if we were to
formally model flywheel dynamics in society, a model of autocatalysis or random grammar
would be one possible start (Kauffman 1993, chs. 7, 10).
Social activity, the channel of reproduction of sociocultural information on the present
account, corresponds to the action situation in Ostrom (2005). Anderies et al. (2016) rightly
note the importance of known regular influences of such situations, infrastructures, as well
as the informational nature of design principles. Since robust-control like relationships
are associated with specialization and differentiation of a self-reinforcing process, it is dif-
ferential access to infrastructure, it is argued, that drives these feedbacks. Precisely for
this reason, different social groups in a SES are likely to have divergent aims toward and
cultural narratives about the infrastructures, and their and others’ uses of it.
It is significant to gather these narratives to prevent ignorance effects, such as those out-
lined by Mills (2007), which play a feedback-like role in social differentiation by maintain-
ing exclusion. Also, entities relying on longer lasting infrastructures, such as organizations,
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are expected to form patterns in cultural narratives and mutual relationships that reflect the
overall differentiation as well as any shorter term emergent dynamics; such patterns may be
fruitfully studied. Finally, self-reinforcing dynamics are in semiotic closure, able to partly
represent and reproduce themselves. Any practical attempt at design of robust institutions
needs to consider how its own activity, institutional learning, can be semiotically closed in a
SES. Any widely applied approach to institutional design needs to be participatory, as An-
deries (2015) points out, and so needs to favor methods that aid the participants in advising
their own institutional choices. Chapter 10 proposes a hypothetical study that incorporates
some of these suggestions in researching alternative food organizations in a locality, and
considers its shortcomings. Longitudinal and tandem comparison study designs are sug-
gested as possible improvements, and the need for coordination among disparate research
approaches is noted.
Every research tradition has its own idea why its work is justified in its context; human
social and cultural phenomena are multifaceted and can be fruitfully understood from many
angles, difficult to tally, let alone reconcile. For social research in general, the implication
from chapter 9 is that an account produced in a study needs to be in some meaningful way
semiotically closed with the empirical phenomena it examines, on top of other assump-
tions; as Anderson (2017, sec. 6) pointed out, we can be prejudiced but not dogmatic. In
starting the more encompassing contexts of conversations among these efforts, the question
becomes what common points can link studies across a diversity of perspectives.
If, as is argued, sociocultural dynamics are in some part evolutionary, explanation starts
with the four questions (Tinbergen 1963): how does it manifest in our actions, how is it
learned or reproduced, what is the history, what does it shape and what shapes it. It would
benefit any research tradition, thus, to choose whom to trust on those of the stances it does
not address, and to pursue common study interests. For competing accounts of the same
phenomenon, one can compare and contrast all four explanations and methods that justify
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them, then ask the evolutionary and potentially difficult question: cui bono? To whom are
they informative and what good or ill can they do?
Chapter 10 briefly discusses the logistical challenges of coordinating many disparate
perspectives. Such exchanges, it is argued, would need to overcome academic institutional
limitations against extensive (widely publicly available) and diffuse (versatile but interact-
ing) ways to coordinate. An eventual prize goal is a network of conversations, potentially
self-reinforcing and supracritical with respect to the breadth of societies and cultures, in
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